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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
Following a sharp critique of the extreme form of 
the "verification theory" of meaning, according to which a 
~tatement is to be regarded as mea~ful only if it is 
possible to establish it as determinately true or false, 
Reichenbach proposes a more liberal criterion: a statement 
is to be considered as meaningful only if it is possible to 
attach to it a "weight," where weight is associated with a 
probability coefficient interpreted as a relative frequency. 
As to the status of impressions, Reichenbach holds that we 
do not apprehend them directly, and argues that their 
existence is simply "interred" with some degree of probabil-
ity. The most satisfactory epistemological basis for the 
logical construction of the world is found in direct 
observations of concrete objects# and starting from such a 
basis Reichenbach outlines the chains of probability 
inferences which hold together the various parts of our 
knowledge. Probability, it turns out, is a triadic 
rela.tion whose terms are propositional functions and the 
ordered pairs of terms which satisfy them. No proposition 
has, by itself, any degree of probability. The numerical 
value of the ratio of certain truth-frequencies as these 
-1-
increase without limit (i.e., in an infinite series). It 
is to be determined on objective, empirical grounds, and 
must not be regarded either as the measure or belief or as 
some unique, unanalyzable relation between pairs or single 
propos i tiona • 
Reichenbach comes to grips with the difficulties 
which race the theory when probability is defined as the 
limiting value of a ratio in an infinite series. For, it 
has been argued, if the value or a probability is to be 
determined empirically, and since empirically we can 
examine no more than a finite series, propositions 
asserting determinate probabilities are unverifiable and 
thus not empirical. The force or this argument has led 
recently to attempts at a "finitistic 11 frequency theory 
which is to avoid the notion or limit in the definition or 
probability. Reichenbach points out that such a finitistic 
theory would render it impossible to make predictions on 
the basis of probability judgments. He is therefore led 
to break the force or the objection partly by developing 
the notion of probabilities or higher orders (judgments of 
probability are themselves only probable, etc.); and 
partly by developing a multi-valued logic with a continuous 
scale or truth-values. To achieve this aim, Reichenbach 
thinks it is necessary to view statements assigning deter-
minate probabilities not as propositions which are either 
2 
true or false, but as wagers which have probability values 
anywhere from 0 to 1. The determination of probability 
coefficients is itself achieved by means or a series or 
such 1wagerings 1 which progressively approximate more and 
more closely to the limiting value (assuming there is such 
a limit) of the frequencies investigated. The procedure is 
not unlike Peirce 1s self-corrective method of sampling in 
order to ascertain the composition of classes. Both 
endorse the formulation as the principle of induction, 
Reichenbach regarding it as the sole methodological 
principle required to discover the laws of nature and as a 
definitive solution of the problem of induction. 
It shall be our purpose not only to present (with 
some degree of technical precisement) an adequate analysis 
of the construction of the theory itself, but to delve into 
the labyrinth of interacting frameworks from which it 
evolved and to investigate the contemporary implications of 
its revolutionary conclusions as well. 
3 
CHAPl'BR I 
NECESSITY OF NORMATIVE FUNCTION 
1. As Independent Tautological Projection 
It is the experienced person who, in personally 
adjusting his degree of expectation to cope with the various 
degrees of circumstance must realize, if he fully exploits 
each Circumstance 1 that hiS COOrdinating Standard-of-adjUSt-
ment must be defined outside of each expectation. The 
visual preference for Euclidean space, therefore, for 
example, cannot depend on its special suitability for the 
visualiza.tion of natural objects, but instead on an inherent 
property which can be formulated quite independently of 
external "things." Such an inherent condition shall be 
defined as the normative function governing the empirical 
visualization of a particular point in space. Or rather, 
the normative function upon which the intelligibility of all 
external geometrical interpretations depends. We are here 
attempting to define the actual laws of the human mind, 
independent of their historical development. It is not in 
the least embarrassing. 
There appear to be two major alternative directions. 
The first of these would be to accept Kant's concept of 
-4-
'pure visualization' ( "anschauung") as the isomorphically 
corresponding form of any empirical visualization (which 
would then be the content of that form). Of course, such a 
view entails the assertion that without a 1-1 reference to 
external reality such a form would represent merely an 
5 
empty notion, the mere shadow of a concept, with no epistemo-
logical (perceptual) significance whatsoever. Such an 
assertion leads to the positing of pure visualization (which 
in this case applies solely to Euclidean objects) as 
a priori in the sense that the normative function of visual~ 
zation (Kantiant:tipriori 'forms of the sensibilities 1 ) must 
be interpreted as being of visual origin. 
The alternative view holds that the normative 
function of visualization, which we shall define as the 
tautological axioms determining the geometrical relations, 
is formulated independently of any specific empirical 
application and is thus of logical origin. 
2. Why A Euclidean Normative Function? 
Lqi1cally speaking, Euclidean space is 'simpler' 
than non-Euclidean spaces (as a circle is mathematically 
'simpler 1 than an ellipse). Yet a return to 'ythagorian 
reification results if we claim that an ellipse is mathe-
matically unreasonable and therefore, the inferior figure. 
The simplicity of Euclidean geometry is irrelevant in the 
face of the philosophical foundations of geometry and its 
logical priority is therefore not justifiable in the sense 
of being epistemologically superior. 
In tact, do not the axioms of Euclidean visuali-
zation, in defining each element independently, automati-
cally exclude all other possible interpretations? 
Consider: 
(1) We interpret spatial objects as conforming to 
Euclidean axioms; 
(2) The reason for this interpretation stemming from 
the logical simplicity involved in correlating Euclidean 
objects to "things"; 
(3) Therefore, "simplicity" has become a justifiable 
criterion for defining such terms as "intuitive," "self-
evidence," ••a priori," and 11 pure vis ua liza tion"; 
(4) Consequently, ·such point-definitions, in their 
Euclidean perfection and thus by requiring the temporal 
concomitance of both the normative function as well as the 
empirical visualization of the normative function, by their 
very definition presuppose ~ self-evident such words as 
"immediacy" (and thus "analyticity"). 
6 
Contrary to such a limiting view, we shall propose 
that a certain triangle does not appear as being constructed 
in accordance with the Euclidean normative because it is 
7 
Euclidean, but because it gives empirical (physical) meaning 
to the logically derived normative construct of Euclidean 
axioms. The fact that we can think of an axiomatic system 
of relations only in terms of concrete objects does not 
change its independent and purely logical significance. The 
inadequacy of such an intuitive view of pure geometrical 
visualization which accommodates only a Euclidean perspective 
must be readily admitted upon the extension of such a set of 
axioms (by generalization; not by annihilation) to cover a 
wider, more richly endowed, and less historically biased 
externality. This can be accomplished, it will be,·s.hown, by 
replacing (by generalization) the correspondence theory of 
point-definitions with a theory of implicit (relative) ~­
functional definitions. By thus extending the conditions of 
•straightness,• for example, we shall seek to establish a 
normative function of the thinking process which will be 
able to guide the pictorial elements of our thinking into 
any number of logically permissible spatial structures, and 
all evolving from the same normative function. This 
surrealistic logistic is feasible because we avoid the 
mistake of isomorphically equating 'existence• with 1truth. 1 
The question or the truth of a particular axiom in a 
geometrical theory does not ariSe in mathematical geometry 
Which deals exclusively with implications and is therefore a 
purely deductive system. Accordingly, "point" and "line" 
8 
have no meaning other than that which is determined by 
their properties as formulated in the axioms. These are 
arbitrarily fixed relations the content or which can be 
expressed by certain combinations cor logical concepts alone, 
and which can be replaced Just as well by any other con-
sistent combination of basic concepts. This is to say that 
in introducing the concept of 11relation," the concept of 
11point," or "line, 11 as independently defined •entities • in 
space must be abandoned. Such "points , 11 and "lines 11 have 
' ' 
no such uniqueness; their only significance is obtained 
from (and only in connection with) other axioms; they are 
neither true nor false. Following this line of present-
ation, there can be no special (pure or intuitively self-
evident) kind or geometrical visualization. 
Why does the physicist in front of an electric 
switch turn the handle or move the wire into a certain 
position? If we were able to look into his mind, as we 
are able to "look into" a motion picture, we would find no 
images of' voltages and lights 'per se,' but invariably the 
sketch of a black curve on graph paper; sinister in its 
portrayal, the eternal backdrop of his comprehension. His 
inner eye sees curves that increase, intersect, or 
decrease, and points traveling along a curve by means or 
switches. To this man the most frequent visualizations of 
external occurrences are representations given solely in 
terms or a mode or spatial relations that completely 
replaces direct pictorialization. The control or natural 
phenomena has been achieved by means or mathematical 
concepts which are defined (in the geometrical theory or 
relations) by implicit definitions and are not dependent 
on a unique and specific kind or visualization. The final 
choice or objects we wish to coordinate to these relative 
definitions is up to us. To repeat: •• the final coordin-
ation is completely arbitrary; "arbitrary" being a word 
which has the unreservedly audacious and thus disturbing 
syntax or pointing. "Choice" becomes the only alternative. 
The questions naturally arise: Do we actually coordinate 
here anything but ideal structures? Do we~ 1n fact, 
coordinate physical things? We shall hold that we do 
' indeed coordinate physical "th1ngs~ 11 but 'that we are so 
accustomed to the coordination of rigid (Euclidean) bodies 
to mathematical topology as a theory or relations that we 
no longer notice that there really exists a duality 1n this 
.. 
respect. Irregardless, it is a coordination. 
For example~ let us suppose that we have, on the 
one hand~ the mathematical axioms 1A 1 or Euclidean 
relations~ and on the other the physical system 1a 1 or 
rigid bodies. While the axioms themselves are neither 
synthetic nor analytic~ true nor false, but merely 
defin,tions, every assertion about 1A1 can be translated 
9 
10 
into an assertion about •a 1 • Thus it is customary to use 
assertions about •a• alone which are symbolic of assertions 
about 'A 1 • Thus we shall feel no strain 1n calling •a 1 the 
visual space of 'A 1 • Mathematical geometry, grounded on a 
theory of relative, set-functional definitions, thus 
becomes visual. The system •a 1 is a space either of pure 
visualization or of empirical visualization, depending on 
our decision to invent the objects in •a 1 GE 1fioo 1 them in 
nature and 'invent• our interpretation (our approximation) 
of them. 
3. Empirical Visualization as Graphic Re-~resentation 
The so-called •visual' geometry is thus already a 
graphical re-presentation; a mapping of the relational 
structure 1A1 upon the system •a• of real objects. In this 
sense it becomes possible to represent even purely logical 
structures in graphical form. It must be understood, 
however, that this re-presentation of normative geometrical 
relations by systems of objects is more than a mere matter 
of convenience and that it rests on the basic necessity of 
human thinking. Although it has not been explicitly 
formulated as of yet, a symbolic representation which 
supplies a concrete model of abstract relations must be at 
least partially assimilated as necessary from the very outsEt. 
Although thinking completely without symbols would 
seem to be impossible, it is most urgent that we avoid the 
mistaken consequence that the chosen symbols (e.g., those 
representing Euclidean objects) are essential for the 
content or thought. 
11 
The choice of •a' (Euclidean), or •a'• (a non-
Euclidean visualization), are or course only two out of 
many possible selections. By reevaluating (and therefore 
replacing) A, we admit A:. ~a'• replaces •a•. Neverthe-
less, the existence of the dual aspect must be preserved. 
This is to say that the fact that we can think of a system 
of relations only in terms or concrete objects does not 
alter its independent and purely logical significance, that 
1 is, the implicit system or relations as tautologies only. 
The point to be remembered at this stage is that the visual 
elements composing the geometrical framework of one's 
environment cannot be exhaustively defined by the basic 
logical concepts alone. In other words, there always 
remains an arbitrary factor governing the identification of 
the basic axioms with their empirical visualizations. The 
axiomatic system cannot exhaust the visual content of its 
elements and its relations, whereas just such an 'exhaustion' 
is accomplished, a priori, if we were to accept the 
alternative view of epistemic correspondence and so-called 
~he notion of 'duality-necessity' will be discussed 
in detail in the concluding sections or this presentation. 
12 
'pure 1 visualization. Thus, due to the necessity of defin-
ing empirical visualization as a graphical re-presentation 
of a normative axiomatic, the concept of the symbol and its 
syntactical implications assumes an essential rSle in the 
multi-fluctuations of human thought. Nevertheless, as we 
have stressed, the chosen symbol (e.g., •a•) is not neces• 
sarily essential for the content of all interpretations of 
a certain situation, yet it must reflect the particular 
axiomatic structure from which it evolved. Thus symbols 
found in a particular order of things, when properly 
inspected and diagnosed as being 'legitimate• symbolic 
representations, consequently reveal, not the normative 
topology behind the actual external world, but the influ-
ences of the categories of the mind which govern the 
interpretation of the actual world. There must be some 
"thing" which requires interpretation. So it is that we 
shall agree with Quine's essentially phenomenalistic 
departure. Thus, although solipsism is destroyed, idealism 
remains intact. The question is, g~ven a 'given,• and 
accepting such a 1given 1 as given, which normative function, 
which set of axioms, are we to choose in interpreting such 
a 1given 1? Indeed, the question actually becomes 11which 
set of axioms did we choose in accepting the 1given 1 as 
given, in the first place?" We must work in reverse, 
inversely, that is all. 
CHAPl'ER II 
:QIALECTICAL EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA 
l. Motionlessness of Diametrical Symmetry 
Existence is one thing, he says, and subsistence 
is another. The only way I know of coping with this 
obfuscation of issues is to give Wyman the word 
•exist.• I'll try not to use it again; I still have 
1is. \ 
The concern is with the building of a bridge 
between the sharply defined but artificial country of 
mathematical logic and the nebulous shadowy domain of what 
is often called the real world. The problem is obvious. 
It is blunt. It is crudely positioned so that it is 
frequently touched and aborted 1n public places. It is, 
in fact, fondled with the wildest indifference in the midst 
of the largest, best intentioned crowds. But remember, I 
said it was 1blunt 1 to begin with. It is the problem 
which arises both before and after knowledge is defined; 
the problem of separating out how much of knowledge is 
contributed by language and how much is a reflection of 
reality •naked,' as it were, to compare it with reality 
lw.v.o. Quine, From A Logical Point of View {Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 3. 
-13-
conceptualized so as to see what the conceptualization 
introduces which wasn't originally there, or what of 
reality is included in the conceptualization. 
Though the stock "descriptive" phrase covering the 
above circumstance is invariably structured in much the 
14 
same way, such as "lingua-centric predicament, 11 nevertheless, 
the clich4-illusion quickly suicides itself into a myriad 
of diverse (and sometimes strangely perverse) interpre-
tations. The point in question thus becomes, not the 
1lingua-centric 1 starting point agreed on by 1all 1 (shall 
we say for the sake of point), but rather the process, or 
rather, the rules governing the process from this point to 
a resulting ontology. The point 1n question thus actually 
levels down to one of basic presuppositions, i.e., to one's 
definition of meanigg, explicitly stated. Naturally (?) 
every philosopher feels that his definition (and thus his 
presuppositions) must be unique, in a word, his own. Yet, 
apparently this feeling itself is not 1unique 1 for the 
alternatives somehow seem to limit themselves. This is to 
say that X is controlled by non-X as its opposition. 
Yet, a point to consider concerning the general 
teleology of this paper would be that of redefining the 
•spatial' relations of the two contradictory views as not 
being diametrically opposed, but as evolving, one upon the 
death of the other. This suggestion of 'opposition 1 in the 
15 
Hegelean sense requires, of course, the prior redefinition 
of "alternative." This is to say that non-X does not occur 
simultaneously as the immediate •spatial' opposite of X, 
but is present only in its conspicuous absence. It is from 
mid-stage and while in full costume that the following 
assertion is distinctly voiced and quite well received at 
all points of the theatre: 
The thesis or the reality of the [external J thing 
world cannot be among ••• statements, because it 
cannot be formulated in the thing language or, it 
seems, in any other theoretical language.1 
At this precise moment of utterance, 'slouching towards 
Bethlehem 1 as it were, the counter-statement is inevitably 
being scribbled together (perhaps on a dusty prop in the 
wings) proclaiming, in this case, that the antic picture 
"can be got by quantifying over non-linguistic objects. "2 
Although here are clearly two alternative positions stated 
within the same framework (viz., from the mutual acceptance 
of the distinction between the material and the formal modes 
of being founded upon a two-valued.framework), nevertheless, 
they are not diametrically placed in the timeless coition 
of opposition. By coherently examining the raul ts of the 
former the latter can be shown to evolve. Progressing 
lRudolf carnap, Meaning and Necessity (University of 
Chicago Press, 1947), p. 208. 
2w .v .o. Quine. Word and Object (The Technology 
Press of M.I.T., 1960), p. 273. 
16 
still further ('dialectically') we shall contend that by 
examining the content of both1 singularly and 1n mediation 1 
from the point of view of a more inclusive perspective that 
a third 'alternative • will evolve, adequate 1n the unique-
ness of its construction to bridge the so-called 1gap 1 
I 
between the so-oalled 'modes of be1ng. 1 
2. carnap 1s Thesis: Verbal Quantification; 
Non-verbal Neglect 
It is characteristic of Carnap•s initial prejudice 
that he explain 1analytio~ty 1 by appeal to what he calls 
"state-descriptions" which can be called contextual 
definitions. These give "a complete description of a 
possible state of the universe of individuals with respect 
to all properties and relations expressed by predicates of 
1 the system." 
It is characteristic of carnap 1s procedure that he 
applies the methods of mathematical logic in structuring 
his contextual framework for the construction of concepts. 
The method does not define isolated concepts as traditional 
logic defined them. Instead, a whole sentence contairt:lg 
the new concept is defined by a sentence (or a group of 
sentences) of a completely different logical structure. 
lcarnap, op. cit., p. g. 
17 
In this way~ what is defined is not a concept~ but a sentenm 
in which a given concept occurs. Thus Carnap would define 
the sentence 'Material objects eXist• by the sentence 'There 
are certain regularities between perceptions.• 
Thus Carnap provides a strictly formal context with-
in which all meaningful (analytic) statements must originate~ 
be tested~ and negated ••• all in the same gestalt. 
It' ir:is any atomic sentence ins~ a state-description 
for S must either affirm or deny i~ hence it must 
affirm exactly one sentence of the basic pair i, rv i • 
Every possible state can be described by a class of 
sentences from every basic pair in s.1 
Statements defined in this way, i.e.~ contextually, he calls 
"L-true" which he likens to Leibniz •s necessary truth 
(necessarily true for all possibleworlds) and Kant's analy-
tic truth. such a state-description, or L-truth is any 
exhaustive assignment or truth values to the atomic, or non-
compound statements or the language. All other statements 
or the language are, carnap assumes, built up or their 
component clauses by means or the familiar logical devices~ 
in such a way that the truth value of any complex statement 
is fixed for each state-description by specifiable logical 
laws. A- statement is then explained as analytic when it 
comes out true under every state-description. It is that 
limiting case which is confirmed no matter what, or again, 
it is true by virtue of meaning which, derived entirely from 
lcarnap, Lotical Foundations of Probabilit~ (Chicago: Universl y of Chicago Press, 1950), p.l. 
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linguistic framework 1 is independent of fact (and is thus 
represented by synthetic, or theoretical statements) which 
remains unanalyzable. It should now be made clear that 
Carnap clearly posits and explicitly distinguishes between 
these two types of existence questions, viz. 1 questions 
concerning new kinds of entities within the framework 
(which he calls "internal questions") and questions con-
cerning the independent existence of the entities (called 
external, or theoretical questions). General sentences 
concerning the new entities can be formulated with the help 
of variables, the values of which~ the new entities. 
Now, although Carnap makes it clear that "whoever makes an 
internal assertion is certainly obliged to justify it by 
1 providing evidence," he likewise demands that all such 
•evidence• is visually the internal consistency within the 
linguistic framework. To justify such evidence entails no 
external (theoretical or intentional) concern whatsoever, 
but 1s1mply 1 demands that the new entity be "expedient and 
fruitful" in the construction a language of interpretation, 
the purpose of which (viz., communication) will determine 
2 
which factors are relevant for the decisions." 
1carnap, Meaning and Necessity, op. cit., p. 218. 
2 Ibid. I p. 208. 
Thus carnap condones the use of bound variables to 
refer to abstract entities known and unknown, specifiable 
and unspecifiable, indiscriminately. These abstrata are 
properties, classes, numbers, propositions, etc. It is 
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within their structural tautological relation alone that 
meaning is found. It is with this in mind that he categorio-
ally denies the meaningful existence of independent extern-
a liza t ions : 
There is no danger in speaking of propositions and 
classes of propositions provided it is done in a 
cautious way, that is to say, in a way which care-
fully abstains from any reification or hypostati-
zation of propositions, in other words, from the 
attribution of propositions of anything that can 
correctly be contributed only to things.1 
Carnap holds that the use of abstract entities does 
not imply a 'latonic ontology. That is to say, that enti-
ties like properties, classes, relations, numbers, 
propositions, etc., are defined entirely within the bounds 
of a "linguistic framework, 11 and that any external statement 
as to the reality (or value) of 'properties,• for example, 
is "devoid of cognitive content."2 For this reason, 
"external questions of the reality of physical space and 
physical time are pseudo-questions"3 unless, that is, such 
1 Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, op. cit., 
p. 71. 
2 
carnap, Meaning and Necessity, op. cit., p. 212. 
3Ibid., p. 213. 
questions were "meant as an internal question; then the 
1 
affirmative answer is, of course, analytic and trivial." 
Thus, all external concern, that is, all questions con-
cerning externality, 'per se', are drained of cognitive 
significance. 
3. Carnap 's Paradox 
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For each synthetic statement S there is a unique 
set of possible sensory events which would confirm S and 
likewise a unique set of possible sensory events which 
would dis-confirm S. Thus every synthetic sentence must 
have an isolable, distinguishable counterpart in experience 
(viz., its own empirical meaning, so to speak), and 
experience would then be able to dictate whether or not the 
sentence was to be accepted into the body of knowledge, or 
rejected. Consider: 
Synthetic statements 
carnap would assume that the factual component (X) boils 
down to a range of verifiable instances (i.e., that X 
exists, 1per se~ in the physical world and can be measuredl). 
It is range of verifiable, or confirmatory instances that is 
the "empirical meaning 11 of the statement. 
1carnap, Meaning and Necessity, op. cit., p. 213. 
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This position consists in the supposition that the 
statement is the unit of significance involving the con-
ception that a single statement, since it names (or purports 
to name) something, can therefore be significant on its own. 
Only after '!X' has been verified (which implies the external 
I I ) existence, per se, of X can 'X is moving' be confirmed. 
The assumption is that 'F(~1 is true because 1X 1 is true. 
Therefore I ax• must be a unit or empirical significance 
because it refers "isomorphically" ( Carnap 1s own wording) to 
its external counter-part, X. Thus, 
•x • :l x or, 
(X)F :) ( 3 X)FX. 
The question arises, Why 1s it an error to suppose that 
statements are individually significant? Why is it in 
error to suppose_, that 
1 ( ?x)( ••• X ••• )• ) '( 3 X)IPX 1? 
For Carnap to do this presupposes the definition of 
"analytic" as that-which.;.is-true-by-virtue-or-meaning-alone. 
Furthermore, carnap 1s state-description method (a statement 
is analytic if true for every state-description in the 
language) succeeds only if all atomic sentences of the 
language are mutually independent. This notion is as hard 
to explain as 11analytic. 11 Thus Carnap 1s principle of 
individual empirical significance or unit statements (which 
utilizes a theory of empirical reference) presupposes a 
pure definition of "analytic" which itself presupposes 
. ' definition of "independent" (which, since true by virtue 
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of •meaning-alone, 1 is non.:.reterential) • Thus, it we try 
to define analytic as true a priori, we must separate 
meaning from reference, and when this is done we recognize 
that meanings, as obscure intermediary entities (e.g., X, 
1per se~ phY!ically existing, if indeed 1FX 1 ) must be 
abandoned. This is to say that for Carnap unit signifi-
cance implies a 1-l isomorphic correspondence between the 
stateme:Q.t (or mather the variable i:Q the statement) and its 
objective counterpart (that is, the value of the variable). 
If this is accepted however, we run into a contradiction 
when we attempt to apply it (viz., the theory of meaning 
•via' reference) to a definition of •analyticity• itself 
(which must be axiomatically assumed to be defined by 
virtue of meaning-alone). Carnap 1merely 1 says 11if 
'(X)FX • [or, 'electrons move 1 ] is true, therefore, this must 
imply • ( 3 X)FX 1 [or, that electrons as singular terms exist, 
1per se1]." 
The results, Quine thinks, is that it can no longer 
be maintained that the truth of an individual statement can 
be distinguished into a linguistic (verbal, analytic) and 
factual (non-verbal, synthetic) component. 
Taken collectively, science has its double 
dependence upon language and experience; but 
this duality is not significantly traceable into 
the statements of science taken one by one.l 
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This seems to imply that one cannot attribute anything like 
individual significance to a statement, but only to some-
thing more complete. Consider the following distinctions 
at question: 
a priori 
analytic 
verbal 
internal 
linguistic 
invented 
logical 
a posteriori 
synthetic 
non-verbal 
external 
factual 
discovered 
physical 
For Quine, to explicitly state a primary difference 
between these two 'modes of being' weuld be to affirm mean-
ing as a theory of names in which 1X1 is meaningful only in 
so far as it names x. In this sense, carnap's "isomorphic 
correspondence" reduces to such a theory of names in which 
the two 1modes 1 are totally independent. Consequently, for 
Quine's counter-theory, synthetic external entities do not 
exist independently of analyticity. While science depends 
upon both human and non-human factors, one cannot 
distinguish these two factors within science (if one was to 
accept Carnap 1s view of meaning) for this would suppose 
unit-significance which would itself presuppose a 
definition of "independence," in this case between human 
and non-human factors. 
lQuine, From a Logical Point of View, op. cit., 
p. 42. 
Thus it would appear that we must recognize the 
presence of both empirical and non-empirical factors in 
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I 
knowledge as both inescapable and indistinguishable. This 
is clearly a contradiction, yet it is a consequence of a 
referential definition of meaning. Surely to state that the 
two factors of knowledge are indistinguishable presupposes 
their initial distinction, or at least some form or dis-
tinction. But this is just the point. By endowing single 
unit-statements with responsibility to both synthetic and 
analytic realms 1 thus making them meaningful by their 
empirical reference (or referring), we are stuck with the 
initial presupposition of dichotomy (or mutual independence) 
which cannot (by definition) be defined. The only 
alternative in this case, since unit-statements endowed with 
referential meaning themselves presuppose the definitions of 
"analyticity" and "independence" which cannot (and thus do 
not) have referential meaning, is to redefine the meaning of 
1meaning 1 so as to liberate single statements from the 
necessity of isomorphic reference in order to be significan~ 
This is to say that unit-statements alone (unrelated, un-
paraphrased) must be considered meaningless in the sense of 
referring or naming something in the external world. 
Isomorphic objective reference cannot be presupposed as 
necessary for meaning. The question naturally arises as to 
how this can be accomplished totally from the analytical 
(logical) point or view without immediately referring non-
verbally, or objectively for significance. How else, if 
not empirically verifiable bJ a range or confirmatory 
events can the unit statement be acclaimed as significant? 
We have tried to show that since this way obviously leads 
to paradoxical presuppositions that it cannot be logically 
accepted and that an answer to "how else" must be devised. 
It is in much the same manner that irrational numbers were 
'discovered,' resulting from the impossibility or the 
alternative ~integer-explanation required for the 
definition or the continuum. 
4. Quine 1s Antithesis: Verbal-Non-Verbal 
Significance Through Paraphrasing 
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It is with this re-evaluation in mind that we shall 
follow the lines set down by Quine and "divorce" meaning 
' ' 
from the object and "wed 11 it to the word. This shall be 
accomplished by acknowledging so-called immediate unit-
statements as meaningless in themselves. Faithful to our 
new criterion we shall require no objective referential 
capacity or these statements, whatsoever. But this is not 
why they, in themselves, are meaningless, for this would 
reverberate into the same Carnapian presupposition from 
which we are supposedly escaping. The fact is that due to 
the construction of our linguistic framework no single 
names, or unit statements, exist as being either true or 
false. Unrelated they are insignificant. But they are 
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also insignificant if objectively related as referring to 
that to which they refer. Thus, granting that· 'relation 1 is 
necessary for significance, is this necessarily acknowledg-
ing isomorphic synonymity of the subjective unit-statement 
with objective unit-value as the only definition of relation? 
Is it not possible that we invent (from within our logical 
framework) the named object? Is it not thus more probable 
that external dependence as we must pictorialize it in 
order to conceptualize things at all is, in fact, a mythical 
security? 
As an example of the unit-statement let us use (as 
Quine does), not the name "Pegasus, 11 but the simple notation 
itself, 'Pegasus.• Now, 
there is just something wrong about admitting that 
•Pegasus• can ever have purely referential position 
in truths and falsehoods; for the intuitive idea 
behind 'purely referential position' was supposed 
to be that the term is used purely to specify its 
object.1 
And concluding with an appropriate 'understatement•: 
Singular terma which, like 'Pegasus,• lack their 
objects thus raise problems.2 
1Quine, Word and Object, op. cit., P• 177. 
2Ibid. 
For the mere occurrance of "truth-value gaps"-
(cases where the question of truth value does not arise, 
for example, 1Pegasus 1 )--would be the cause of irksome 
complications to deductive theory, which assumes the con-
firmability of unit-statementsand therefore of singular 
terms, if allowed for. Thus it turns out that since we 
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do, in fact, attach significance to the term 'Pegasus,• 
these positions that we have been classifying into purely 
referential positions are actually positions of singular 
terms relative to sentences that contain them, and not to 
an objective counterpartl It follows that simply in order 
to intelligibly conceive of the single entity Y~egasus• we 
must relate it {or rather, we must first analyze it as-
related) so that which has a truth-valve, i~e., to that 
which its description describes. This cannot be 
accomplished, however, until the single term has been 
transformed into a "singular description" {viz., the 
attributes of •Pegasus• that describe 'Pegasus•). Such 
singular descriptions donot refer objectively for notation, 
yet they do not stand alone. For we must note that Quine 
himself supposes (and this is essentiall) that all singular 
entities which can only be "uttered" as singular~ descrip-
tions are, nevertheless, in-themselves, 11truth-v~lue gaps" 
and thus linguistically intelligible, or assertable. It is, 
from the fact that we do assert singular descriptions that 
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we must infer an object for them to describe. Since this 
object does not •exist' (i.e., externally, physically), 
therefore it follows that we presuppose, in all assertions, 
an object which merely 1is 1 , viz., a "mythical" object. In 
short, Q.uine assumes that all assertions imply conformity 
to (or acceptance of) a two-valued logical framework, but 
admits that this is a "man-made fabric which impinges on 
experience [singular descriptions in the phenomenalistic 
1 
sense] only along the edges." 
5. Quine 1s Elimination of Carnap 's Paradox 
By Elimination or Singular Terms 
Quine 1s motive for changing the singular terms into 
singular descriptions and then •analyzing them out,• thus 
leaving only the mythical object as the core or our 
language structure, is not founded on an a priori defini-
tion or •analytic,• or 'independence,• but stems only from 
an a posteriori desire for better communication and logical 
application. His motive is explicitly pragmatic in that 
singular terms and descriptions must be paraphrased out to 
2 
resolve ambiguity in language. 
1Quine, Frsm a Logical Point or View, op. cit., p. 18. 
2Perhaps it should be stated here that we shall not 
agree that a communication dynamics must necessarily be 
grounded in Quine's (and Russell's) paraphrasing teleology 
suggesting that the communication or information must take 
place solely within the bounds or a two-valued framework. 
But in all fairness it must be noted that Quine does not ex-
plicitly attach an alternative-logic schemata to all possib~ 
linguistic framework, but only to the existing 'predicament.• 
Singular nouns which are non-referential and have 
no truth-value can always be expanded into singular des-
criptions and then analyzed out (! la Russell). 
or, 
'Pegasus• becomes 1Pegasizing 1 
I ?xI becomes ' (?X) ( ••• x ••. ) • 
~
any sentence containing 'X • 
in purely referential posi-
tion. 
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We shall call the resulting expression ("utterance") of 1 ? X' 
(which we noted'<? X) ( ••• x ••• ) I) S, or the basic singular 
description: which (1) has no truth value; (2) has no 
explicit reference (due to indicator words 11here," ,.how") 
and, therefore, (3) is ambiguous. Our job will be to 
transform S into S 1 which will eliminate ambiguity and 
thus, increase the general information through the use of 
general terminology. It must be noted that 
What we are seeking is not a synonymous sentence, 
but one that is more informative by dint of 
resisting some alternative interpretations.1 
Thus •paraphrasing' which is inventive cannot be 
equated with 'synonymy' which is mechanical. This, of 
course, was Carnap's trouble, for "in the pattest of para-
phrasing one courts confusion and obscurity by imagining 
2 
some absolute synonymy as goal." Consequently, "eking 
1Quine, Word and Object, op. cit., p. 159. 
2Ibid., p. 161. 
out descriptions is pragmatic, like settling ambiguities, 
tenses, and indicator words."1 Therefore, 
given: = s • I ( I) X} ( • • • X • • • } ' 
where •x• = singular term 
and 1 •• .X ••• 1 • sentence with 1X 1 , 
and since • ••• x .•• • is purely referen-
tial, therefore, we can substitute the 
identity 1y 1 for the singular descrip-
tion 1 ( ?x)( ••• x ••• ) •, 
i.e., 1 y = ( ? X)( ••• x ••• } ~ 
The standard position of 'X' thus becomes 1=X' 
e.g., 'Pegasus• becomes 1pegasizing 1 and since we 
cannot assert 1pegasizing 1 without assuming that-
object-which-is-pegasizing consequently 1•X 1 becomes 
the verb F of Fy ( 1y is pegasizing 1 ). 
Thus we have eliminated the singular noun 'Pegasus' 
('X t) • 
Likewise singular descriptions can be eliminated by para-
phrasing: 
given ' (?X) ( •• .X ••• ) • 
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we obtain a larger amount of information by equating it 
with an object (which it 1purports 1 to describe ••• but 
all this takes place within the linguistic framework): 
1 Ibid., p. 183. (No synonymy claim is involved for 
••paraphrasing depends on what we are trying to prove o~ 
find out." Ibid.) 
1Y = (?x)( •• .x •.• )1 
Now in order to eliminate this equa. tion we simply para-
phrase 
t y & ( ? X) ( • • .X • •.) 1 
as 1 (X)( ••• x ••• if and only if X = y) • which states in 
briefer form 
• ••• y ••• and y only' ( 1 y 1 being our new mythical 
object referred to]. 
Now, to affirm •(?x)( •• .x ••• )1 
is to say I ( 7 X) ( ••• X ••• ) exists 1 which can now be para-
phrased as 
1 (3 y) (X) ( ••• x ••• if and only if X • y) 
\ J 
. "' 
(which is the case, since 
• y • ( ? X) ( ••• X ••• ) • is 
paraphrased as '(X) { ••• x ••• 
if and only if X • y} which 
states in briefer form 
1 ••• y ••• and y only']. 
The above statement is the same as saying 
: • ( J y) ( ••• y. • • and y only ).1 
This statement is what Quine calls a "canonical notation." 
Although it has eliminated all singular descriptions (by 
paraphrasing) and thus does not purport to name, neverthe-
less, it is in intensional agreement with the original 
statement 1 ( ? X) ( ••• X ••• ) • • 
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Thus, as we have seen, 
Quine (via Russell) has thus shown us ways of 
paraphrasing sentences; a method we shall consider essen-
tial only in so far as gaining clarity of structure a~ 
economy of linguistic constructions in a communication-
schema is concerned {i.e., is the 1end 1 sought). Quine 
has repeatedly pointed out tbat this can be accomplished 
at ,.little or no cost except of brevity and familiarity 
of expression," and it is clear that due to the awkward-
ness of relative experience (or occasion) situations, 
which (by definition as a 1new• expe~ience) continually 
presents us with supplementary data, we must, for the sake 
of coherentaxmnunication, concomitantly posit supple-
mentary abstract entities as "surrogate truth vehicles." 
That this posit is not to remain entirely on the 
philosopher's conscience can be seen by inspecting the 
limiting structures of our language. (But, of course. 
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this is the problem and 'problematic' situations inevitably 
recapitulate, by definition, the philosopher's environment). 
1Ibid., p. 183. (Underlining mine). 
In fact, it must become our 1po1nt at issue 1 that man ..£!!!. 
(indeed does) direct the governing principles of' his 
semantic security, even though he must remain somewhat 
subservient to them throughout the process. So it is-M. 
present that Simone de Beauvoir 's woman is the 11 second 
sex"; it is at present that the Negro in the south is 
(statistically) economiaally and intellectually 11 inf'eriortt 
to his white counterpart (irregardless of' the causal 
factors involved); likewise, it is in the present that 
ordinary language by purporting myth-objects and myth-
object-designators fantastically embedded in the most 
unsuspecting levels of' its structure, often purports the 
illusion of' a timeless necessity of' a hidden ontology, 
likewise embedded and likewise purporting • The simplest 
of' these 'myth-designators' is the 1that 1 clauses with 
'that' as co~nction, not as relative or demonstrative 
pronoun. Such clauses function grammatically, we have 
seen, as singular terms thus evidently purporting to 
designate something. It is these purported objects that 
the philosopher takes up and calls 'propositions.• In the 
foregoing 'example' such singular terms were included in 
the canonical notation as "propositional abstractions•• 
("Pegasus"----'-~)"Pegasizing,'' or the F of' F(x», which 
recognized mythical objects. (propositions) which were 
designated (viz., that-which-is-pegasizing, or X in FX). 
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Since a prominent use of the 'that' clauses is to 
be employed as grammatical objects of the so-called verbs 
(X of FX) of propositional attitudes, we found ourselves 
taking propositions in particular as the things that 
people believe (or don't believe), affirm (or deny), wish, 
etc. 
By the very nature of the elimination technique, 
propositions stayed on as denizens of the universe 
alluded to in the 'everything 1 and 'something • of 
• (X) • and 1 (3 X) 1 ; as values, in short, of the 
variables.1 
By •value' Quine means 
The object designated by such a term [ 1 (X' • ] 
that. counts as a value of the variable; ar.d tbe , 
objects stay on [upon canonical notation through 
paraphrasing] as values of the variables though the 
singular terms be swept away.2 
We are left with language components that, upon 
inspection, are not events of utterances but universal 
sentences. Quine equates tbe utterance-event with the 
phenomenalistic surface level of the epistemological 
process. It is only after this utterance has been 
sufficiently repeated to form a recognizable sound pattern 
that an approximable norm emerges which we call 'object• 
(Quine's second, or 'physicalistic' level). But the weight 
of ourdlscussion rests on the 'discovery' that object-
statements ('propositions') are not reducible to factual 
lrbid., p. 192. 
2!lli.· 
experience in the way or the older reductionism or carnap. 
Instead, its entities are 
conceptually imported into the situation as con-
venient intermediaries - not by definitions 1n 
terms or experience, but simply as irreducible 
posits comparable, epistemologically, to theegods 
of Homer [eg., 1Pegasus 1 ].1 
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There is no separate meaning, in the terms of' communicable, 
intelligible experience (which must be called direct 
experience) for the proposition that there is Pegasus, or 
that there is a bottle half' full of' claret wine, or that 
there is a planet half way in outer space. We have equated 
direct experience with observation sentences, or object 
sentences, becauae we have found single terms and descrip-
tions (which are purely phenomenalistic, by definition) to 
be individually non-expressible and thus unintelligible. 
Consequently, they are dependent on the object level 
which is invented for interpretation, i.e., for empirical 
content. Thus the difference between gods and electrons 
becomes one of degree rather than kind. 
Thus evidently nothing stands in the way of 
our making a clean sweep of singular terms 
altogether, with the sole exception of the 
variables themselves.2 
1Quine, From a Logical Point of View, op. cit., 
p. 44. 
2Quine, word and Object, op. cit., p. 185. 
The very forms • ••• y ••• and y only' 
and 1 ( 3 y) ( ••• y • • • and y only) 1 
which served to supplant the immediate contexts of' des-
cription# both contain 
'X = Y1 
because • ••• y. • • and y only 1 = 
1 (X) ( •• .X ••• if' and only if' X = y)'. 
Therefore# 
The uniqueness sentences which may be expected 
to come into prominence with the reparsing of' names 
require 1 = 1 flanked by variables.1 
For example# 'That one and only one thing is Socrates' 
runs 1 ( 3 y) (y is Socrates and y only) I 
or 1 (] y) (X) {X is Socrates if and only if' X = y) 1. 
Consequently# 
Such definitions have the virtue • • • of restoring 
singular terms in all their flexibility without 
reviving the nuisance of' the truth-value gaps.2 
l ~., p. 186. 
2 Ibid.# p. 188. 
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6. Quine's Holistic Degree -Linguistic 
phenomenalistic scheme 
physicalistic scheme 
c Platonic scheme 
Linguistic levels arranged in 
the order of increasing 
simplicity through creative 
ingenuity. 
A. Most contracted scheme; with no lower expansion; 
expressing a literal truth which plays the r8le of 
myth at no lower literal truth. e.g.~ 'singular 
descriptions • ' 
B. (object or~ conceptual scheme); a convenient myth 
from the point of view of A. Achieves simplification 
by associating the "myriad scattered sense events 11 of 
A with "single so-called objects" of B. This object-
level admits points 1 miles~ attributes~ propositions~ facts~ and classes land thus is 'mythical' from A's 
point of view) • 
c. "one of degree rather than kind" --a difference. 
Quine's conception of literal truth at the lowest level, 
the phenomenalistic, is expressed by his phrase "play by 
l play reporting" which suggests a kind of elementary 
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description. Nevertheless, "we should still find, no 
doubt, that a physicalistic scheme, purporting to talk 
about external objects, offers great advantages in simpli-
fying our over-all reports. "2 "The rule of simplicity is 
. ' 
indeed our guiding maxim in assigning sense data to 
3 
objects." Thus 1inmed1acy 1 is not to be equated with 
• simplicity, 1 but with singular descriptions . only. For 
since the phenomenal~stic level cannot be uniquely 
evaluated {in itself), it cannot refer isomorphically to 
any external intermediary obscure entity. 1-1 corres-
pondence is outl Although literal truth is present at 
level A it is because it appears in the form (or, rather, 
the non-form) of singular descriptions that they cannot be 
apprehended by our object demanding conceptual scheme. 
We might compare this "initial" level of literal truth to 
the initial traces in the Wilson chamber, in physics, 
which remain unintelligible until partical and wave have 
been theoretically dis~inguished. It is because, as 
1Quine, From a Logical Point of View, op. cit., 
p. 17. 
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Strawson observes: '~he category or process-things is 
one we neither have nor need. 111 We do not need such a 
wave-category because we invent a tense-less ("et,ernal"} 
proposition from which 1 securely bound in myth 1 we 
immediately "view'' (whereas we actually infer} all external 
motion. Strawson dismisses such event-objects (physical 
objects 1 four-dimensionally conceived in space-time} as 
"not to be identified either with the processes which 
2 
things undergo .s:_ with the things that undergo them. •• 
With this in mind 1 our main task will be to justify1 
logically, a linguistic principle of indeterminancy. 
We have pointed out (in the example above} that 
by inventing eternal definitions [e.g., 1 (3 y) (X) (X is 
Socrates if and only if X = y) 1 ] we are able to "cleave 
theoretically to a canonical notation in which there are 
no singular terms but variables 1 " but at the same time 
(i.e., from the same level of discourse) we are able to 
define, relative to that notation1 "a shorthand use or the 
other singular terms after all" (i.e. 1 all propositions at 
the object level contain •x = y 1 ). It is in this way that 
we are able to at least view the virtues of eternal 
definition, viz., "as a method or eating one 1s cake and 
having it. ,,3 
1 
2 Ibid • , p • 56 • 
3Quine, Word and Object, op. cit., p. 189. 
But, since this process of canonical notation is 
theoreticall1 uni-directional, i.e., since its resulting 
"objects" cannot be reduced to phenomenalistic surface 
. . 
data, therefore, "in a contest for sheer s1stematic 
utility to science, the notion of ph,aical objects still 
1 leads the field • 11 Nevertheless, because abstract 
objects (electrons) must be grudgingly admitted into the 
theor1 for their efficacy, they must be said to "exist," 
i.e., they must be quantified. Therefore, since the 
logical notation 
'~FX ) ( j X)FX' 
is logically true only if there is such an existing thing 
in the linguistic framework presupposed, and since Quine 
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has confined his ontology to his holistic framework, 
therefore, all entities defined must exist as logically 
significant entities. But this existence has been 
accomplished without resorting to an external correspondence 
theory. 
7. Quine •s Formal Acknowledgment of Verbal 
and Non-~rbal Entities Within a 
Two-Valued Scheme 
As Quine puts it, only expressions that designate 
may be regarded as terms and substituted for variables. 
This position seems simple enough until we are confronted 
by examples such as the following: 
An (Nadja lives at 18 rue d 1Auance) 
therefore, ( 3x ) .AX (There are residents at 
18 rue d 1Auance) 
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Here we discover the ''over the line" pragmatic connections 
which Carnap is forced to treat as valid. Clearly 11Nadja" 
(referring to Breton's surrealistic enchantress) does not 
exist in the sense implied so that her living at 18 rue 
. -
d 1Auance proves anything abou·t there being genuine examples 
of' people living at the same address. Nevertheless, Nadja 
•exists. 1 The point here against Carnap is that granted 
there are two senses of •exist,• nevertheless, the two can 
. -
be logically correlated. To make an unalterable and 
absolute distinction must be to label Oarnap as a purist, 
an a priorist. Thus, in Quine's terms, since the 
expression "Nadja" does not designate, it is not substi-
tutable for the variable. 
To decline to explain oneself in terms of 
quantification, or in terms of those special 
idioms of ordinary language by which quantifi-
cation is directly explained, is simply to 
decline to disclose one's referential 1ntent.1 
Quine proposes to make ~ external (theoretical) 
questions as well as internal questions subject to analysis 
1Quine, Word and Object, op. cit., p. 243. 
and at the same time (in the final analysis) recognize 
their dichotomy 1 viz. 1 between non-verbal and verbal 
entities. This 1s to say that Quine 1 recognizing 
carnap •s own appeal to the convenience of his linguistic 
framework which allowed pragmatic connections •across the 
line 1 ' sought to rectify the difficulty by officially 
uniting the two. This could be done by what he calls 
"semantic ascent" which proposes a shift from the 
material mode into the formal mode. It is the shift from 
talking in certain terms (and thus unawareness of one's 
terminology) to talking about them (awareness). Thus he 
proposes that it is only after the process of "semantic 
ascent" that 1 from a verbal point ofvYiew, we can (and 
must) designate the intensionality of non-verbal 
externality. This is to say that from the analytical 
•existence• of the linguistic framework (state-descrip-
tions) we are able to quantify external matters of fact 
which are, 1n themselves 1 non-verbal. But this must be 
done in a rational process, for 
The intuitions are blameless in their way, but 
it would be a mistake to look to them for a sweep-
ing epistemological dichotomy between analytic 
truths as by-products of language and synthetic 
truths as reports on the world.1 
1 Ibid., p. 67. 
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As example, the external •existence• of the 
electron, itself indiscernible (non-verbal) is not 
rejected due to •existence• of the formal definition of 
an electron in our linguistic framework, when in fact it 
is the non-verbal electrons which are the very ground, 
condition of the linguistic ascent in the first place • 
Dichotomy is a result. And so we must reject carnap 1s 
doctrine of "pse udo-ob j eo t" sentences, but accept his 
' ' distinction (though it is not absolute) between the 
material and the formal modes. In this sense, Quine's 
holistic framework is more comprehensive than carnap 1s 
position. 
or 
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Why do some philosophers (and indeed all men 
within our presenting existing communications framework) 
feel the imperative ~ (in order for "greater coherence") 
to single out sentences such as 1Pegasus exists• or 
( 3 y) (y = Pegasus) 1 as FALSE rather than as neither 
TRUE nor FALSE? 
Granting Quine's psychological assertion that 
"concrete reference is felt as more secure than abstract 
reference:"1 or rather, accepting such an assertion as 
psychologically significant, the question presents itself, 
in the race of Quine's own admitted of myth-objects, as 
to whether •concreteness' is a legitimate form of 
libid., p. 234. (Underlining mine) • 
'security.• It is fruitless, in our present set-up, to 
attempt to equate the syntactically 'correct' pleasure 
with the external "thing" which stimulated it, for 
intelligible cognition of a sensual description demands 
the existence of an abstract entity at a higher level of 
the language for it to signify, or describe. The only 
alternative, since 'concreteness• is "demanded," and, 
furthermore, since it cannot exist externally, is to 
"posit supplementary abstract entities-propositions-as 
1 
surrogate truth vehicles."~ Such myth or, process-
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objects exist only as man-made paraphrasing's of other-
wise unintelligible singular descriptions. They refer 
(i.e., they are quantified) only in so far as .all refer-
ence takes place solely within the bounds of ~he linguis-
tic framework. Thus the obJect-sentences, or propositions, 
are tautologically related. But the difference between 
Carnap 1s tautological structure and the similar admission 
by Quine is simply that while the former logician 
founded his scheme on the self-evident truth of the 
meaning of •analyticity,' Quine refuted such presupposi-
tions as contradictovy and thus derived the prior 
conditions of his analytical structure solely from 
experience, viz., as phenomenological descriptions, 
descriptions which, in a language structure which pre-
supposes the dictates of a two-valued logic, must rest 
upon eternal quantifications in order to be intelligibly 
apprehended in the first place. 
8. Quine 1s A posteriori Starting Point Presupposing 
Two-valued Backdrop Leads to Infinite 
Regress Complication 
Since single descriptions are the lowest level of 
literal truth (i.e., descriptions, in being utterable, 
are the lowest point of significance) in Quine's system, 
it follows that this phenomenalistic level is "influenced" 
by a higher level, since single descriptions are reducible 
to object-norms upon which they rely as the 'F' or 'F(X)''. 
'rhi:&r: is to say that all descriptions presuppose ante-
cedent intervention from a higher level in linguistic 
framework in order to be und.erstoodl We have pointed 
this out before but without recognizing the problem which 
turns up if we wish to preserve both the primacy of the 
phenomenalistic level as well as the necessity of the 
intervention of the object level in order to assure 
recognition. 
The Problem: To avoid an infinite regress. 
Solution: 
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Quine sought to avoid carnap 1s paradoxical directly 
verifiable atom-statements by adherence to Russell's method 
of eliminating single entity terms~ by paraphrasing them 
into eternal propositions at object level. But when 
pressed for an initial order of levels (chronologically) 
the spotlight naturally falls on the first singular 
description. 
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Now, consider this unit-description in its most 
rudimentary stage of development • It certainly carmot be 
thought of as having been significant, in itself, for this 
would entail the theory of names and consequently the 
carnapean paradox of •analyticity. 1 At the same time, to 
conceive of the initial unit-description as quickly 
reduced to the object level presupposes the a priori 
status of the abstract and mythical "surrogate truth 
vehicles" which, of course, contradicts the claim of uni-
directional development in Quine's holistic scheme of 
things, introducing the problem of an:infinite regress. 
Accordingly, since basic descriptions cannot be ultimately 
reduced to consciously verifiable entities, it is(our 
contention that the initial unit-description must have 
existed, primarily, at an unconscious level of awareness , 
known only by the subsequent recognition of its contrast. 
Thus the basic unit-description does not exis~per se,as a 
single description, but is recognizable only from the 
apprehension of a contrasting description which it is 
"similar to." Consequently, the apprehension of a single 
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description ~plies an i~erse inference on the basis of 
remembered contrasting unit-descriptions. The initial 
description, having no contrast, was recorded unconsciously, 
thus implying that the determination oftt.he conscious level 
of phenomenological descriptions presupposes the consider-
ation of an antecedent •reflect arc 1 type paasivit;. ·. 
Consider the following illustrative extension of Quine's 
holistic scheme: 
tl 
inferred 
from memory 
only 
c 
i 
I 
~ 
t3 
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This diagram agrees with Quine's holistic framework (pre-
viously illustrated) in as much as all intelligible 
utterances# viz.# anything significant# are restricted to 
the phenomenalistic and higher levels of meaning. This is 
to say that (according to our diagram), all conscious 
apprehension must be at least conscious apprehensions of 
singular descriptions (viz., of "traces") at t 2 • Where 
this diagram differs from Quine's is only in the extended 
segment of t2 to the actual particle at t 1 • Our contention 
is that if such an extension is neglected# i.e., if the 
inverse inference from t 2 to t 1 is not made, the following 
contradictions arise: 
either (1) we are directly aware of 
(A~B) at t 2 # 
or (2) we are indirectly aware of 
(A~B) at t 2 
(1) if /direct awareness/ 
~herefore # either (A~B) 
at t2 
atomic J if true# there-
• unit fore, Carnapian 
statement objective veri-(timeless) fiability compli-
cations; 
or (A~ B) : a process ] if true, therefore # 
-- at t 2 in-time Bergsonian objective-motion complications; 
(2) if (indirect awareness/ 
therefore# influential relation} 
with object level 
which intercedes for 
significance 
if true# there-
fore# problem of 
infinite regress. 
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Since these alternatives lead to contradictions we 
must (in order to "save," literally, the level of signifi-
. . 
cant, yet non-objectively referring, single descriptions): 
(1) Recognize t 2 as the level at which we are conscious ot 
singular descriptions, not as directly ve~ifiable entities, 
but as traces. This is to say that the level at t 2 
actually encompasses the remnants or a 1 thing 1 in motion, 
beginning in this particular illustration at A and ending 
at B. (2) In recognizing "traces" as evidences or motion 
we must (since the only conceivable way we can not only 
conceive or motion but be aware or it at any level is by 
consciousness of temporal difference) at the same time 
(at t 2) be aware or difference. 
To be aware or difference is to be aware or time -
time passed. This implies, or course, (anti-Bergson) that 
some"thing" (A) was obJ.iterated (meaning 1n1hilated" J not 
"annihilated) by the presence or (B) and it is just this 
consciousness-of-obliteration which constitutes our present 
state. The description is obliteration. This is the 
- -
description. Obliteration requires only one •action• tor 
significance as a present description or the present 
-
•moment.• It need not depend· upon m,th-objects or a 
higher level tor its determined meaning as mere •obliter-
ation• (tor only 1obliterat!a&1 can ever become the 'F' or 
1F(x)) 1 • No, and this 1s essential, the most delicately 
necessary act of inference made thus far, the crucial 
question concerning the grounds for determination of the 
single description, not as an immediately verifiable 
entity and not as directly reducible to higher levels, is 
the question concerning the justification of inferring 
backwards, or inversely, (outside the bounds of the 
present, t2, back to A at t1• For surely theconsciousness 
of obliteration is consciousness at t 2 , or B-at-t2 only, 
but just as surely is the simultaneous awarene.ss that 
. l 
somath1Jli was-obliterated, viz., A-at-t-1 • Thus, the 
initial conscious awareness of obliteration is at the same 
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time the awareness that the actual obliterat~ has already 
taken place and is (now) a null class. In fact, this is 
to suggest that even conscious sense experiences (bare 
sensa) are made up of what Reichenbach has called 
11sim1lari ty disjunctions, 11 which refer, for significance 
to the past, and for verifiability to the future, but 
which can never hope to refer isomorphically "to~; 
externality •• ~ for tracks imply absencel 
Whereas the similarity disjunction contains a 
variety of components in an exclusive disjunction 
[(A v B) • Jr;B], the fact that it is not equiprobable 
lAt the actual time of A, viz., t 1 , there was no 
consciousness whatsoever of A (since this would imply 
direct verifiability), therefore, A at t 1 is unconsciously 
apprehended. 
implies that the various possibilities share different 
weights and therefore were retained by memory (which we 
may define for the present as the motor principle de la 
reflexi6n) at different occasions as members of a growing 
reference class by which to judge not the objective 
validity (cause) of a sense experience but rather to 
decide such questions as to whether we had an experience 
in the first place. 
9. Evidence Method •superior 1 to Correspondence Method 
If we were to generalize the results of the fore-
going analysis and supplementary extension of Quine 1s 
holistic system of levels it would be to re-emphasize the 
superiority of the evidence method as over against the 
correspondence (or, objective-reference) method of 
epistemic evaluation. By "superiority 11 is meant priority, 
temporal priority. We found that even on the lowest level 
of Quine 1s system--the phenomenalistic--antecedent condi-
tions were presupposed and, therefore, necessarily 
inferred before even the s~plest description could be 
consciously experienced. Thus we found even within the 
most immediately simple and apparently intuitive evidence, 
necessary evidence of temporal linkage exceeding the 
bounds of the present moment • We became aware of both 
temporality in one direction and physicalistic objects 
in another by external inference and internal reference 
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successively, but we knew both only as null classes. The 
motive for continuing is found in comparing these nullities 
and choosing as the 1more actual' reality the less decep-
tive; the one existing as the antecedent condition of all 
our experiences • Although we shall find that we cannot 
(by the very nature of an externality which is continuously 
moving aheadoOf our experiences of its traces) hope to 
develop an isomorphic linguistic scheme, nevertheless, 
~here is no reason why, by establishing a metalinguistic 
system founded .. not on self evident axioms, but upon a 
calculus derived a posteriori from experience, we cannot 
reinstate the correspondence method. equipped with 
tautologous axioms. 
In summation, four landmarks must be cited: 
1. Quine admits elimination of singular descrip-
tions to be founded on two-valued framework. 
2. Likewise, Quine admits non-verbal ground for 
verbal "ascent ••;. 
3. Infinite regress results if phenomenological 
level 1s not inversely extended for chronological 
explanation. 
4. Likewise, two-valued framework must be 
extended (generalized) in order to cope with 'similarity 
disjunction• problem. 
Quine has stretched the two-valued interpretation 
as far as it can be 'healthfully' extended. Still it 
cannot cover the wide expanse of verbal traits which, in (' 
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their nakedness, must exhaustively delineate their 
existence as "truth-value gaps." Yet, the •utility' of the 
' ' 
two-valued framework arises only in its denial aa ~n 
epistemologically adequate tool for the acquisition of 
information. For it is only by the awareness of the 
incongruity existing between the acknowledged facts of' 
verbal-non-verbal duality and the infinite regress compli-
cation existing between the initial and terminating levels 
of discourse that the two-valued backdrop becomes ~ 
•vehicle,• not of' its own annihilation, but of its self-
transcendence towards the development of a more extensive, 
more embracing (although somewhat less Secure) linguistic 
framework. 
For as we shall hope to establish, the positing of 
a normative interpretation of the phenorneno~ogical level 
of a linguistic set-up requires (actually presupposes) the 
formal acknowledgement of' a calculus of probability. Such 
a multi-~ed logistic if the paraphrasing of single 
deacriptions can be successfully accomplished, would, in 
offering a wider capacity for interpretation, permit the 
inclusion of' such verbal traits as "vagueness, ambiguity" 
and "fugacity of reference" as cognitively significant 
expressions. Indeed 1 the question has slipped into the 
following form: can our suggested interpretation of the 
chronological evolution of Quine's phenomenological level 
of descriptions be l~ically axiomized so as to do away 
with the infinite regress difficulty? This question 1 of 
course 1 presupposes another 1 viz. 1 Can a re-evaluation of 
Quine's scheme be performed without diluting the potency 
of his two-valued paraphrase? The answer to this question 
will depend partially on the strength of the .,concrete-
security" bias prolonged into the actual processes of re-
evaluation. Notwithstanding, the successful generali-
zation of the paraphrase procedure into a multi-valued 
framework becomes the immediate •task at hand .• 
Only the idea of the Idea is in silhouette • • • 
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CHAP!'ER III 
IMPLICATIONS OF A META-LINGUAL CONCEPT OF MEANING 
1. Necessity of Bridging the Gap Between Semantical 
and Syntactical Significance -- Reichenbach 
If 1Paul 1 is the name of a certain man, this 
symbol will always occur in sentences concerning 
actions of, or the status of, Paul.1 
Thus, we shall consider the symbol as we consider 
the physical 'fact.• From it alone we shall derive all 
knowledge which is in fact, derivable. It shall be the 
first object of our epistemological inquiry. 
'~he minimum length of a speech is one propo-
2 
sition." The symbol 1Paul 1 is meaningless posed merely 
as itself, in itself. Thus it must occur in-connection-
with, in-relation-to; in words it cannot occur alone. In 
order to acquire significance, the word 1Paul 1 must occur 
as the action-of-, the status-of-, or the function-of-
Paul; its meaning cannot exclude its utility. It is in 
this sense that 1P8ul 1 ( 1X1 ) cannot be separated from the 
lHans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 17. 
2Ibid., P• 20. 
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proposition 'Paul utilizing 1 '(F ( X)); establishing the 
proposition-as-a-whole as the necessary criteria for 
meaning. It is in attempti~ to establish a correspondence 
between such symbols (physical things) and other symbols 
that one becomes aware of his dependence on certain rules 
called the rules of language • The disagreement concerning 
the justifiable range of such rules of comparison has lead 
to the development of two possible interpretations of the 
truth tables of alternative logic, viz., the adjunctive and 
connective operations. 
Adjunctive operations, by pre-establishing the 
truth-values of the elementary propositions, are able to 
determine the truth-value of the compound propositions, 
which in turn are verified (or falsified) by the truth-
values of the individual propositions combined. This is to 
say that, using the truth tables, adjunctive operations 
can be interpreted by reading from either side; they are 
truth-functional operations, axiomatic in view of their 
symmetrical interpretation. In this sense, adjunctive 
operations provide the necessary context for tautological 
correspondence between propositions (sometimes called the 
laws of syntax). It follows from what has been said that 
certain individual propositions 'F( x)~ byconstituting the 
~um length of an intelligible utterance in portraying 
the symbol-in-action (or, symbol-symbolizing), can be 
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related to other individual propositions G(Y) only by a 
tautological transformation which would entail the 
individual assignment of truth-values to each proposition. 
Therefore, since the truth-value is a property capable of 
only two possible values, the positive one and the negative 
one, the proposition asserting the combination of the two 
constituent propositions is itself capable of being inter-
preted as either true or false. It must, accordingly, 
take on the character of a s,mbol in-itself, which does 
not acquiesce to the above requirements so far set down 
for 1meaning. 1 This complication likewise results when we 
examine the above combination in reverse manner by first 
assuming the combination to be both true and meaningful. 
such •complications• are perhaps more clearly seen if we 
examine the results 1n the truth table: 
P(X) G(Y) P(X) ) G(Y) 
F F T 
By assigning certain truth-values we are told by 
a single observation that all false propositions imply 
every proposition, an assertion which, although determined 
in-itself is, nonetheless, meaningless. This is to say 
that in as much as both the propositions F(X) and G(Y), 
as well as their combination F(X) ) G(Y), are seen to be 
. truth-functional, the concept of meaning, as the semantical 
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significance of a proposi tion1 cannot 'be applied. Thus 
adjunctive operations might literally 'be conveyed as 
syntactical structure per se, viz. 1 as unadulterated Form 
alone. 
The necessity of a counter-operation quite 
naturally arises with the need of combining empirical~ or 
semantically significant, statements. Such operations, we 
have seen 1 cannot 'be accomplished 'by the adjunctive two-way 
reading of the truth tables. Such operations Reichenbach 
refers to as connective operations and can 'be interpreted 
only 'by reading the truth table from left to right. Rather 
than 'being immediately verified 1 as their truth-functional 
counterpart~ connective operations can only 'be falsified 
'by a single observation of the truth table. Thus, 
connective propositions must 'be said to differ from 
adjunctive operations in that they are not truth-functional, 
although semantically intelligible. The dilemma 'becomes 
more clearly delineated upon sharpening our criterion of 
•meaning 1 to cover the following points: 
{1) Propositions can be held as meaningful only if 
verifiable as either true or false 1 but (2) the truth-
value cannot 'be already given, (these requirements can 'be 
reduced to the following): (a) propositions must 'be 
syntactically or tautologically relata'ble 1 yet (b) they 
must also 'be semantically significant. Reichenbach 
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closely resembles Quine in this respect. Both agree that 
since all sentences have meaning, but not the same meaning, 
that, consequently, the individual separation of different 
meanings can be achieved by supplJing a principle deter-
mining a necessary criterion for the same meaning. 
It is seen that while the first requirement is 
readilJ fulfilled by the adjunctive operations, as 1S the 
second by the connective operations, that nevertheless a 
true dilemma is apparent. For both operations involve 
propositions and propositions, if investigated, are seen to 
demand initial SJmbOlic constituents complJ!ng with the 
requirements above. Thus it is that the connective pro-
position •watch out for that rattlesnake1 1 1s an empirical 
visualization based on empirical evidence which is 
semantically intelligible, although not syntactically 
(tautologically) maneouvreable as are the adjunctive pro-
positions 1All rattlesnakes are poisonous• and 1If that 
is a rattlesnake and JOU are bitten by it, you could die 
as a result of it 1 Which contain no empirical content what-
soever in their •relation-ness• and are thus the so-called 
•pure visualizations• of the object, •snake.• Although an 
apparent dichotomy persists between the two operations as 
far as satisfying our requirements for a mead.ng-criterion 
is concerned, a reconciliation is in store if it can be 
shown that both operations actually presuppose the use of 
propositions which comply with the above suggested rules 
of meaning. To state the opposition to such a reconcili-
ation more clearly~ the carnapean position flatly holds 
that logical tautologies cannot be reduced to empirical 
statements • 
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Therefore~ that which is shown by syntactical 
(adjunctive) structure cannot be said by semantical 
(connective) propositions. It shall be our intent to show 
that the 1squaring 1 of semantical significance with 
syntactical structural relations evolves necessarily from 
our conception of meaning. This is to say that we shall 
seek not to establish a ~ linguistic framework permitting 
the peaceful coexistence of both adjunctive as well as 
connective operations~ but rather to show that such a 
rapport actually does exist and that the present fault 
(resulting in a so-called 1dichotomy 1 ) results from 
deductions from an "incomplete schematization."1 Such a 
1faulty deduction• is the establishment of intensionality 
as a separate~ independently given~ property of a 
proposition. 
By examining the meaning of connective propositions 
we find that the intensionality of such empirical proposi-
tions~ although given with the proposition, cannot become 
1Reichenbach frequently uses this term in referring 
to the limitations of a two-valued evaluation bias as 
employed by carnap. 
fixed without an additional definition performed by means 
of the concept of uthe same meaning. 11 
The comparison is, in itself, an act of thought, 
["an intellectual comparison"]. What it deals with, 
however, is not an imaginary ~content 1 of the symbols 
but the ~ymbols themselves, as physical entities.1 
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This is to say that a single proposition cannot exist as 
cognitively significant if unrelat~d with other propositions. 
In other words, the significance of a proposition, in 
requiring verification as true or false, thus requires to 
be connected in such a way that, if any observation makes 
one sentence true, another is also made true. The point 
is that the assertion of verification cannot itself be 
given within the propositions concerned but only by an 
"intellectual comparison" of the two (or more) proposi-
tions. Thus we unveil the demand for a language of a 
higher level, called the meta-level. Accordingly, the 
connective statement •a•, although not truth-functional 
in the narrower adjunctive sense (requiring a priori truth-
verification), nevertheless must be considered meaningful 
1via 1 a meta-comparison which requires the translation of 
•a• into other statements containing only truth-functional 
and, therefore, tautological operations. Comparisons 
resulting from such a •translation• would occur on a 
1Re1chenbach, Experience and Prediction, op. cit., 
p. 32. 
1higher• level than the mere proposition •a•, for they 
would hold for an endless symmetry of repeated operations 
of the single event portrayed by the single connective 
statement •a•. (This can be favorably compared with 
Quine's meta-equation •x = y 1 , essential in his operations 
of para phrase ) • 
Although empirical science tries to formulate 
empirical content, as fully as possible, in the 
object la~uage [viz., made up of empirical 
statements], there remain empirical contents which 
can be said only in the meta-language.1 
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In this sense the meta-language is able to 
formulate those 1contents 1 which cannot be said in the 
object (empirical) language of the connective statement, 
although they may be given !!!.!!!!. the object language. In 
other words, assuming that the empirical content of a 
connective proposition cannot be asserted by the object 
language as part of its meaning, nevertheless, it can be 
shown (and must be so shown) through the syntactical 
structure of the language, viz., at a higher language level. 
By the same token, the adjunctive proposition, standing in 
full syntactical regalia, stands, as such, impervious to 
intelligible comprehension, until the semantical content 
necessary for the formation of the proposition in the first 
place is officially recognized. This assertion of the 
1Hans Reichenbach, Elements of B~bolic Logic (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), p. 82. Reichenbach's 
object language should not be confused with Quine's myth 
object statements. Instead, they should be equated with Quine's level of object descriptions. 
semantical significance of certain syntactical relations 
likewise requires a meta-level interpretation. This is 
illustrated by the following schema: 
•a• ----~ connective proposition 
•a is true 1 --~~adjunctive proposition 
" •a is true 1 1s true" --~)'meta-level 
interpre-tation 
[arrow indicates theoretical direction of interpreta-
tive process.] 
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Thus 1 we are attempting to diminish the gap 
separating the semantical content of the object language 
from the syntactical laws-of-relation by means of a 
connecting bridge which denies independent isolation yet 
affirms an empirical difference between the two operations. 
This "difference 1 11 although given in formulas of the 
object language (la 1 ) 1 is not said in such formulas and 
can be said only by statements in the meta-language ('a is 
true 1 and "•a is true • is true ••) referring to the syntacti-
cal structure as well as the derivative relations of the 
statements established in the object language. 
Reichenbach expresses such a statement by the use of a 
l \. 
"connective implication" 1 ::> 1 which is remarkably 
laeichenbach1 Logic~ op. cit. 1 cf. pp. 411 199, 
3781 380. 
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similar in all outward manifestations to Lewis's strict 
implication and meta-linguistic counter-factual conditional; 
At any rate, the point is made plain enough by both 
logicians, viz., that it is impossible to define all 
concepts of empirical scie~ce in thecbbject language. 
2. Reichenbach's Translation of 
'Improper Individual Operations 1 
Equipped with such a •connective• we are immediately 
able to establish all single empirical propositions as 
2 
existing, in themselves, as 'improper individual operations 1 
and thus subject to translation into syntactically tautolo-
gous relations which permit (at a meta-level) the more 
complete 'intellectual comparison• of incomplete particular 
object-statements. 
Although we shall later use it to accommodate some 
of the inadequacies of the counterfactual conditional, we 
shallnnow introduce Reichenbach •s concept~ nomo-logical 
statements since such statements play an essential r~le in 
meta-translating. These statements have resllted from the 
necessity of extending the concept of 1!! beyond the 
confines of being truth-functional in the narrow adjunctive 
l c. I. Lewis, Anal is (LaSalle, Illinois: Op~e~n-Ci:ilou~r~~~~"'"iM~'T-...;.;.;;;.x-.;...;....;;.;;.;.;;.~~., 
237, 249. 
2Reichenbach 1s terminology. 
sense to covering a truth-function in a wider sense per-
mitting connective propositions. The concept of nomo-
logical law is thus considered the most complete set of 
restrictions in a non-completable scheme. The following 
illustration of translation is intended to show that 
connective statements are no more than corresponding 
adjunctive statements. Consider the statement •took out 
for that rattlesnake!' which actually reduces to a con-
nective implication positing the snake as a possible cause 
of death, which in turn implies certain truth-functional 
statements pertaining to the general nature of poisons 
and their relation to snakes and humans, such as 1If' Paul 
takes the poison he will die.• This translation is 
symbolized as follows: 
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( ) logical implication is 1 this individual nomo-) a xl derived from a general nomological implicaUian; 
(X) [J(X) ) Q(X) ]} general nomological 
, implication; 
"• (X) [r (X) ) Q (X)] 1 is a nomologkal 
formula." 
If the translation of connective into adjunctive operations 
is to be more than a merely fictitious coordination, it 
must be shown that the truth-functional character of 
adjunctive operations can be retained also for general 
universal statements. Also, it must be noted, we have no 
means of verifying the individual nomological implication 
for the particular case of Paul (which itself takes on the 
form of a counterfactual conditional) but only means of 
confirming the general nomological implication, i.e., 
asserting whether it is contradictory or not. 
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3. Reichenbach's OWn Form of Paraphrasing by Introducing 
the Inductive Inference at Level of Single Descriptions 
(Percepts) 
We shall now develop the ini~ial conditions upon 
which rests the fundamental direction of this interpretive 
process; later the epistemological significance of such a 
direction shall be established. It will entail the non-
equivalence of both the connective and adjunctive.oper-
ations as well as the highest meta-linguistic operations. 
We shall hold that this semantical-syntactical non-equival-
ence is defined at the lowest level of intelligibility, 
which shall be shown to be a level quite different from 
the level of atomic (immediate) sensations. In fact, by 
eliminating all immediate objects of perception in favor 
of a temporally extended •mediacy,• we shall observe 
ReichenbaCh's account of the perceptual levels of experi-
ence to be in close accord with those of (Russell and) 
Quine's, while being in discord with Carnap 1s conception. 
Accordingly, Reichenbach "shows that expressions 
' l 
stating immediate existence can be eliminated •11 
1Reichenbach, Logic, op. cit., P• 275. 
He thus distinguishes between 'perceives,• indicating the 
occurrence of immediate things, and 'observes,• which he 
reserves for objective, or physical. existence. 
The existential operator introduced by us repre-
sents p~ysical existence, i.e., the sort or existence 
applying to the concrete objects of our daily life as 
well as to the objects discovered by the methods of 
science. It is sometimes convenient, as in addition, 
to speak of existence in a fictitious sense and thus 
to introduce classes or fictitious objects which 
facilitate the description of the world.1 
Reichenbach's method of elimination can be illustrated in 
the following way: 
(1) A percept: an expression stating immediate 
existence. For example, 1 Xa perceives a dog,• 
which can be symbolized 
denotes, peRf!e.pt-torv 
<1/IJd St-muJ+-aneo<JS oc>evn·e.vee 
t>F 6c+h ?f1 BrHI o'oc;- e·rrf'~'J 
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(2) An observation: an expression stating 1th1nghood. 1 
For example 1 1 'X a observes a dog, • which can be 
symbolized 
(3'1) c/('1) · • · o6s ( ?(1 , '1) 
I 
physical existence 
The point to be noted is that (1) does not exclude the 
truth of ( 2) which is left open. This is to say that 
1Ibid ., p. 274. 
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(1) holds for a dream (as for shadows on a wall) as well as 
for real physical entities. Of course# what can be asserted 
-
as physically existent during a dream is only a physiologi-
cal process of the kind that would take place if there were 
a real physical object. This 11f there were' statement 
presupposes subjective things as fictitious. Thus by intro-
ducing a time argument •t•we are able to formulate an expres-
sion equivalent to (1) viz.# one which says 'When~' 
observes a dog# then he feels (perceives) certain bodily 
states z~ This can be symbolized in the follOWing way' 
(3) 
( 3 z) ~st(X1 rZ) [(3 'f) Obs (~, \) • JC<t J) bst (;r,,z~} 
m,,.. •S a L,, L''Y Shf< ••• ..L ~••~ "• n,,., 11 
'S;+'e 6otlt£'1 .s"f"ate o&&ettues d""'t 'i - 1 b f 
"' 'Xt, J E.-xf'e~ErCRS s z 
It must be noted that the physical existence of 
the dog is not asserted in (3) (as it is 1n (2)) because 
the existence sentence ~ 3 y) ••• 1 occurs in the 1mplicans 
of the c onnec ti ve 1mplica tion. Thus since ( 1) and ( 3) can 
be held as equivalent# then {1), stating immediate 
existence# can be eliminated in favor of (3) with the 
results that in (3) (as in (1)) the existential term is 
not asserted while it is in {2). Thus (1) and (3) are 
equivalent indirect modes of speech which# although 
not equivalent to the physical assertions of (2), are 
nonetheless translatable into statements asserting physi-
cal existence. This •translation' is accomplished when 
the assumption of physical existence by the connective 
implicate is not contradictory. This was established when 
we stated that the truth of (l) does not exclude the truth 
or (2), i.e., that the question or whether (3) holds for 
an illusory object or for the observation of a real object 
must be left open, depending upon whether the quantif11ng 
of the implicate is non-contradictory. This requires a 
temporal confirmation at the meta-level by which the state-
ment 1( 3 X) Jl( X)' would mean "the statement 1 ( 3 x) p'( x) 1 
is not contradictory." In this example '( 3 x) :j'( X )1 can 
be expressed alone only as an "improper object statement" 
and requires the meta-level for interpretation as an 
object-statement. Applying this to the results obtained 
above, we find that statements asserting immediate 
existence are eliminated in favor of connective impli-
eations which assert observational existence only in their 
implicans and thus while they do not assert the existence 
of real objects they nevertheless are translatable into 
observational statements (2) if confirmed as non-contra-
dictory. That such a translation involves the assertion 
of nomological law in the meta-level is readily seen from 
the following diagram or the eliminating process: 
f I • 
(1) 
so-called immediate percept 
4 
! F(xl ) ) G(xl) } incomplete object-
statement 
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( 4) (F(x1)) G(xl ) } particular nomo-logical statement ••• 
(x) [F(x)) G(x)]} ••• derived from 
, . general nomo-logical 
statement =Df 
1 (x) [F(x)) G(x)] 1 is a nomo-logical 
.. formula" 
The meta-linguistic interpretation of 
=Df 
(2} (~y) d(y) • obs (xl•Y) 
Thus, it can be shown that 
[ ( 1) E (3) ] = DF ( 4) 
in other words, that perceptual statements (1) can be 
eliminated in favor of their empiricist translation (3) and 
then reduced by definition to its nomological confirmation 
(4), with the final outcome that (1) is not equivalent to 
(3) although it can be reduced to (3). This relation by 
reduction, translation, or elimination, Reichenbach calls 
1 
"equipollence." Thus single percepts at the lowest 
' ' 
epistemological level are equipollent with their meta-
level confirmation. 
Our conception of meaning, in requiring temporal 
transcendence (extension) for interpretation, has been 
defined within a pragmatic context. It appears that if 
upon examining the pre-eliminated immediate percept state-
c ) 
ment ( 3 y) -;r1 d(y) • pc ( -;r, ' y) in the form of its 
equivallent connective implication, viz., 
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'(3 z) Gst ( "X1 1 Z) [( 3 y) oils ( ;~:, 1 y) • d(y) ) bst ( ?(,, z) y: 
we find its status to be fictitious, i.e., that it asserts 
no existential entity, it likewise appears in conclusion, 
that the quantifier {3 ZJrepresents a decision reached. 
This is to say that t3z)' takes the form of a similiarity 
disjunction which posits that 11entity" of the greatest 
t I 
weight. Thus, in the above example, (3~designatedt.hhe 
' J bodily state of "'X, as the "existing entity" of·~t.he highest 
probability in a non-exclusive (non-equipossible) similarity· 
Thus '(3z)' disjunction of other possible 'bodily states.• 
implies choice. We are tVYing to point out that the so-
called immediate statement is not closed by means of 
b~nding variables through the use of all-operators. At the 
same time we are suggesting that paraphrasing cannot be 
1Ibid. , p • 108 • 
accomplished (without encountering the problem of an 
infinite regress) except from an initial similarity 
disjunction. Does not the immediate connective condi-
tional1 by the very fact that it is fictive 1 imply that 
it is a favored weight chosen from an inclusive 
similarity disjunction? On the basis of our previous 
discussion concerning the 1historical 1 development of 
the initial unit-description at the phenomenological 
level of Quine 1s schema it should not be in the least 
difficult to suggest that by 1chosen 1 is meant 
'inversely inferred' (referring to the singling out of 
one particular "entity" from other 'possibles' available 
in the disjunction). 
Reichenbach has generalized the narrower sense 
of "analytic statements" to account for conception of 
"tautology •11 The assertion "the statement that a given 
formula is a tautology1 is not a tautology but an 
1 
empirical statement" plays an important rale in 
Reichenbach's answer to the problem of the ultimate basis 
of logical justification. The problem is one of infinite 
regress: if logical truths are established by appeal to 
rules in the meta-language. then we must fall back on 
the logic of the meta-language so as to work with those 
1Ibid • • p. 186. 
72 
rules as well as to assure ourselves of their consistency. 
Reichenbach's answer: since the statement that a state-
ment is tautologious is empirical, the regress is broken 
by posits made on empirical evidence. 
4. Towards a Richer Epistemology 
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Our goal shall be to describe more than one space 
on the basis of the same calculus. Accordingly we shall 
propose a more closely isomorphic epistemological 
programme simply by showing the description of Euclidean 
spaces to actually presuppose the definition of non-
Euclidean spaces, the normative function of which must 
.govern the spatial visualization of itself. This is to 
say again that the visualization space is not to be 
hypostatized as a self-evident ding~-sich, but can be 
described only as empirically evolving from its antecedent 
and tautological normative function. The necessity of 
axiomatic structure shall become obvious; the question 
shall be to decide which of the normative calculii 
provides a more comprehensive and therefore potentially 
richer epistemic foamework. 
Following this we shall contend that a wider 
variety of spatial relations (both Euclidean and non-
Euclidean) can be described if the normative function of 
two-valued point-definitory axioms (which, in claiming 
l-l correspondence with Euclidean objects# denies all 
other empirical visualizations) is extended by generali-
l 
zation. This is to say that by re-evaluating point-
function normatives in terms of set-function normatives 
by employing the geometrical theory of implicit (relative) 
definitions, the definition of a point in space shall not 
be given in relation to a physical object (i.e., shall 
not be given as self-evident), but shall be given only in 
tautological relation with other axioms from which it 
evolved. It has been suggested that the axiomatic frame-
work of carnap, although deceptively 'implicit', 
actually reduces under full analysis to the two-valued 
self-evident assumptions of .1-1 correspondence. In our 
attempt to establish the necessity of the independent 
formulation of an axiomatic structure together with its 
dependent expressal we are forced to abandon carnap 1s 
schema in favor of Quine's meta-linguistic (holistic) 
paraphrasing which has in turn been superceded by 
Reichenbach's own form of reductionism; the major differ-
ence being that Reichenbach extends Quine's view by 
presupposing a probability logic rather than the two-
valued framework which he finds altogether too confining. 
1As posed to •annihilation.• 
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Again 1 our goal shall be to describe more than one 
space on the basis of the same calculus. 
5. Ontological Implications: A Hint 
Following Quine's method of elimination~ descrip-
tions and even proper names as terms were defined on the 
basis of primitive predicates not directly introduced into 
the language and were therefore introduced as values of 
bound variables. Thus, it is with the immediate para-
phrasing away of single descriptions 1 a process which 
Quine considers necessary requisite for any epistemologi-
cal endeavor 1 that we are in agreement. Yet it appears 
that Quine could be accused of being guilty of an infinite 
regress in that each of his phenomenological descriptions 
must be regarded as being 1unique 1 1 or 'positive' in the 
sense that each is dealt with directly by the paraphrasing 
process. Thus the value of the bound variable at the 
meta-level is not only the result of immediate para-
phrasing at a lower level but is the •eternal' value of 
that variable in that the same results at'e obtained after 
all paraphrasings. This 'difficulty' of apparent 
symmetry between single descriptions and their meta-level 
interpretation does indeed result in an eternal atagnancy 
which seems to leave unexplained the initial physical 
development of the normative framework which is necessary 
in order for the first paraphrase to take place. But this 
difficulty can itself be 'paraphrased away~' by consider-
ing the initial phenomenological descriptions as fictiti-
ous entities, the elimination of which requires an induc-
tive inference made on the bases of temporally extended 
appearances of roughly the same entity. This way the 
aforementioned difficulty is eliminated by substituting 
"equipollence" for "equivalence'' between the single 
' ' description and its higher level interpretation, which 
in turn requires the introduction of "confirmation" in the 
place of "verification." By thus extending the two-valued 
normative function into a more inclusive schema which is 
truth-functional in the wider sense, we are able to give 
meaningful interpretations to a statement in the object 
language which rely on the inductive inference for its 
existence. Reichenbach has shown that such an extension 
is possible by redefining the concept of "law" with the 
introduction of the nomological statement. This he 
defines as a universally quantified statement which {a) 
"contains no individual signs 11 (thus withholding the 
status of law from·truths which are essentially local in 
reference}, (b) is "demonstrably true" (i.e., "practically 
true on inductive evidence,"' or capable of beizlg 
established on possible future evidence), and (c) is 
"fully exhaustive," but only in the sense that the 
76 
addition of surplus meaning can be made {by employing 
nomological laws) without further inquiry in the meta-
language into experience. We have already seen nomo-
logical statements in the diagram illustrating the 
eliminating process. Concerning the fictitious existence 
of the entities described by single phenomenological 
descriptions# (so-called immediate percepts) we have 
likewise already shown how Reichenbach has introduced 
special quantifiers of a kind which behave as if they 
were quantifiers in the obJect language 1 ranging over 
unactualized possibles 1 though actually no such realm of 
entities is presupposed# and these special quantifiers 
are explained away by meta-linguistic paraphrase. By the 
very nature of the inductive inference which forms the 
core of Reichenbach's equipollent process of elimination 1 
we are forced to agree with Quine that a system of 
elimination# or paraphrase,. remains both incomplete and 
incompletable. But by our proposed extension of his 
ontological restrictions we hope to reRegitate his 
reasons for incompletion, while preserving a certain 
element of futility regarding any attempts at isomorphic 
correspondence with physical reality, regardless of the 
level of interpretation from which it is attempted. Thus 
we shall hope to at least 111mprove" a bit on the pessimis-
tic involvement resulting from the resignation to 
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Euclidean myth-objects in Quine's interpretation. It is 
needless to say that such "pessimistic involvement" is 
the more direct effect of a Euclidean normative function. 
We shall rehabilitate the eternal object by denying 1 with 
Quine 1 the existence of entities-beyond-classes as values 
of bound variables and thus as having any ontological 
status 1 whatsoever. But we shall broaden the concept of 
'entity' so as to include non-Euclidean empirical 
visualizations as interpretations which are actually pre-
supposed by Euclidean interpretations and thereby follow-
ing from the same normative function. We shall see that 
the establishment of such a generalized two-valued inter-
pretation (which will assume the form of a multi-valued-
probability logic with a continuous scale of' truth-values) 
will lead, in the exploitation of its implications 1 to the 
final positioning of nature as an external continuous 
motion 1 itself non-verbal 1 itself moving in the direction 
of higher probability (and in this sense alone does it 
correspond with our evaluation of it). Externality cannot 
be posited ultimately as an entity1 i.e. 1 as a value of' a 
bound variable. For it shall be shown that while factual 
entities are confined as realities to epistemological 
realms, the queries that take place within such realms, 
concerning the external cauaes of such entities 1 actually 
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presuppose the existence of this other reality. Shall 
such a reality be called the PhySical reality? Granting 
"physical," shall we call it the real reality; that 
reality which, due to the limiting processes of human 
conceivability, must be presupposed as existing, yet as 
existing independently of anything that is known 
as its initial condition? 
• • • 
Thus, confronted with a random sequence of chalk 
marks on a blackboard, we must infer that a piece of 
chalk was thrown and that its motion was continuous and 
non-verbal. For we shall also recognize, on the evidence 
of such dis-continuous traces of calcium, the futility of 
ever locating the actual causal piec~'per se~ 
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CHAPI'ER IV 
ELEMENTARY AXIOMATIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CALCULUS OF PROBABILITY 
1. Tautological Construction Based on Given Probabilities 
The contribution of logic to science consists in 
the construction of tautologies from axiomatic collections 
of synthetic statements, e.g ... Axiom A :) Axiom B. But 
such a construction contributes nothing to the truth of 
Axiom A. Thus, by employing the logical rules of substi-
tution, replacement, inference, free variable, etc., 
axioms can be derived from synthetic statements, a deri-
vation which in turn can be reduced to a derivation of 
tautologies. And tautologies, since they are empty, may 
be added to synthetic premises without adulterating the 
empirical content of the axioms.~ For, 
since the meaning of ••• [unspecified symbols] 
••• is not completely determined by the axioms, 
the definitions merely set up certain relations 
that are to hold between the unspecified symbols; 
they define only certain structural properties 
for these symbols.1 
lHans Reichenbach, Theory of Probability, English 
translation by Ernest H. Hutten arid *ria Reichenbach 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1949), p. 40. 
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Accordingly, the axioms of the calculus of probability 
shall be based upon the assumption of given probabilities, 
just as the meta-assertion of nomo-logical law was seen to 
rest upon the inductive inferences derived from a collec-
tion of "weighted" (empirical) connective implications. 
2. Logical Formulation of the Brobability Implication 
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·~he probability statement is a general implication 
between statements concerning the class membership of the 
elements of certain given sequences. "1 Thus, in the 
general symbolization, the statement 
( i) (Xi E A 3- y £ B) 
-p, 
represents the probability of the attribute B that is 
considered with reference to A, or rather to the elements 
included in the class A. The all-operator (i) as~e~s 
that the statement applies "for all Xi of the class A 
and for all Yi of the class B • 11 Thus it can be seen 
that from the very nature of the probability implication 
(as opposed to unique truth-functional statements) that 
it is impossible to determine the probability of the 
attribute B (which can be considered only with reference 
to A) without first putting the elements of the classes 
(xi, Yi) into a 1-1 correspondence and seeing that they 
1Ibid • 1 p • 46 • 
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(x) (y) [f(x) • e (x, y) 7 g(y)] 
-fh 
We have presented this notation for the main purpose of 
accentuating the importance of the sequence.,~pair in the 
determination of the truth-value (which will now be in 
terms of a determined probability) of any proposition. 
"Intellectual compariaon1 " which we have held to be 
essential in any determination of meaning 1 is accomplished 
primarily through the functioning of sequence pairs. 
Unique verifications have thus been omitted. IncidentallY~ 
since sequence pairs never occur as free variables 1 but 
only as bound variables 1 we can follow Reichenbach's 
procedure of employing the Rule of Translation 1 thus 
( } 
omitting the appearance of e (:X, y) from probability 
statements.1 Consequently1 the existence of such a 
corresponding functional relationship is asserted in the 
probability statement in the form of a certain existing 
determinant probability: 
( ] p) ( i) (xi £ A 3- y i t B) 
--f1' 
Now it must be understood in relation to asser-
tions made in this and the previous section 1 that the 
existence of a probability implication is a synthetic 
statement that cannot itself be proved by any calculus. 
Thus the juxtapositions of calculus can only transfer 
existence character 1 i.e. 1 with the aid of such apparati 
we can infer 1 fr~m the known existence of certain 
probability 1mplications 1 the existence of new ones. 
Therefore 1 Reichenbach deems it necessary, prior to the 
construction of a probability calculus 1 to establish a 
2 
rule of existence which asserts the existence of all new 
probability implications derived from old ones which were 
1Ibid • 1 p. 49. "Rule of Translation. For every 
capital letter K substitute the expression•xi e: K; using 
for different capital letters different variables xi, Yi 
••• 1 with the subscript i 1 but the same variable x1 for the capital letters K11 KO· ••• In front of ali parentheses containing capital letters place the symbol i 
within the all-operator." 
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2Ibid., p. 52. ''The existence of a probability 
implication-! regard, in_general 1 as a synthetic statement 
that cannot [itself] be proved by the calculus." 
~· ''The calculus can only transfer existence character." 
initially given as existing. Naturally the justification 
of such a rule can only be given in the meta-level where 
in fact"' it was originally formulated. Thus meta-
assumptions are present 5 in even the 'purest' attempts at 
axiomatic construction and any conception of the self-
evidency of existentially quantified 'givens' must be by-
' , passed. Thus when we employ the notation ( 3 p) we are 
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merely asserting that the rule of existence can be deter-
mined by the rules of calculus only as far as expressing 
the probability as a mathematical function concerning the 
given probabilities and can be expressed only incompletely 
by the axioms, in themselves. It is for this reason that 
only from a meta-level or the language can'(3 p)'be 
completely expressed. But this has been our main 
objective: to construct a calculus of the logic or 
probability based entirely on a system of axioms in 
tautologous form which were initially derived from 
synthetic premises existing solely on the justification 
of induction. But since such reliance on synthetic 
premises can be justified only at a meta-level (where all 
interpretation takes place), it follows that the axiomatic 
calculus itself can be developed entirely independent of 
any empirical interpretation. This is tosay that such a 
calculus, which we shall regard as our normative function, 
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although presupposing synthetic prem1ses 1 is not nevertheless, 
deduced from such empirical statements as a matter-of-fact. 
For as we have continually restated, the full significance of 
the ( 3 p)-assumption remains a mere passion1 until justified 
at a higher level. But strangely enough it is to this incom-
pleteness that we are necessarily indebted 1 for only such a 
presupposition enables the formulations in the long run 1 of 
certain rules permisting us to infer inversely the antecedent 
conditions of an event and subsequently to determine the 
probability of its future state. 
It should be mentioned that the idea of construing 
probability ( p as a relation between statements, which in-
cludes logical implication ( ) ) as a special case, was first 
proposed by Bolzano in 1837. Thereupon many writers have been 
responsible for the development of various logics of probabil-
ity.2 In this presentation the laws of the probability impli-
cation shall be formulated as a system of logical formulas 
that contains- nothing apart from logical symbols except the 
probability implication symbol ~ from which we shall be able 
to derive the formulas that are actually employed in all 
applications of the probability calculus. 
lAssuming the 'complete• passion to be unintelligible, 
~-~~ in-itself, and therefore intelligible only as a oontrad1Dtion. 
2For an approximate hiatorioal scenario the following 
authors might be referred to: G. Boole, Laws of Thought (New 
York: Dover Publications, Inc • , 1951) , ohS • XVI-XXI. 
R. Carnap, Lo~ical Foundations of Probability, op. cit., of. 
pp. 19-52 1 1~-192, 528-530. c. s. s. Peirce, Doctrine of Chances, in Collected Papers, Vol. II (Cambridge, Miss., 1932), 
p. 395 ff. J .M. Keynes, Treatise on Probability (London: M:lo-
m1llan and Co., Ltd., 1921), cr. pp. 79-111. 
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3. Frequency Interpretation 
Our presentation will be seen to follow the method 
applied in the teaching of geometry~ where the conceptual 
formulation of geometrical axioms is always accompanied by 
spatial imagery which takes on the same meaning as 
'empirical visualization' discussed earlier. We shall 
adopt the same vehicle of interpretation~ viz., the 
frequency interpretation of probability, as incorporated 
by Reichenbach merely as a means of illustrating the 
axiomatic system of formal laws of probability, and we 
shall again accent the cause by reasserting that it will 
always be possible~ during the development of the 
individual axioms~ to separate the conceptual system from 
the interpretive system. This shall be possible because~ 
for the derivation of theorems, the axioms will be used 
merely in the sense of formal statements~ sans any 
reference to their interpretation. 
In order to develop the frequency interpretation 
of probability~ Reichenbach defines probability as the 
limit of a frequency within an infinite sequence.1 
~his follows pretty much the same definition 
used by G. Boole, (as well as by von Mises). cr. 
George Boole~ Laws or Thought (London~ 1854), 
p. 295. 
This method of interpretation is considered a propos since 
the assertion of a determinate probability is itself a 
synthetic statement. Agreed that this need not hamper 
any development of the axioms themselves, it is in their 
interpretation (at the meta-level) that we find their 
validity can be ascertained where physical events are 
concerned only by means of statistics in combination with 
inductive inferences. Thus classes are defined by the 
frequency of appearance of their elements. Illustrated, 
these definitions, are as follows: 
n 
N (Xi € A) : Nn(A) 
i=l Dr 
Consequently, the relative frequency of elements in the 
class B (e.g., the number of bull's eyes) in relation 
to the reference class A (e.g., compared to the total 
number of hits on any of the target area) would be 
formulated as 
Fn {A, B) _ lfl (A•B) 
- 1fl (A} 
It should be noticed that the two expressions in this 
equation are not connected by definition (: Dr) which 
further illustrates the incapability of expressing the 
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frequency of one class without stating it in relation to 
another. Thus, only if Qertain probability implications 
are as~umed to exist (e.g., xi € A), must other probabil-
ity implications (e.g., Yi € B) also be asserted ·as 
existing. 
Now as the various 1hits 1 are recorded on the 
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target area in relation to the shots fired, and if the 
relative frequency F~ (A, B) of this sequence pair (xi Yi) 
goes toward a limit p as the number of firings approach 
infinity (n --+ oo ) , Reichenbach calls this l:mtt p the 
probab~lity from A to B within the sequence pair. He 
introduces the following notation as the "coordina.tive 
definition" of probability: 
~------~----------------~ 
P (A, B) : lim Fn (A, B)1 
71~00 
It shall be shown that by assuming this frequency defini-
tion of probability we will be able to interpret each 
axiom of the calculus of probability as representing a 
tautological relation between frequencies. Thus the 
calculus can be deductively built up.directly on the 
basis of the definition of probability as a frequency. 
Furthermore, since it can be shown that such tautological 
frequency equations are valid even before the transition 
1 Ibid., p. 69. 
to the limit, it follows that the rule of existence (noted 
for its 'incompleteness' at the axiom level) is likewise 
valid for the frequency interpretation. In Reichenbach's 
statement that "all the axioms are satisfied tautologic-
ally and are ••• valid even before the transition to the 
limit,"1 the 'transition~ to the limit' mentioned can take 
place only by a generalization of the axioms at a higher 
linguistic level and is not required for either the 
construction of the calculus alone or as interpreted by 
2 the frequency interpretation. 
Thus, given a three-termed and non-homogeneous 
relationship existing between two different properties 
from the same universe and a real number, 1rhe probability 
that a random thing has thefirst property on the evidence 
that it has the second property either could or could not 
equal that real number. Such a trinity constitutes either 
a positive or a negative order of a certain relation. The 
symbol of this relation is p. It is called the probabil-
ity relation. It is our concept of axiomatic probability 
and it sets the stage for Reichenbach's first axiom. 
1Ibid • J p • 76 • 
2venn, in his Logic of Change made a systematic 
attempt to show how the calculus could be developed on the 
basis of a definition of probability as a relative 
frequency of an event within a sequence. 
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4. Axiom I. Axiom of Univocality 
This axiom states that given a probability p in 
favor or the occurrence or a particular property 
observed in a certain thing on given evidence, this 
probability, the evidence remaining unchanged, will be 
one and only one real number. The denial or this uni-
vocality resulting, for example, in the assertion or two 
probabilities in favor of a certain occurrence and thus 
p I. q, would imply the denial of the given evidence. By 
representing (A) as the evidence given, (B) as a new 
property or the 1th1ng 1 discussed, and•p•as the amount 
by which (A) favors (B), the axiom can be symbolized 1n 
the following way: 
(p "! q) ) [(A 3-B) 
p 
• (A 3- B) ii (A) ] 
q 
Whereas, on the other hand, if (A) is given, that is, if 
the elements in the class A [(A)1 are assumed as existing 
then the ·probability or (B) will likewise be one and only 
one real number: 
l ( 3 i) (xi E A) • (A :}- B) •(A ~ B) ) (p = q) 
p q 
l Ibid., cr. pp. 53-55, 72, 111-119. 
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5. Axiom I. Derived by the Frequenc;y Interpretation 
This same axiom, derived above independently of 
any interpretative imagery, can be interpreted by the 
frequency interpretation of probability. For, given (A), 
the relative frequency pn would assume the indeterminate 
form~ since the summation lfl in Fn(A, B) = tfl(A· B) 
Nn(A) 
would then lead to 0 for the numerator as well as for the 
denominator (P(A, B) would also= 0 /o ]. Whereas, on the 
-
other hand, if (X) does not hold, then a definite limit 
1 (viz., of one and only one real number) would exist. 
6. Axiom II, (a). Axiom of Normalization 
A connection is established in this axiom between 
the logical implication and the probability implication. 
If there exists a logical implication A ) B, there also 
exists a probability implication A ~ B where p = 1. 
p 
This can be symbolized 
I (A ) B) ) ( j p) (A t B) • ( p .. 1 T 
... 
It follows from a simple consideration that the converse 
2 
relation cannot be maintained. That is, that certainty 
lon the frequency interpretation a limit is held 
to exist even when only a finite number of elements Xi 
are known to belong to (A}. Thus the value of the last 
element in the frequency is regarded as the limit. 
2This appears to resemble Lewis 1 method of dis-
tinguishing between the logical implication p ) q and 
the strict implication p~ q. 
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does not follow from the probability 1. This can be 
illustrated if we take as corresponding to the above 
formula a formula stating that whenever an impossibility 
exists (as opposed to the necessity of A ) B implied in 
the formula above) a probability implication or 0 degree 
exists also: 
[ (A ) m ) ( ~ p) (A? B) • (p • 0) l 
Tqe reverse relation of this formula would assert that 
the probability 0 entails impossibility.1 This logical 
irreversibility of certainty and the probability 1 
suggests that certainty is only a special case of the 
probability 1 and that probability is therefore the more 
2 
comprehensive concept and certainty the narrower. 
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7. Axiom II, (a). Derived By the Frequency Interpretation 
The sequence B may have a ~ in certain elements 
and a B in all others which, if distributed sparsely, does 
not disallow the limit Fn of becoming equal to 1, although 
every individual Fn may be smaller than 1. Thus, instead 
lwhich can be seen to be false in the example of 
paper-pricking: the mathematical probability of hitting 
a given loifii with a pin is equal to zero,; nevertheless, 
a point s t each time suggesting that the probability 
0 does not entail impossibility. 
2For Reichenbach's formal statements concerning 
this axiom, cr. pp. 54, 60, 72, 119, 120. 
or demanding the individual implication to be valid sans 
exceptions {as in logical implication), the frequency 
interpretation requires only that between the numbers 
or the elements there must exist a frequency ratio that 
goes in the limit toward a determinate value. Following 
from such an interpretation it should be clearly 
established why the probability 1 represents a wider 
concept than the general implication of symbolic logic 
and is thus a generalization or it. 
8. Axiom II1 (b). Axiom of Normalization 
The normalization to values in the interval from 
0 to 1 is restricted to the case where the class A is not 
empty, i.e., where it is not the case that (Xi€ A) in 
1 (i) (Xi E: A) is null or, where (-:-i') '('!'!x-=i-e =;=A•}. Thus the 
degree of probability is asserted to be a positive 
number ( ~ 0). The axiom is stated I ( 3 1) (Xi ~ A) • (A ~B) J (p ';; 0/ I 
lrollowing Reichenbach's rule of translation, 
{A) = {i} (ii e A) 
2 The condition that the de~ree of probability = 1 
remains to be stated explicitl{. (Ct. Addition Axiom 
below~ Thus here the arlthmet c sum equals the logical 
sum. 
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9. Axiom II, (b). Derived by Frequency Interpretation 
This axiom is satisfied by frequency requirements 
due to the fact that the relative frequency Fn(A,B) is a 
positive number [Fn(A,B) • Nn(~·B)] including zero (p • 0 /o). 
Nn A) . 
10. Mathematical Formalization of Axiom II 
II, (a): {A)B)) { jp) {A }-B) • {p • 1), 
.fJ' 
P(A, A v B) = 1 
II, (b): (A) B)) ( 3 p) (A ) B) (p : 0) 1 
p (A I B • 13) • 0 p 
and furthermore: 
(. 
0 = p, 
0 i P{A,B) 
no qualification is needed to 
demand that A be non-empty 
because, if A is empty this 
inequality does not represent 
any restriction on.the numerical 
values of the probabilities. 
Resulting from these first two axioms, the 
probability implication (7) 1s seen to be an extension of 
. p 
the logical implication () ) which can occur as absolutely 
certain only if' tautologous. Since; as has been discussed, 
any conceptual formulation of' a physical event represents 
an idealization at the meta-level of the language, it 
shall now be held that any application of' such an idealized 
concept (i.e., any self-determined action in the future) 
can possess only the uncertainty of synthetic implications 
which have the characteristic of probability implications. 
According to the adjunctive interpretation of the 
truth tables we have seen that the general implication 
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A ) B corresponds religiously to the individual impli-
cation a ) b of the single event. With the presentation 
of axioms I and II it shall now be formally established 
that such a tautological isomorphism between single-event 
interpretations and meta-level generalizations cannot be 
used for probability implications. Thus, like the meaning 
I 
of an individual connective implication ( ) ) was deter-
mined, the meaning of an individual probability impli-
cation is likewise derived by a "transfer of meaning from 
the general to the particular case." Thus, the degree of 
probability holding ·for an entire sequence can be trans-
ferred to the individualccase only in the fictitious sense. 
Yet it will be held that the single event can be inter-
preted (in fact can only be interpreted) by using the 
frequency method of interpretation. It is upon this fact 
that we base our denial of both the positivist and meta-
physical idealists• assertions of immediate verifiability 
of the single case. It is from this fact that we shall 
eventually hope to impregnate the great importance of the 
probability implication, viz., that all laws governing 
the motions of external imagery are themselves "only" 
prGbability linkages in space. 
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11. Axiom III. Addition Theorem 
In throwing a single die the probability of getting 
face 115" instead of face "4" is = 1/6. Likewise, the same 
can be said of "4 1s" chances. The two events are mutually 
' ' 
excluded, that is, both cannot possibly turn up simultane-
ously. Symbolically this condition of exclusion can be 
represented (letting A = throwing of die, B = face 115 11 and 
c = face "4") in the following way: 
A • B)~ 
From this can be stated that the fact that the 
individual probabilities of two faces of a particular die 
are mutually exclusive implies that there exists the 
probability of either of the faces (B v C) turning up, and 
that this probability is their logical sum. This axiom is 
symbolized by Reichenbach in the following way: 
1 (A 3- B) • (A;:)-- C) • (A·B) 1") ) (j r) (A ;3--Bv C) • (if • p+q) 
P q r 
By letting p and q represent the mutually excluded sides of 
the die the logical sum resulting is 1/6 + 1/6 = 1/3. 
It should be noticed that the axiom asserts the existence 
of the probability implication for the logical sum by 
expressing the transfer property of the calculus, but the 
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existence rule is applicable only if the individual 
probability implications are given. Probability equations 1 
therefore 1 determine the existence of any of the other 
probabilities occurring in the equation if all other 
probabilities are known to exist. 
12. Mathematical Formalization of Axiom III 
The generalized formalization appears in the form 
P(A, BVC) : P(A 1 B)+ P(A, C) - P(A, B•C) 1 
but we cannot incorporate into mathematical formalization 
the exact condition of exclusion expressed in the axiom as 
l 
stated above. Therefore, by taking its reverse we 
obtain 
(A ~B) • (A 3- B V C) • (A •B) ~)) ( J q) (A ::t C) • ( q•r-p), 
P r q 
which can be mathematically formulized as follows: 
P(A, BVC) : P(A, B) + P (A, C) 
or 
P(A, C) = P(A, B V C) - P (A,B) 
such a formalization required both the axiom of univocal-
ity (I) and the rule of existence. 
1cf. General theorem of addition developed 
below. 
13. Axiom III. Frequency Interpretation 
Nn(A•B) 
-
- Nn(A) 
(Assuming (A•B) C) to be valid). 
14. Axiom IV. Multiplication Theorem 
According to the generally accepted multiplication 
theorem in the calculus of_)probability the probability of 
a logical product is represented by the arithmetical pro-
duct of certain individual probabilities. Thus the 
probability of the combination of independent events is 
determined whenever the probabilities of the specific 
events are given. For example. the probability 1/6 of a 
certain face turning up for each of a ~ of dice thrown 
individually determines the probability l/36 for the 
combination of any two races turning up. So it is that 
this axiom determines the probability of a combination of 
terms. The necessity of establishing an axiom or this 
nature becomes apparent upon consideration of the following 
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problem. Determine the probability a person suffering from 
diptheria has of subsequently contracting nephritus and 
dying. If we assume A as diptheria, B as nephritis, and 
c as representing death, the probability sought takes on 
the form (P(A,B•C); a form characterized by the occurrence 
or three classes. The uniqueness of this axiom comes 
plainly into view when we notice that the probability that 
a person who gets nephritis after having had diptheria is 
different from the probability that a person suffering 
from nephritis will die (since a patient suffering who has 
had diptheria is thereby weakened and in greater danger of 
losing his life). Thus 1 the original probability sought 
[viz. 1 P(A 1 B•C)] must be calculated as a product or these 
two differing probabilities. The axiomatic expression 
resulting is as follows: 
l {A)-B) •(A•B 3- C) ) ( j r) (A 3-B•C) • (tt • p•q) 
P q r 
where the second probability of conjunction {A•B ~C) must g 
be characterized by three calsses. These are cases where 
the domain of the probability implication is a triplet of 
sequences • But these three sequences, or events, must be 
seen (in cases such as the one above which are governed by 
the multiplication axiom) to be non-symmetrical. That is, 
460. 
libid., p. 62 (cr. also pp. 102, 142, 145, 146, 149, 
that B and C are not mutually exclusive with respect to 
(A ·B ~C) as in the addition theorem [(A ·B))~]. This 
asymmetry is easily proven by citing the two different 
conversions of the multiplication axiom. These are 
obtained by switching (A ~B·C), in the symbolic expres-
r 
sion of the axiom above, first with (A•B ~C) and then 
q 
with (A 3-B). Thus we obtain, p 
(1) (A tB).(A ?'"B•C) ) ( 3 q)(A•B tc).(q • r/p) 
and 
(2) (A ?-B•C)•(A·B tc)) ( jp)(A ~B) • (p • r/q). 
15. Axiom rv. Mathematical Formalization 
The mathematical expression of this axiom is 
P(A,B•C) : P(A,B)•P(A•B,C) 
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in which the probability P(A•B,C) is characterized by the 
occurrence of three classes and of a term having two 
classes (A•B) in the place of the reference class. By 
using this form for the theorem of multiplication certain 
logical difficulties that were connected with this theorem 
in the history of the calculus of probability have been 
eliminated. The use of relative probabilities for the 
determination of dependent events can be traced back to a 
corresponding rule given by Laplace as early as 1814. 
The 'logical difficulties' which arose from his conception 
of probability and the evolutionary necessity of such 
difficulties (in the development of the modern calculus) 
will be discussed in detail in a subsequent chapter. 
16 • Axiom IV. Frequency Interpretation 
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That the multiplication theorem can be derived by 
the frequency interpretation can be shown by the following 
equalities: 
: Nn(A•B) • Nn(A•B•C) 
Nn(A) Nn (A•B) 
The resulting formula Fn(A,B•C) • r0(A,B)•Fn(A•B,C) 
states that the desired frequency of the pair B•C can be 
represented as the product of the frequency of B by the 
frequency of C within the subsequence selected by B which 
is the reference class.1 As has been generally stated 
1consider the following sequences of the classes 
A, Band C: 
AAAAAA 
B 1J 1J B,- B 
@c c~c(ID 
Here the number of elements in the sub-
sequence selected (under) the combination 
A•B is given by Nn(A•B). 
previously, the assertion that the probabilities of sub-
sequences represent limits of the frequency is an addi-
tional assertion which need not be stated within the 
axiomatic formulation of the calculus itself. 
The same frequency formulation stated above 
remains valid for the transition to the limit, if the 
individual limit exists. But since each of the axioms 
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represents a tautological relation between frequencies 
which holds strictly even before the transition to the 
limit, therefore, every probability formula derivable from 
the axioms will correspond also to a tautological relation 
between frequencies which will likewise be strictly valid 
before the limit transition bas taken place. It is for 
this reason that it is now seen why this form 
[Fn(A,B•C) = Fn(A,B)·FO{A•B,C)], which was the same used 
in the mathematical formalization of the theorem, is 
always valid, viz., because only in this form does the 
multiplication theorem represent a tautology in the 
frequency interpretation. 
With the completion of axioms I-IV and 'with the 
help of symbolic logic a probability calculus has been 
constructed that exhibits not only the mathematical but 
also the logical structure of its subject matter."1 
l Ibid., p. 121. 
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What has been formulated is an elementar~ calculus, where 
probability sequences are treated solely with respect to 
their external connections without regard to the manner in 
which the elements of such sequences follow one another. 
Probability has been attached to sequences which "exist" 
as units, the mutual relations of which were investigated. 
In this sense both strictly alternating sequences 
(abnormal sequences) and random sequences (normal 
sequences) were subsumed under the name of probability 
sequences in the development of axioms I-IV. Now we shall 
extend these elementary axioms into a formulation of a rule 
permitting us to determine inverse probabilities, and we 
shall do this without referring to the internal order of 
the unit-sequences assumed as given from the very outset 
of the axiomatic development by the rule of existence. 
16. Rule of Elimination 
The following relationships are based solely upon 
the elementary axioms already developed • Thus 1 in an 
attempt to establish a formula expressing a direct 
probability relationship between A and c, thereby 
acquiring the formalization P{A,C), we observe the impli-
cations involved in the following diagram of possible 
probability manoeuvres of A, B, and C. 
( 1) If ( [B v ~] • C I! C) , 
(2) Then it follows that F(A,C) = F(A, [Bv B] • C), 
= F(A,B•Cv B • c), 
(3) which can be restated as 
F(A,C) : F(A,B•C) + F(A,B•C), 
( 4) which breaks down into 
F(A ,C) : F(A ,B) • F(A •B ,C) + F(A ,B) • F(A •B ,C) 
lo4 
Formulas (3) and. (4) express the rule of elimination. By 
examining formula (4) we see that it is possible to deter-
mine F(A,C) only when all the probabilities expressed in 
1 
the diagram have been given. F(A,C) is thus considered 
as expressing the direct probability from A to c. 
By further examining the diagram the necessity of 
knowing all the probability relations involved 1n a deter-
mination becomes more clearly pronounced. 
1Reichenbach refers to these as the 11divergen4i 11 and 
"convergent" probabilities (cf. p. 76, Th.F.) . 
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Since 
is not determined 
by the other probabilities (i.e_., since it is unbound), 
therefore B can be eliminated, in the determination P(A,C), 
only when P(A •13,c) is known! The significance of' this is 
round in causality problems of' the following type. 
Given: A = hot summer day, 
B = thunderstorm, 
C • subsequent change in A. 
stated problem: to determine the probability of' a change 
occurring in the weather, given a hot 
summer •s day. 
Formalized problem: Find P(A,C). 
By employing the information obtained in our derivation or 
the rule or elimination, we round that in order to obtain 
P(A,C) it is first necessary to know the following 
probabilities: 
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(l) the probability of the initial occurrence of a thunder-
storm on a hot day, expressed as P(A,B), 
(2) the probability that a thunderstorm would not occur on 
a hot day, expressed as [1- P(A,B)], or P(A,B), 
(3) the probability of a subsequent change in A after a 
storm had occurred, or P(A•B,C), 
(4) the probability of a subsequent change in A following 
the occurrence of something other than a storm on a 
hot summer day, or P(A ·~,c). 
Combined, these probabilities form the rule permit-
ting the elimination of B 1n the direct determination of c 
from A, viz., 
P(A,C): P(A,B) • P(A•B,C) + P(A,B)• P(A•~,C). 
18. Extended Rule of Elimination 
By replacing ( [B VB] • C ! C), in the last section, 
. 
with a complete (where at least one element is true) and 
exclusive disjunction (where only one is true), we derive 
( [B1 V • • • V Br ] • C ~ C ) 
in which [B1 V • • • v Br] is a many-termed disjunction. 
Consequently, since all the terms of the disjunction must 
-
be in the reference class, there is noB, B dichotomy and 
the previously stated rule of elimination does not hold: 
P(A,C) '1- P(A,B) • P(A•B,C) + P(A,B) • P (A•:B',C) 
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and in its place we insert an expression denoting the sum 
of all the terms of the disjunction: 
P(A,C) : 
l 
P(A ,~) • P(A •Bk, C) 
In this statement of the extended rule of elimin-
ation the implication P(A,Bk) represents the divergent 
(bound) probabilities, therefore 
whereas the probability implication P(A·Bk,C) which repre-
sents the summation of the convergent probabilities is non-
bound. 
It should be noted that these lines represent probabilities 
but not necessarily causal lines. 
lThe subscripts [k=l] =Dr The members of the unit 
class which are to be added,·in this case all members are to 
be included. ---
[r] =Dr The number of terms in disjunction. 
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This extended notation of the elimination rule can 
be illustrated by using the throwing of two dice as an 
example. The probability of getting the face 11111 with a 
second die can be divided, additively, into the probabili-
ties of the various combinations in which this result is 
accompanied by one side k of the other side. Through this 
illustration it can be shown that the extended rule of 
elimination applies only to exclusive disjunctions the 
terms of which mutually exclude one another, i .e • , the 
terms of which one and only one must be true. 
18. General Theorem of Addition 
With the completion of the last rule the question 
arises concerning calculation of the probabilitiss of ~­
exclusive disjunctions. It is quickly seen that simple 
addition does not work. Take, for example, the problem of 
determining the probability of at least one 1tails 1 turn-
ing up if two coins are tossed. Obviously the answer 
cannot be reached by simply adding the probabilities of 
obtaining •tails 1 of each of the respective coins. This 
would result in the contradiction 1/2 + 1/2 = 1. It is 
evident that the conditions for applying the addition 
theorem or, more pointedly, the conditions of mutual 
exclusion (A •B) 'C) must be met. By letting B • the side 
1tails 1 of the first coin, C = •tails' of the second, and 
A : the initial simultaneous throw of both, we can obtain 
the following disjunction of possibleresults: 
(B V C a B •C v B •U" V 1! •C) 
P(A ,B V C) : P(A ,B •C V B ·U" 'II I! •C) 
• ~(A ,B •C) + P(A ,B •C") + P(A ,l:S •C) 
applying numerical values we obtain 
P(A,B v C) : l/2 • l/2 + l/2 • l/2 + l/2 • l/2 
= 3/4, or the probability of obtaining at 
least one tails from the initial throw of the two coins. 
It shall now be shown how, from the formula 
P(A,BV C) : P(A,B•C) + P(A,B·~) + P(A,B•C), a more 
general formula can be derived which applies to both 
exclusive and non-exclusive situations. It shall be 
derived solely from the calculus without the aid of 
material thinking. Since we are starting with the 
formula applying only to non-exclusive disjunctions and 
concluding with a formula applicable to both non-
exclusive and exclusive disjunctions as well, therefore 
the formula for non-exclusive disjunctions shall be held 
to be a generalization of the formulas for exclusive 
disjunctions. The steps of such a derivation are 
symbolized as follows: 
(l) given: P(A,B v C) : P(A,B•C) + P(A,B·C") + P(A,l!•C) 
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{2) The probability that B will occur as tails (in this 
equation) is 
P(A,B) : P{A,B•C VB·~) : P(A,B•C) + P{A,B·~) 
This is to say, in non-exclusive disjunctions where 
both Band C can turn up as tails, that it is 
immaterial, if B turns up, whether or not C turns up. 
But if B does not turn up (viz., B), then C must turn 
up. Therefore, 
(3) P(A,C) : P(A,B•C) + P(A,~·C) 
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Now, since (1), {2) and (3) are all factors of the 
same formula, it is permissible to construct their 
sum. This addition of (1), {2) and (3), with the aid 
of the algebraic law or transposition, is expressed in 
the form 
(4) P{A,BVC): P~ + ~+ ~ 
0 : P(A,B) - P(A,B•C) - P~ 
0 • P(A,C) -~-P~ 
I P(A,B v C) • P(A,B) + P(A,C) - P{A,B•C)] 
which shall be called the general theorem ot addition.1 
1 ~·~ cf. pp. 82, 83, 88, 103, 107, 119. 
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This can be seen to be a generalization of the addition 
theorem mathematically formalized earlier as P(A~B v C) = 
P(A~B) + P(A~C). In the generalized formula it is seen 
that P(A~B v C) is not contingent upon the conditions of 
~xclusivity 1 expressed in the context because if exclusive 
it is taken care of by the notation [-P(A ~B •C)] which was 
derived from the non-exclusive formula. It is therefore 
'hlways-true 11 in the sense that it is always-applicable 
regardless of exclusivity. Perhaps it should be noted 
here that the process of deriving the generalized always-
true formula from the formula for non-exclusive 
disjunctions is 1rreversible 6 thus the formula for the 
determination of exclusive disjunctions is seen to 
actually presuppose (assume) a more widely applicable 
formula as its backdrop. This corresponds exactly with 
the 'positions' of two-valued and multi-valued logicl 
20. Rule of the Product 
Given three events A (as initial condition), B (as 
interruption of A) 6 and C (as the effect of the interrup-
tion B)~ and assuming only the rule of existence and the 
elementary axioms of the calculus of probability already 
developed~ we shall now attempt to construct formally 
(i.e.~ without •materiality' except as a subsequent 
illustrative guide) a rule, or formula 6 expressing the 
1 possible relationships of these three given events. 
First, by examining the mathematical formuli-
zation of the multiplication theorem 
P(A,B•C) = P(A,B) • P(A•B,C) 
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we see that the complete probability status of B and c 
with respect to A[P(A,B•C)] is not expressed. Therefore, 
because B and C are symmetrical on the left side of the 
equation since the "and" connecting them is commutative, 
we are justified in further equating P(A,B•C) with P(A,C)• 
P(A•C,B). 
Now this is not to say that the corresponding 
individual probability statement are equal, i.e., that 
P(A,B) = P(A,C), for although they are proportional, it 
is only their products which are equal. This can be seen, 
and at the same time we can determine the (more) complete 
2 probability status of B and C with respect to A and 
P(A,B·C), by equating these multiplications and thereby 
eliminating P(A,B•C): 
IP(A ,B) • P(A •B,C) = P(A ,c) • P(A •C ,B) .I 
1It should be remembered that our axioms deal only 
with variable combinations. 
2i.e., with A as a factor in the reference class. 
This expression is called the rule of the product, from 
which it will eventually be possible to derive all the 
other B-and-c-with-respect-to-A combinations. 
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For illustrative purposes we shall give values to 
the symbols A, B, C 1 being careful to keep in mind that if 
we are to abi4e by our original intention of developing a 
strictly formal calculus it will be essential that any 
question as to which of these probabilities we shall choose 
to determine must be regarded as strictly arbitrary and 
conventional. 
21. Bayes 1 Rule for Determining Inverse Probabilities 
Thus we shall assume that all probability impli-
cations predict (infer) unobserved (unknown) events on 
the basis of observed (known) events which form the 
reference class. Remember 1 this is an assumption. 
Accordingly, we shall assign the following values: 
A = certain general data at a certain time t1, 
viewed possibly as the saage, general conditions, 
backdrop, etc.; 
B = a particular occurrence at t2, but one which is 
recorded only 1via 1 an inference from Cat t3, 
this is to say that B is not directly known; 
c = a particular effect occurring at t 3 (given as the 
effect of B) •1 
lrt can be seen that A, B and C thus correspond with 
the examples given earlier: A • hot summer day, B = thunder-
storm, and C • subsequent change in weather. 
While the quantity P(A·B,C) expresses the pnb&-
ability that a certain cause (as reference class) will 
produce a certain effect (as attribute class), the 
quantity P{A•C,B) states the probability that an observed 
effect !!!!_ produced by a specified cause. Thus, although 
the former is useful in particular problems such as in 
social statistics, by taking B and C as events standing 
to each other in the relation of cause to effect the 
quantity P(A•C, B) becomes or p~rticular interest and is 
derived by simple transposition from the rule of the 
product. Accordingly, 
P(A,C) • P{A•C,B) =-P(A,B) • P(A•B,C) 
becomes 
P(A •C ,B) : P(A,B) • P(A•B,C) 
P(A,C) 
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The three probabilities on the right-hand side of the 
equation are referred to as the three fundamental probabil-
:liies governing A, B, C relations, for they determine, 
completely, the probability status of B and C with respect 
to A. This rule is appropriately called the rule for the 
probability of a cause. But considering B as another 
possible cause or c, what would normally be represented by 
P(A,C) must be expanded so as to include the case 1it is 
not the case that B ••• •. This is accomplished by 
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referring back to the rule of elimination 
P(A,C) : P(A,B) • P(A•B,C) + P(A,~)· P(A•~,C) 
and making the substitution for P(A,C), thereby transform-
ing the previously stated expression for the rule for the 
probability or a cause into 
P(A,B) • P(A•B,C) 
which can be generalized even further so as to include 
more possible interpreta tiona. This is done by recalling 
the extended rule or elimination 
r 
P(A,C) • ~ P(A~) • P(A·~,C) 
After again substituting for the denominator of the rule 
for the probability or a cause we obtain a formalized 
statement of a rule for determining the inverse probabili-
ties or the unobserved causes of events, commonly referred 
to as J!yes• rule: 
• P(A·~ 1C) 
1Reichenbach, Theory of Probability, op. cit., 
cr. pp. 92-95, 101, 126, 432. 
1 
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Event Bi in P(A,Bi) is referred to certain general data A 
the acquisition of which must preceed the observation of 
c. This is to ·say, in our illustration, that a "complete" 
knowledge must first be obtained pertaining to the 
definition of •a hot summer day' in order to legitimately 
recognize that a change has occurred at C due to the inter-
cession of B. It is in this sense that P(A,Bi) and P(A,Bk) 
are referred to as the antecedent probabilities of the 
relationship. On the other hand, the probabilities 
expressed by P(A•C,Bk) are determined 1n Bayes' rule as 
functions of the forward probabilities, viz., all those 
occurring on the right-hand side of the formula. All such 
probabilities occurring as functions of forward probabili-
ties are thus called inverse probabilliies. From the 
formalized structure of the rule it can be seen that with-
out a knowledge of the antecedent probabilities (on the 
right side of the equation) the problem would be indeter-
minate • Thus , only when 
• • • 
do the antecedent probabilities cancel out, thereby 
establishing Bayes' rule in simplified form: 
P(A •Bk,C) 
It is at this point that we must examine the 
teleology, or ultimate direction of our axiomatic 
development. In other words, granting that the probabil-
ity concept has been successfully developed up to this 
point quite independent of any interpretation, neverthe-
less, it is at precisely this point that disagreement (in 
fact, radical disagreement) arises concerning the further 
development of a probability concept. Many attempts at 
constructing a probability concept from the axioms of the 
calculus of probability have reached more or less the 
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same plateau of development expressed by the general 
apparent acceptance of Bayes 1 rule for determining inverse 
probabilities. Nevertheless, the thread that eventually 
turns the tide for many logicians is often found at this 
point by forcing each constructive engineer to step 
momentarily out of his strict formalistic framework and 
explicitly confess that regardless of his (or any other's) 
final conclusions concerning a probability schema, such a 
constructcan be studied successfully only within the realm 
of epistemological application. This is simply to require 
of each 1engineer 1 that he admit to the initially 
necessary assumption of an existence rule; an admit*&~ 
which would reveal the primary concern that in the latter 
stages of development this particular probability concept 
will adequately conform to (interpret, feel out, represent, 
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provide reliable information of) the external world. We 
find that in performing just such an •exorcism' many have 
become tainted by initially incorporating into their 
supposedly 'bare' assumptions a fundamental bias which 
becomes, in effect, the determining factor of faulty con-
clusions. Thus the initial teleology becomes apparent in 
its conclusions; so-called transparency becoming apparent 
thus becomes blighted. The bias mentioned corresponds 
exactly with the assumptions of analyticity and truth-
functional alternatives attacked earlier, viz., it is the 
blight of presupposed symmetry; external congruity immacu-
lately conceivedl 
On the same note, it is in complete congruity with 
an unempeachable disgust with the 1reenforced 1 icon that 
we shall attempt to show con~lusively that such precon-
ceived ontologies do not conform with the conditions set 
down in Bayes' rule and subsequently must be proven 
inadequate as possible vehicles or interpretation. We 
shall show how, within an a priorily assumed two-value 
construct (e.g., Carnap 1s •analyticity•), in the abandon-
~ of what might be called the "alternative-bias" or 
bias or necessary-conditionals (if not true, therefore, 
false), it would be a contradiction to derive a generali-
zation other than one strictly acquiesing to the truth-
false opposition which is the trademark or two-valued 
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frameworks. What we are actually saying is that disorder 
cannot be viewed as the antithesis of order. The one can-
not recapitulate the other. Thus, to deny one's initial 
assumptions of the bias of alternative determinations does 
not entail the immediate inheritance of dis-order as the 
guiding light of all critical thinking. 'Disorder• as 
antithesis becomes meaningless and unintelligible, as do 
any a priori attempts to discredit those occurrences which 
are un-uniform. lronically, it will be shown that only 
through the initial coordination of the assumption of the 
ideal structure of reality and the subsequent contradic-
tions which arose that the probability concept initially 
entered the physical ·sciences, which is by definition the 
coordination of externality per se. Of course, all 
concepts of probability can be made to 1follow 1 if 
confined to that bare undelineated enclosure where the 
invention took place; assuming the deductive congruity of 
one's axioms, onlythhe question of application causes 
moments of embarrassment. The mistake· (or 1blight') 
evident in the historical presentation of probability 
resulted :ftaom a surreptitious glance prematurely made in 
the direction of the externality they hoped to eventually 
describe. Prejudice will be held to be necessary, only 
in the sense of positing that "something is out there," 
not necessarily what. 
CHAPrER V 
THE A POSTERICRI PRESUPPOSrriONS OF THE 
SO-cALLED A PRIORI EQUIP.ROBABILITY 
1. Revolution Without Ideology 
The urn from which we are to draw the white and 
black balls is no less than the one to which Quetelet re-
fers when he epitomises a novel interpretation of scien-
tific reasoning in the assertion "1 1urne que nous inter-
rogeons c •est la nature." Pearson speaks of it as the 
"nature bag. ••1 Among other consolati.ons he extracted 
therefrom, one Pierre Si.mon, Marquis de Laplace who con-
ceived it as possible to provide a long overdue rationale 
for inductive reasoning and a rebuttal of Hume•s so often 
misconstrued scepticism. our interest in Laplace stems 
primarily from the general consensus that he was the first 
philosopher to justify a theory of induction with the 
calculus of chance. By the explicit introduction of such 
a calculus in an effort to deny the Humean denial we hope 
to uncover the bone-structure of the most insidious 
departure from the classical tradition. By "insidious 
1 K. Pearson, Grammar of Science, 2nd ed. (London: 
1892) 1 P• 147 • 
-120-
departure 11 is meant the undeniable abolition of Humean, 
or classical presuppositions, not merely a surface 
bickering over fallacious deductive manoeuvres. But we 
will repeatedly warn that such a complete re-evaluation 
is only dimly visible in the exposition of the doctrine 
as set down by Laplace himseli'. Although the vehicle of 
transcendence (viz •. , the calculus of·:;probabilities) is 
stated clearly enough, nevertheless Laplace's formal 
explanation is essentially based upon exactly the same 
assumptions held by Hume and is in itself not to be con-
sidered as a formulation or a completely new ideology. 
Instead we shan present Laplace •s calculus as a •surface 
bickering' with Humean deductions, a reaction, but in 
historical context only. When fully exploited, Laplace's 
justification or induction does not merely end in a 
ricochet of contradictions confined solely within the 
logical framework presupposed. Its very failure will 
provide a loophole for escape. In fact, we shall find 
that the inadequacy of Laplace's induction by probability 
can be established only by challenging the self evident 
121 
a priori aspect or the asserted assumptions as actually 
presupposing quite opposite (quite empirical) principles. 
We shall see that such a 1challenge 1 does not arise in the 
Humean schema for no such motives exist. It was only by 
the mediating reaction or Laplace that the post-Laplacean, 
in reacting against that particular reaction, i.e., in 
the counter-movement# was forced to establish a new 
ideolog~, the germ of which appeared, though well guised, 
in the initial revolution. 
On the grounds that only a priori truths hold 
eternally, that is, in all possible worlds, Hume 
supposed hiS coordinating logistic (i.e.# his normative 
function) to be self-evident and axiomatic. A framework 
which permitted onl~ tautological transformations or, 
postulates which existed implicitly in# and therefore 
followed necessarily from, the pre-assumed axioms. 
Hume 1s justification for accepting a two-valued, or 
alternative logic as the self-evident precondition of any 
proposed rational activit~ was precisely, on the whole, 
simply that he could think precisely of no antecedent 
reason why he shouldn't think of 1 necessit~ 1 as the con-
trolling influence over any judgment.1 Thus the compon-
ent variables of any linguistic scheme, to have any value 
at all, must be either true or false·idlich implies that 
the~ are necessaril~ derived from the initial assumption. 
Thus equipped a priori with empty structure, Hume in his 
attempt at empirical assimilation, established the 
isolated event as axiomatic but# unhappily, as that axiom 
lor course, the problem concerns the meaning of 
"necessity." 
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from which nothing followed. It was natural that on these 
grounds there could be no necessary justification of induc-
tion. 
When we look about us towards external objects, and 
consider the operation of causes, we are never able 
in a single instant, to discover any power or neces-
sary connection, any quality which, binds the effect 
to the cause, and renders the one an infalliable 
consequence of the other. We only find, that the 
one does actually, in fact, follow the other.1 
causality was thus reduced to a succession of conventionally 
enumerated entities. For although the idea of logical nec-
essity was 'real' enough due to its self-evidency, any 
empirical application was doomed as potential mythology, 
for necessity 1per se' could not be demonstrated. "We only 
learn by experience the frequent conjunction of objects, 
without being ever able to comprehend anything like con-
2 
nexion between them." In this sense at least, Hume 1s 
a priori concept of 'necessity' can be compared with 
Carnap's concept of •analyticity.• 
It was in strict opposition to Hume 1s conclusion in 
the argument, "if a priori necessity, therefore, no 
a posteriori necessity," that Laplace defined the natural 
order as synmetrical, viz. 1 that the past and future of 
each event existed implicitly within that event. It is 
lnavid Hume, An 
~ (LaSalle 1 Illinois: 
or:fg. ed. 1777)~ p. 67. 
2Ibid., p. 75 • 
Inquiry Concerning Human Understand-
Open Court Press, 1949 -Reprint of 
124 
said that upon inquiring of Laplace as to what rSle God 
played in his nebular hypothesis, that Napoleon received 
the reply that in so rational and orderly a world as 
Newtonean physics was disclosing this one to be, there was 
simply no need for the divine hypothesis. Laplace did not 
hesitate to assume that the causal precision governing 
both celestial and terrestial bodies also holds within the 
atomic domain. Since, "the human mind offers, in the per-
fection which it has been able to give to astronomy, a 
feeble idea of this intelligence,"1 it therefore reflects 
the constellations of atoms within the brains.2 Thus he 
concludes that since "present events are connected with 
preceding ones by a tie based upon the [self-] evident 
principle that a thing cannot occur without a cause which 
produces,n3 therefore, every future occurrence is as 
4 determined as the past. Therefore with human ignorance 
alone preventing us from absolute prediction of the future, 
it follows that the concept of probability originates in 
human imperfection and has no objective significance. It 
1Pierre Simon, Marquis de Laplace, A Philosophical 
Essay on Probability, tr. by F. w. Truscott arid F. t: 
Emory (New York: Dover Publication, Inc., 1951), p. 4. 
2no we gather then that intelligence is a property 
of 11atoms"? On the contrary, that a thing is an ordered 
event implies only that it is a determined event; not that 
it is a self-determined event. 
3Laplace, A Philosophical ••• , op. cit., p. 3. 
4Tha t this is nothing more than an assertion that 
Hume is wrong is exactly the point. 
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was held a proiri that the strict type of law has a logical 
priority. Such was Hume•s assumption. Though both affirmed 
the existence of isolated, immediate events, they disagreed 
as to the necessary connections implicit therein. Laplace, 
by assuming his two-valued judging coordinate to be in 1-1 
correspondence with the symmetry of the universe thus held 
that single events, if directly verifiable, could be 
asserted to be isomorphic reflections of both their causes 
and possibilities. At the present, only human inadequacy 
stood in the way of direct verification, but it was held 
that in time, if molecules could be directly observed, then 
its complete causal line could be likewise verified. Thus, 
with a reference class of tautologies, all future events 
must be mere repetitions of past events, a symmetry 
observed at present. The reason Hume 1s critique of causal-
ity appears so nihilistic evolves from his requirement that 
causality in order to be rational must meet the specifi-
cations of logical necessity. Counter-balancing this 
negative accentuation is Laplace's assertion that physics 
does, in tact, meet these requirements. 
Actually this conclusion of ultimate symmetry 
closely reselbles the ontological conclusions of the 
Einstein-Minkowski space-time manifold inasmuch as both 
must result in the assertion of an absolute time 
1 (objectively speaking). Such views inevitably lead 
Laplace to identify man as a logically possible superman: 
We ought then to regard the present state of the 
universe as the effect or its anterior state and as 
the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for 
one instance an intelligence which could comprehend 
all the forces by which nature is animated and the 
respective situation or the beings who compose it--
an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these 
data to analysis--it would embrace in the same 
formula the movements or ~he greatest bodies or the 
universe and those or the lightest atom; for it, 
nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the 
past, would be present to its eyes.2 
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We might add that the very sense or the temporal succession 
of events reflects our present ignorance by the fact that 
temporality demands a future 1becom1ng 1 which exists only 
as the need for verification of the present. 
Stated as such, Laplace's position did not take, in 
relation to Hume 1s, the form or a counter-ideology but 
existed •merely' as a reactionism against the Humean ~ 
elusions only. It is at this stage that ideas come in pairs 
and contradiction~ by reflecting opposition, preserves its 
1More will be said concerning temporal objectivity 
in a later chapter. Meanwhile it will suffice to remember 
that or all Riemann space-times, the simplest is the flat 
space-time of Minkowski. It corresponds physically to the 
complete absence of gravitation. 
2Laplace, A Philoso~ical ••• , op. cit., p. 4. 
It might be held that herent says almost literally the 
same thing. 
127 
counterparts-in-opposition. What does this say? Visually, 
that contradiction must follow only within the same medi-
ating construct. It is at this level (which we shall later 
call a level of evolution) that possible Revolution is 
grounded in opposition or, reactionism. In this sense we 
are referring to a reactionism as the principle engine of 
reflection (the motor principle). Thus it was in strict 
reactionary form that Laplace countered, not against the 
initial Humean presupposition of a two-valued logical scheme 
as the only possible judging coordinate through which any 
semblance of empirical order can be interpretated, but 
solely against the Humean conclusion that nothing in the 
realm of nature corresponded, or followed, with such axioma-
tic necessity. 
Since things must be either true or false, the 
question must be answered as to which of these values do 
1things 1 acquiesce. In order to answer this question 
empirically each philosopher further assumed the positive 
immediateness of the single experience.l From this central 
point they parted company. Hume, unable to move, spoke of 
eternal isolation, while Laplace, convinced of man's 
!Although Laplace does not explicitly state a 
positivistic position, he certainly implies a doctrine of 
immediate verification with statements such as those 
asserting the reflection of the external symmetry of the 
universe in the single atomic event. 
eventual triumph over ignorance 1 sang or temporary soli-
tude. In keeping with the Humean assumptions concerning 
the limits or logical interpretation, Laplace never 
explicitly questioned the grounds or self-evidence which 
assured a one-by-one empiricism. But he did not need to 
verify his theory or symmetry with future observations 
based upon past recollections, for from the confirmation 
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of the single event he was able to hypostisize necessity, 
running in both directions. Furthermore he justified such 
clairvoyance with the identical principle employed by 
Hume, viz. 1 due to lack of sufficient reason to the 
contrary. Consequently we must define the relation as one 
or action and subsequent reaction. Now the question arises 
as to whether these counter-measures of Laplace will eventu-
ally (in time) give birth to a counter-ideology, viz., an 
empiricism based on a multi-valued logic as a necessary 
generalization or the two-valued type assumed by both 
constituents or the reactionism. Following this idea we 
shall hope to show that Laplace's results created only in 
practice the very idea which eventually clarified it but 
which could hardly be applied to Hume 1s theory, as stated. 
Thus it is only through analysis of the Laplacian results 
in action that the seed of genuine reformulation is first 
discovered then exploited in the direction of a complete 
reassessment of scientific single-event presuppositions in 
statistical terms. It must remain clear that though the 
seeds of a new ideology may be implicit in the initial 
reaction) tha~nevertheless, this is not to be understood 
1 in the Aristotelian sense of potentiality. 
2. LaPlace's So-called Justification 
of Inverse Probabilities 
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It has been pointed out that Laplace's case for an 
external symmetry rests on the confirmation of a single 
isolated event. Once this has been accomplished all past 
and future possibilities can be inferred, relying solely 
upon the evidence directly available. Laplace held that 
just such an isolated hypothesis can be derived from an 
examination of the mechanisms involved in the games of 
chance. In the die, for example, if there are no known 
reasons for predicting, say, the side tttwo" rather than the 
side 11 five 11 in the throw of a single die then the probabil-
ities of any one side appearing as opposed to any other 
(assuming there are six possible sides) is 1/6. 
lrt is false that a multi-valued logic can be 
defined within a two-valued scheme, although the reverse 
is true. It is in this sense that a multi-valued concept 
will be the New Ideology, not opposing but 'born out of 1 
the mediating opposition within the Old Ideology. The 
New Ideology 'evolves• from the complications involved in 
the denials of the old ideology; it is not the denial itself 
which defines it. Denial results from contradictions them-
selves from attempts to justify the Old Ideology. 
The theory of chance consists in reducing all 
the events of the same kind to a certain number of 
cases equally possible, that is to say, to such as 
we may be equally undecided about in regard to 
their existence, and in determining the number of 
cases favorable to the event whose probability is 
sought.1 
Now, upon first approaching a particular situ-
ation, 
When the probability of a single event is un-
known we may suppose it equal to any value from 
zero to unity. The probability of each of these 
hypotheses, drawn from the event observed, is ••• 
a fraction whose numerator is the probability of 
the event in this hypothesis and whose denominator 
is the sum of the similar probabilities relative to 
all the hypotheses.2 
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Thus when the probability of an event is unknown, 
we may suppose all possible values of the probability 
between 0 and 1 to be equally possible a priori. The 
probability, after the event has occurred, that the 
probability a priori was (et~) 1/r, is measured by a 
fraction of which 1/r is the numerator and the sums of all 
the possible a priori values the denominator. For example, 
if we use Jevon 1s illustration 
if the letters of the word roma be thrown down 
casually in a row, what is -:crurprobability that they 
will form a significant Latin word? The possible 
arrangements of four letters are 4X 3 X 2 X 1, or 
24 in number, and if all the arrangements, be examined, 
seven of these will be found to have meaning, namely, 
roma, ramo, oram, mora, maro, armo, and amor. Hence 
the probability of-a81gnificant result is 7/24.3 
1~., p. 6. 2Ibid., p. 18. 
3w. s. Jevons, The Principles of Science (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1924), p. 203. 
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Thus Laplace assumes that every probability has 
a numerical value a priori and that, in those cases where 
there seems to be no unique, preferential numerical value 
(i.e., no reason for choosing •ramo' in preference to 
•maro') this value is not non-existent but unknown (due to 
the insufficiency or human reason to know absolutely that 
the problem is symmetrical). He proceeds to argue that in 
cases where the prior numerical value is unknown every 
value between 0 and 1 is equally probable prior to the 
event. 
For example, the theorem or addition permits us to 
inter that the probability is = 1/r for every single or 
possible term (i.e., 1/6 for side X of die, 1/24 for 
1ramo, 1 etc). Such a value judgment is characterized by 
the existence of a complete and exclusive disjunction 
[(avb)·~l or equiprobable terms from which the inference 
is made. The degree of;probability is thus reduced to the 
determination or the concept equiprobable which is, by 
definition, the determination or probabilities on the 
ground of properties or external symmetry. Thus the physi-
cal alternatives are symmetrically opposed due to the 
insufficiency of human capabilities (at present) to know 
their asymmetry. Since there is no reason to the contrary, 
therefore, equiprobabilityl 
Thus Laplace tells us that although the values of 
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the antecedent probabilities are unknown 1 nevertheless the 
probability, relative to the same evidence 1 that this prob-
ability has a given value (i.e., that it exists externally) 
is not 1 itself, unknown. Clearly we are involved in an 
infinite regress. can absence of reason to the contrary 
guarantee the equality of antecedent probabilities (possi-
bilities) "instinctively"? 
. . 
According to Laplace we are entitled to treat 
alternatives as equipro~ble if, but only if, we know that 
the available evidence ·does not provide for preferring any 
one to any other. According to the principle of indif'f'er-
~ we may call alternatives equiprobable if we do not 
know that the available evidence provides a reason for pre-
ferring any one to any other. Instead of knowledge of 
absence Laplace accepts absence of knowledge as sufficient 
1 ground for judgments ef' probability. This change accords 
with his subjectivism for •absence of knowledge' signifies 
only a fact about a mind, whereas 'knowledge of absence' 
signifies not only a fact about a mind, but also a truth 
about something independent of that mind. It is likewise 
1In regards to a comment made by a certain professor 
concerning this passage 1 that he was "intrigued to note that 
appeal to ignorance is used as a basis for belief in other 
things than immortality," may it be stated that a priori 
equiprobabili ty is ( = Dr) inmortali ty. 
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in accordance with our underlying theme that most of the 
writers to whom we owe the development of the calculus of 
chances primarily held a subjectivist theory of probab11-
1ty.1 The irony involved in the eventual establishment of 
an objective, or a posteriori interpretation of probability 
which employ the same rules of calculus must be considered 
an •evolutionary• by-product. 
The principle of ignorance (Insufficient Reason) 
oan be easily shown to lead to absurd! ties. Supposedly it 
justifies the probability assertion of a die's falling with 
the number "two" uppermost as being 1/6, but it could be 
used equally well to justify an assertion that the probabil-
ity is 1/2. Considering the two oases falling-with-the-
number-"two"-uppermost and fall1ng-w1th-any-al terna tive-
' ' 
number-uppermost as our two possibilities; and, with our 
only information being that a die has been thrown, we may 
say that we know of no reason to assert either of these 
alternatives rather than the other. F.er surely, we say, 
the logical notation • (jx) (FX v FX) 1 tells us as much. 
It should follow that the probabilities of each alterna-
tive are equal to l/2., Therefore the probability of a 
1 The subjectivist theorist assumes external 
(objective) symmetry from the very outset due to 1 laok of 
sufficient reason to the contrary.• This is to say that 
objective symmetry is caused by subjective ignorance. 
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die's falling with "two" uppermost is 1/2, and so on for 
each of the six possible results, which is absurd. Never-
theless, such an assertion has been upheld in all serious-
ness by Jevons who holds (in accordance with Laplace) that 
if we know of any proposition only that it may or may not 
be true we are able to take its probability as 1/2 because 
this is in accordance with the equal distribution of our 
1 ignorance between the alternatives. 
To hold such an eminent mathematician as Laplace 
to such an absurdity would indeed be an injustice for it 
is clear that many who professed to use the principle of 
indifference for finding equiprobable cases must have used, 
for measuring purposes, some other principle or principles, 
that is, additional requirements which will allow for the 
determination of probabilities a priori. One such 'addi-
tion• would be to require the alternatives to which the 
principle of indifference is to be applied to be geometri-
cally symmetrical or equispecific, i.e., that they should 
be coordinate alternatives according to some one principle 
of division. But althoygh we shall avoid some of the 
absurdities of the first example, it is obvious that in 
the case of a loaded die that the probability of such a 
die 1s favoring a certain side is greater than 1/6. 
1Jevons, The Principles of Science, op. cit., p. 21~ 
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But if we try to discover the exact value of this probabil-
ity what are the equispecific alternatives to consider? 
Surely the alternatives of falling with "one" uppermost, or 
,.two," "three," etc., are just as much equispecific altern-
atives, that is, in respect to geometrical symmetry alone, 
for a loaded die as for an ordinary die, and yet we now 
refuse to call them equiprobable. Even if we grant, that 
equiprobability for mechanisms like the dice and roulette 
wheel are desirable only from certain of their physical 
properties, among which geometrical symmetry plays an impor-
tant part, the point in question still remains: If nothing 
is known to the contrary and geometrical symmetry is 
assumed (a priori) can we, therefore, infer the conclusion 
that equal areas obtain equal possibilities? 
Consider the problem of transition from one attri-
bute space to another or equal "area •• when the two spaces 
are coupled by a nonlinear measure transformation. Now, 
according to the principle of Insufficient Reason, if equal 
areas possess equal probabilities in one space, they should 
do so in the other. Actual observational experience tells 
us differently: 
Assume it is known only that the specific weight of 
an unknown substance lies between 4 and 6. The 
principle [of Insufficient Reason, or Indifference 
or, No Reason to the Contrary] then leads to the 
consequence that there Is a probability of 1/2 that 
the specific weight lies between 4 and 5 1 the same 
holding for the interval from 5 to 6. Applying the 
same inferences to the determination of the specific 
volume 1 which is the reciprocal value of the speci-fic we1ght 1 we arrive at the result that the speci-fic volume is to be expected with a probability 
greater than 1/2 in';the interval from 1/4 to 1/5 1 
since the difference 1/4 - 1/5 is greater than the 
difference 1/5 - 1/6. This results contradicts the 
previous one.1 
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Granted 1 at first s1ght 1 the justification of an 
assertion of equiprobability on the grounds of insufficient 
reason seems plausible enough. Jevons · apparently 
associated (as did Laplace) the inference with the logical 
"feeling" of self-evidence and on these subjective grounds 
(which will be seen to be at most 1 a product of our 
supposed knowledge) posited equiprobability as a condition 
holding for objects. Thus probability is equated with 
possibility. Indeed it is the implied connotation.of the 
principle itself 1 in proclaiming our a priori ignorance of 
external relations 1 that would seem to prohibit 1 by 
definition 1 any assumption as to the actual probability 
itself. Nevertheless~ consider the following clash with 
reality and the resulting "hedging" of a supposedly avowed 
a priorist. Such ~:•clashes'1 are brought about through 
passive observation of actual frequencies. 
Of lotteries Keynes records the following 
particulars: 
1Reichenbach 1 Theory of Probab111tl 1 op. cit. 1 
p. 355. 
Czubes has made calculations based on lotteries 
of Prague ( 2854 drawings ) and Brtl:rm ( 2703 drawings ) 
between the years 1854 and 1886,,in which the actual 
results agree very well with theoretical predictions. 
Fechner employed the lists of ten State lotteries of 
saxony between the years 1843 and 1852. Of another 
more interesting character are Professor Karl 
Pearson's investigations into the results of Monte 
carlo Roulette as recorded in Le MOnaco in the course 
of eight weeks. Applying Bernou1111 *s Theorem [viz., 
if a certain inexactness ~ is specified, the prob-
ability that the frequency f • m/n of a segment of 
the length n will lie within P + ~ can be made as 
closely equal to 1 and desired oy making n larger), 
on the hyPothesis of the equiprobability of all the 
compartments throughout the investigation, he found 
that the actually recorded proportions of red and 
black were not unexpected, butthat alternations am 
long runs were so much in excess that, on the 
assumption of the exact accuracy of the tables, the 
a priori Odds were at least a thousand millions to 
one against some of the recorded deviations. 
Professor Pearson concluded, therefore, that Monte 
Carlo Roulette is not objectively a game of chance in 
the sense that the tables on which it is played are 
absolutely devoid of b1as.1 
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Should the occurrence of physical events follow the direc-
tive of human ignorance (upon which the assertion of equi-
probability is based)? 
The important point to recognize is that any addi-
tional requirements, be they geometrical or biological, 
which we may introduce are not mere modifications of the 
principle of indifference, but radically new conditional 
The necessary application of Bernouilli 1s Theorem by 
Pearson in the passage cited by Keynes above is an excellent 
1Keynes, Treatise of Probability (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1957. 
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example or nervous 1hedging. 1 Later we shall examine the 
utility or this theorem as the only possible way Laplace 
was able to apply his theory or probability to practical 
problems, but tor the present let it be made clear that 
the principle of indifference which purports to provide a 
rule tor the determination or probabilities a priori from 
the consideration of our own ignorance, must be rejected 
entirely. 
As a final example consider the case that so long 
as nothing was known about the mechanism of fertilization, 
·the probability was assumed to be 1/2.1 The chances of a 
male birth were considered equiprobable. Again the ground 
tor this probability assertion as to a future actuality 
was the principle of indifference. Later, due to obser-
vational research, it was discovered that 1n the surround-
ings or the ovum the number or spermatozo8ns producing the 
male sex somewhat surpass those of the rema.le producing 
one, and consequently the probability based on actual 
physical frequencies gives a slight edge to male births. 
It would be plainly absurd to claim any binary relation 
exists between the two probability assertions. As was 
lAlthough this as well as the 'lottery' example 
pertains to equiprobability of large numbers of events, 
as opposed to single event equiprobabilities, we are 
reminded that it is the grounds for such assertions that 
is questioned here. 
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seen in the case of Pearson, in the face of contradictory 
evidence the adherent to a priori equiprobability must 
either admit total defeat or seek refuge in large numbers; 
hoping against finite results for a priori correspondence 
in the infinite "long run" of Bernoulli's Theorem. 
' ' Meanwhile it has become necessary, in attempting 
to discredit all intuitive statements of empirical fact, 
somewhat to overrate the positions of such "intuitionists" 
as Pearson and Jevons in order to hoist them up to the level 
of minimum intelligibility. By reverse measure it appears 
that for lack of a commonly accepted degree-linguistics we 
have requisitioned Laplacean equiprobability in favor of 
two-valued appraisal, and thus co~tted the injustice of 
anachronistically identifying the contradictions arrived 
at by Laplace with those round in the assertions of 
Pearsons and Jevons. With the results that the degree of 
infamy is equated and the Laplacean contribution is ~ear­
fulltunderated. For it was Laplace's inconsistencies 
which eventually supplied the post-Laplacean with the 
explicit motive for a scientific re-evaluation and a new 
ideology. It is with "ought" in mind that serious 
consideration will be given to Laplace's formulation of 
inverse probabilities. Thus the attempt to inversely 
infer the antecedent conditions of an event solely from 
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from the evidence. presented in the:;_:l.solated event becomes 
of' a "moral" endeavor. A daring programme which 6 if' 
successful, would have permitted a complete appraisal of' 
the world lines of' any observed event; an omniscience 
having total disregard f'or both temporality or 'becoming.' 
Nearly all inquiries into the causes of' observed 
events are performed in terms of' Bayes' theorem which 
gives explicit enunciation to a rule f'or the determination 
of' inverse probabilities. Such a form of inquiry is often 
called the method of' indirect evidence. The importance of' 
this rule in its relation to Laplace lies in noting that 
there is a formal proof' which makes plain the necessity in 
general (if' the causes of' an event, are to be inferred at 
all), of' taking into account the antecedent probabilities 
of the possible causes. 
By assuming the existence or some probability 
implications to be given we have already dealed with the 
question of how to derive new probability implications 
from the given ones. We have held the existence of' a 
probability implication to be, in general, a synthetic 
statement that cannot be proved by the calculus, but which, 
with its help, enables us to infer new ones. We have also 
established that the •existence 1 assumed is not(:an axiom 
or the calculus but is derived •a posteriori and asserted 
at a meta-level of the language. Once granting this 
existence assumption 
when three events A1 B1 C1 are concerned 1 it is 
sufficient to ascertain statistically the values 
of the three fundamental probabilities; these 
values ••• are sufficient to derive all other 
probabilities of B and C that have the term A 
and reference class or as a factor of the refer-
ence class •1 
By recalling Bayes• rule we have the following 
formula: 
2 
Thus we have the probability Cf a particular hypothesis 
in relation to our total information where the numerator 
is one of the terms summed in the denominator. 
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Now Laplace claimed that absence of knowledge of 
numerical values 1 for example 1 of the probabilities of the 
antecedent conditions surrounding each throw of the die 
were equiprobabilities was equivalent to the knowledge of 
their equality; an assertion which 1 if granted 1 leads to 
their immediate cancellation 1 leaving us with the inference 
of equiprobability as the cause of each throw 1 regardless 
lReichenbach 1 Theory of Probability, op. cit. 1 p. 92. 
2Refer to previous formulation of Bayes• rule. 
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of the results obtained. But an analysis of the calculus 
of probabilities shows us that no such inference exists 
which would enable us to infer with probability from an 
observed effect c the presence of the cause B. For such 
an inference presupposes the implication (B ) C) as its 
self-evident condition. In other words, from (B)C} it 
does not follow that (C ~B) because (B ) C) supplies only 
~ 
P(A•B,C) = 1, or certainty, and has nothing at all to do 
with P{A,B) and P{A•B,C) which exist independently as 
certain general data which must be acquired before {inde-
pendently of) the observation of certain specific data in 
c. 
Thus, in order to avoid the fallacy of incomplete 
schematization in Bayes• rule we must include the ante-
cedent assumptions as well as (but independently of) the 
notation of the specific data observed. All the premises 
required for the truth of the conclusion must be stated 
and this can be done,as we have seen, if the rules of 
calculus are followed. It is interesting to note that 
Carnap follows essentially the same assumptions of Laplace 
concerning the denial of unknown probabilities as in any 
way interfer~ng with the inference leading from (B )C) to 
(c ~B). He calls such an inference an inference bl 
l 
confirmation, and in denying the existence of unequal 
causal assumptions he shares with Laplace the fate of 
incomplete schematization. Laplace grudgingly admits 
failure to assimilate his views of equiprobability with 
the rules of calculus in Bayes• rule, but oddly enough he 
does not admit defeat. It is in this curious turn of 
events that the seeds of revolution take a definite 
direction. 
3. Attempts to Justify Induction by 
Use of the Inversion Theorem 
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A sure sign of failure in his earliest attempts to 
justify induction within the calculus of chances was 
taplace 1s later concern with the estimation of physical 
probabilities rather than with the establishment of laws. 
Laplace's interest in the practical applications of the 
theory of probability forced the realization that no 
probabilities of any great importance can be determined 
a priori from single events. He therefore proposed to show 
how probabil_ities could be derived from frequencies by an 
inversion of Bernoulli's Theorem which may be described 
loosely as an argument from probability-to frequency. 
1R. carnap, ''Testability and Meaning," Philosophy 
of Science, III (1936), 420. 
Nevertheless, even in resorting to experience Laplace was 
plauged by his initial assumption of external symmetry. 
Laplace, following the Humean line of examples, 
held that the conditions governing whether the sun will 
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or will not come up tomorrow was an illustration of 
certain conditions that we are ignorant a priori as to 
whether they do or do not lead to the occurrence of a 
particular event. The question was posed: In the light 
of M out of M + N occasions on which these conditions have 
been observed as well as the corresponding occurrence of 
the event, what is the probability that the event will 
occur on the next occasion? The answer to all such 
problems is M + 1 • In cases where N • O, i.e., 
M + N + 2 
when the event has invariably occurred, as in the case of 
the sun, the form = M + 1 • Now, on the assumption that 
M + 2 
the sun has risen daily for 5,000 years {1,826,213 days) 
the formula of Laplace assigns betting odds of 1826214:1 
{P = 1826214/1826215) in favor of the event. The prob-
ability is defined in this case as the limiting value of 
the relative frequency of events. No longer is there any 
excuse for speaking of a special kind of probability of 
unique causes or, hypotheses, since all that is determined 
is the probability of an event in a collective, viz., 
1826214:1 in favor of the sun rising tomorrow. There is no 
longer any meaningful content conveyed by the determi-
nation of probabilities of isolated hypotheses. Has 
Laplace apparently adopted what is essentially a 
behavioristic attitude? 
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To make such an assumption would be to underesti-
mate the Laplacean conviction, for in failing to observe 
the reflection of symmetry in the isolated event, he 
applied exactly the same a priori assumptions to a fre-
quency of isolated assumptions as a frequency of isolated 
events, viz., that the various hypotheses which make up 
the number of past occasions are each equally likely at 
the beginning. For all the initial probabilities, if 
~ndeed he is going to go from a collective frequency to 
probability of a single event in a collective, must be 
infinitesimal. But we have already condemned his use of 
the principle of indifference and may therefore rightfully 
resent this repetition of complication. Bernoulli 1s 
Theorem, like all other theorems in the calculus of 
chances, only allows us to derive one probability from 
another. If, in its stated form, it cannot provide a 
bridge from probability to certainty then the reverse 
must certainly hold. 
Although his attempt to evaluate empirical prob-
abilities as the limit or relative frequency appears to 
be in basic agreement with a behavioristic scheme 
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presupposing only the passive 'reflex arc' in the face of 
objective nature (similar to the one implicitly proposed 
in this paper), nevertheless it must be remembered that 
Laplace has yet to abandon his original a priori assump-
tion of a two-valued interpretatiye coordinate through 
which the external world must be interpreted. When this 
did not work for the single case evaluation due to the 
conflict of unknown antecedent probabilities, rather than 
attempt a complete analysis of his procedure in search of 
this error, Laplace merely reversed his original ha.bi t of 
equating (and thus eliminating) all unknown probabilities 
in terms of Bayes' rule and assigned, instead, the condi-
tion that all prior probabilities be initially infinitesi-
mal. He does not escape the fixation of Humean Necessity. 
CHAPI'ER VI 
IMPLICATIONS OF A POSTERIORI PRESUPPOSITION OF PROBABILITY 
A little tap at the window, as though some 
missile had struck it, followed by a plentiful, 
falling sound, as light, though, as if a shower 
of sand were ·being sprinkled from a window over-
head; then the fall spread, took on an order, a 
rhythm, became liquid, loud, drumming, musical, 
innumerable, universal. It was the rain.1 
1. Development of Theory of Order Evolving from 
Inadequacy of Laplacean Probability Explanation 
One new insight was opened by games of chance 
following the recognition by mathematicians that probabil-
ity statements about the die or the roulette, for example, 
are used only because of the impossibility of portraying 
the individual cast of the die or turning of the wheel by 
mathematical laws. It was the discovery that probability 
statements can be transformed into statements of a high 
degree of certainty if they are applied to a great number 
of homogeneous cases, t,hat is, if the probability state-
ments are transformed into statistical statements. This 
was, as has been stated, the first relation of probability 
lMarcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, tr. 
c. K. Scott Moncrieff (New York: Random House, 1934), 
p. 77. 
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and frequency. In reference to Bayes' Theorem the problem 
shall be to make P(A,Bk) = 1, or as close to 1 as we like. 
The difference is that we shall be talking about the rel-
ative frequency of B-things as opposed the absolute and 
uniquely verifiable B-content. Therefore it was proposed 
that in a sufficiently large set of A things it is almost 
1 
certain that the relative frequency of B things will 
approximate the relative frequency of an A-thing's being B 
(within any degree of approximation desired). This is to 
say, for example, that a distribution of at least 51 heads 
among 100 tosses is more probable than a distribution of 
at least 6 heads among 10 tosses. But the probability or 
a relative deviation of' at least 1/10 sinks rapidly. In 
short, it is much less likely that we will get an absolute 
deviation of at least 10 in 100 tosses than an absolute 
deviation of at least 1 in 10 tosses. Such is the gist 
of Bernoulli's Theorem which, it should be noticed, like 
all other theorems in the calculus of chance, permits us 
only to derive one probability from another probability. 
There is no mysterious law of' nature which guarantees, 
within a sufficiently large number of trials, the absolute 
realization of' a probability as a frequency, i.e., 
Bernoulli's Theorem cannot provide a bridge from 
lwith p as close to 1 as we like .• 
probability to certainty. It is thereby useless to try 
to verify the theorem by experience • Such attempts lead 
to the fallacy of' the maturity of' chances in which 11next-
ness" is governed by the 'law of' averages' -- whatever 
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1 that means. Thus, in order to assert Bernoulli's Theorem 
we must first posit the condition that the several •trials' 
should be made without. influence on each other. Only then 
does the correct application of' the law of' great numbers 
govern the expectation of' one frequency over another. If' 
•nextness' is assumed to follow from the results of' its 
immediate predecessor an absurdity results, nevertheless 
one which must be identified as a fundamental misconception 
in all gambling systems. Surely it is absurd to try to 
prove that the probability of' a coin's coming down heads is 
greater than 1/2 by use of' an argument which starts with 
the assumption of' equiprobability f'or each individual toss. 
In a genuine game of' chance there is no system f'or improv-
ing one •s chances of' winning. Could this be, perhaps, 
part of' what we mean by calling it the game of' chance? 
Repeat: this is a game ••• of' chance. 
1 An illustration of' this fallacy was given in an 
example above when C%lJbea was actually astonished at the 
apparent lack of' causal connection between the recorded 
results and the next result of' the roulette (that is, the 
prediction of' the next single-event). 
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l In the elementary calculus, probability sequences 
were treated with respect to their external conditions. A 
degree of probability was attached to each sequence which 
then became a unit which was mutually related to other 
units, thus neglecting the internal structure of such unit-
sequences. This is to say that no statements were made 
concerning the manner in which the elements of these unit-
sequences follow one another. Upon investigation we find 
that there are two types, or orders, of sequences. Those 
made up of elements which follow each other in strict 
accord (e.g., B B B B If"'! B I'), and in which the occurrence 
of an element is determined by its immediate predecessor 
are called non-normal sequences, whereas those in which 
the elements are arranged in random order (B B B B B B B B) 
and in which the occurrence of an element is not influenced 
by its predecessor are called normal sequences. 
By analysing the non-normal sequence we find that 
the probability of Bin the sub-sequence selected by~-as­
predecessor• = o, for B 1n B lJ B ~ B ~ B B, is always 
followed by ~. On the other hand, the probability of B in 
the major sequence is = 1/2. Thus it is seen that in non-
normal sequences the probability of a particular element 
1 Axioms I-IV. 
in a subsequence (or a combination or subsequences) does 
not equal the probability of the major sequence. Sub-
sequences need not be defined 1n the definition of non-
normal sequences for the constituting elements must 
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follow the a priori directive of the major sequence. But 
these conditions do not comply with the actual results or 
games or chance as was seen in the random sequence obtained 
by C~ at Monte carlo. Therefore the assumption or equi-
probability 1n normal sequences (i.e., those other than 
non-normal sequences where it is assumed a priori) must be 
given in terms or an internal property of the major 
sequence. It is in a way that the normal sequence is 
characterized by satisfying the condition laid down by 
Bernoulli's Theorem that a selection by means or any 
combination of predecessors (or combination or probabili-
ties of sub-sQquences) results in the same probability for 
a particular element as exists in the major sequence. 
Thus, it is in compliance with Bernoulli's requirements 
concerning the occurrence of each element independent of 
its predecessor, that we are 1forced 1 to inspect more 
carefully the properties and assumptions characterizing 
the existence or the normal sequence. Since Bernoullian 
frequency probability determinations depend on such an 
existence, we shall feel justified in. resting the case for 
probability determinations in any game or chanoe on its 
elucidation (in order to avoid the symmetry assumption or 
non-normal sequences). As has been stated, in order to 
properly characterize a normal sequence, subsequences 
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must first be defined. As will be established, in order 
to properly define mutually independent subsequences, an 
axiom or infinity must be developed, the incorporation or 
which will define the direction or the Revolution thus 
lifting it from the bonds or a mere •reactionary• movement 
onto the ground structure or the New Ideology. 
Accordingly we shall attempt to develop the follow-
ing thesis concerning the elucidation or normal sequences 
and consequently or sub-sequences. Abiding within the 
definition set forth by Bernoulli, an infinity or elements 
must be held as composing any sequence the probability or 
which is in question (assuming probability to be the 
limit or relative frequency). Upon questioning the pre-
suppositions or such an assertion or infinite equi-
probability we round the ignorance assumption,or lack or 
evidence to the contrary, to be inadequate grounds (tor 
any probability statement), and yet we find that the 
theory or subs-quences which constitute the normal 
sequence, to which Bernoulli's Theorem applies, cannot be 
established without first assuming the sequences to be 
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composed of an infinite number of elements. There appears 
only one alternative. Acknowledging the impossibility of 
an infinity assumption on grounds of external ignorance we 
are compelled to establish an axiom or infinity in 
1 
•roughly 1 the same manner as the elementary axioms were 
developed. 
To summarize briefly, although Bernoulli realized 
that the •workability' or his theorem demanded the 
assumption that in an infinite number of trials the 
probability of tails turning up, for example, would equal 
the limit 1/2, nevertheless, the grounds for such an 
assumption (viz., external symmetry due to principle or 
ignorance) were found to be inadequate. Consequently, by 
analyzing the structure or the sequences required by the 
Bernoulli Theorem we round it necessary to define normal 
(random) sequences in terms of an internal property of 
the sequence, viz., in terms or subsequences, for without 
an adequate account or subsequences any distinction 
between normal and non-normal orders would be impossible. 
Yet, such a distinction must be made if we are to avoid 
probabilities of single-events by way of Bernoulli's 
Theorem. Furthermore, we find that subsequences cannot be 
~he differences of construction will be dis-
cussed below. 
defined independently of an infinity assumption which~ 
since it cannot be based on grounds or indifference, must 
follow from a constructed axiom. Thus~ the infinity 
requirement will be met, but in a different manner. The 
directive of human ignorance shall give way to the 
edifice of axiomatic structure which shall present 1 1n 
its completion, the foundations of an objective theory of 
probability, which is to say that probability will tell 
the story of the external world rather than reflect an 
emotionally disturbed 1inadequacy. 1 
2. Necessity of Axioms V of Infinity Evolving from 
Establishment of Theory of Order 
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We shall attempt to follow a method of representing 
the structure of order in a major sequence (of a normal 
sequence) by statements about the various phase-
probabilities in the sub-sequence (derived from the same 
major-sequence). As has been established, all subsequences 
are mutually independent, that is, they caa&bt be derived 
from one another, yet the relative frequency of each 
subsequence coincides with the relative frequency of the 
major sequence. Given the major sequence 
BJ'B'g1rBB ••• I 
• • "t 
two examples (types) of phase probabilities in this 
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sequence would be: 
(1) the probability that B follows ~; 
(2) the probability that the combination~~ is 
• 
followed by B • 
• 
Now we shall show how it is possible to give a definition 
of' the type of' order of' a given sequence even in the 
formal calculus with the introduction of' an axiom refer-
ring to infinite sequences. That the elementary axioms 
(I-IV) do not refer to such sequences can be seen in their 
logical and mathematical formalizations in that the symbols 
have no subscripts (which will ref'er 1 1n the new axiom 1 to 
infinite sequences). Now it bas been stated that normal 
(random) orders of' elements could not be defined unless 
subsequences were first defined 1 and furthermore that any 
such definition depended on an infinity assumption. Thus 
we shall assume as given subsequences consisting of' an 
infinite number of' elements (Xi) which refer to a o~pact 
sequence A. In a compact sequence all xi (subsequence 
elements of' A) belong to class A: 
(i) (~i € A). 
Thus, if' Xi~ A is true for !!! Xi, then the class A (for 
this particular subsequence) is equivalent to the universal 
class A vi. (though this is not analytic) • This amounts 
to saying that if the subsequence is compoaecl of' an 
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infinite number or elements xi, where all xi belong to A, 
then it follows that if the number of elements in the major 
sequence A were finite, the subsequence elements xi would 
not all belong to A but would be A elements instead. Thus 
it falls into the general assumption (premise) that the 
major sequence must be composed of an infinite number of 
elements since it is compact. This definition is symb~lized 
in the following way: 
----------------------------- 1 n ( 3 oo A) • Df ( J m) (n) [ N (xi f A) < m] 
i•l -
which says that if the A-sequence is to be defined as an 
infinite sequence, then the subscript n (denoting phase 
probabilities) can never be raised to a number m which is 
greater than the number of elements in;:;tbe subsequence xi 
between 1 and n that satisfy Xi 6 A. This results follows 
from the condition that xi € A be true for all xi; which is 
the same as saying that if, xi f£ A is true for all xi then 
A-sequence must be infinite, because xi occurs as a subse-
quence of the major sequence A, and. all subsequences 
require an infinite number of elements, by definition. 
Therefore, we are able to formulate Axiom V, 1: 
lReichenbach, Theory or Probability, op. cit., cr. 
pp. 136-141. 
which says that the infinity of c-sequence permits the 
same (equivalent) inference of BP !'rom either Aa or A. 
Likewise, the condition of infinity can be stated 
!'or combinations or subsequences: 
n 
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( ]ooAa ••• Br) • Df <'3m)(n) [i~(xi+aE. A) ••• (yi+rE.B) <m~ 
according to which the subscript n can never be raised to a 
number m which is greater than the number of xi+a combin-
ations of sequences between 1 and n that satisfy xi+a E A 
••• Yi+r E B. There!'ore1 the condition xi+a E A ••• Yi+r E B 
is true for all xi+a ••• Yi+r. With this definition of 
infinity (oo ) . .applied to combinations we are able to 
formulate Axiom v, 2: 
A•( 3 oooa ••• Gr)) [(A•c& ••• ar tB~) ! (A•Ca-p ••• 
ar-p ~B~ -P)] 
p 
stating that the infinity of the elements in the subsequent 
combinations ca ••• Ga permits the equivalent inference of 
Bp or B ~ -P from A.1 
3 • Axioms V: Mathematical Formalization 
In P-notat1on the two axioms are represented in the 
following way: 
Axiom V 1 1: ( P(Aa •C ,B P ) = P(A •C ,BP ) j' 
lrrherefore, probabilities !'rom combinations ! 
probabilities from compact class. 
Axiom V, 2: P(A•Ca ••• Gr, Bp): P(A•Ca-p ••• 
ar·P, B,g-+). 
It must be noted, however 1 that the conditions 
for which these inequalities hold (viz., the ~initt 1 
~remise) are not stated in the premises of the mathemati-
cal formalization. Thus, the axi0118 in P-notation are 
not valid before the transition to the limit and there-
tore became tautologies only for the limits themselves.1 
4. Axioms v: Frequency Interpretation 
We have shown how Reichenbach has derived the 
elementary axioms (after independently developing each) 
from the frequency interpretation. Now he constructs a 
similar derivation for the fifth group of axioms. 
given 
Axiom V,l: P(A8 •C,Bt9) • P(A•C,B" ), 
and remembering P(A ,B) = lim jdl(A ,B) 
1'1-+a:t 
therefore, ~(Aa•C,B~) • .,n {A•C,BP) • an i)ii 
likewise given Axiom V,2: 
P(A ·ca ••• ar I B 13 ) = P(A•ca-p • • 
lWhereas axioms I-IV were valid (i.e., were 
tautoltf1cal due to the existence rule) even before the 
trans! ion to the limit. 
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Wei.·are able to derive 
• • 
ar-p BfJ-..P. ) • 
-~ btl 
Thus f'rom this proof'1 it f'ollowa that axioms V, like the 
previous axioms, are valid for all probability sequences, 
whether normal or non-normal, because they can be derived 
f'rom the frequency interpretation which applies to all. 
Because we find that the frequency interpretation can be 
extended to cover the existence of' infinite classes, the 
existence rule is thus extemed to the wider calculus. In 
this sense "all probability equa tiona will be regarded as 
.. 2 
determining existence." 
5. Necessity of Continuity Assumption in Empirical 
Evaluations of Chance Situations 
we shall follow the suggestion that the principle 
of' equiprobability based on the a priori grounds of' self-
evidence is not admissible when the a posteriori interpre-
tation of' probability 1s assumed (due to the constant 
problem of unkaown and equal antecedent probabilities in 
both Bayes' rule as well as any attempt at an inversion 
laeichenbach, Theory of Probability, op. cit., 
pp. 140-141. 
2Ibid., p. 141. 
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·or Bernoulli's). The subsequent goal shall be to determine 
whether Laplaee•s explanation or supposed equiprobability 
in mechanisms or games or chance is actually based on his 
explicitly alleged principle or insufficient reason or 
whether~ in tact~ his so-called a priori assumptions are 
not actually derived a posteriori from initial empirical 
observations. 
By analyzing ·the following mechanical experiment 
the 'visual' necessity of a continuous probability 
assumption shall be empirically established. Such an 
as.sumption completely transcelicis all such intuitive 
assumptions as the principle ot Insufficient Reason, at 
least in the following application. We shall see how 
Laplace, by (unconsciously) presupposing a continuous back-
drop, actually held the seed of revolution~ Just as in the 
preceeding sections we have formally show~ how, in answer 
to the problems posed by his probability conception~ a 
theory of order as well as the axioms ot infinity have 
been formulated. Likewise, the mathematical formalization 
of an axiom of continuity shall be developed immediately 
upon the establishment of its 1need 1 in the empirical 
evaluation ot a probability situation. 
6. A posteriori Presuppositions of So-called 
A priori Equiprobability 1n Roulette 
Let us suppose that we have an apparatus somewhat 
like a roulette in which a pointer is made to spin over a 
circle divided into alternat•ly colored sectors of red 
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and black1 and that it is required to find the probability 
of the pointer 1s stopping within a given sector. Assume 
that the wheel is played in such a manner that prior to 
each spinning the indicator is brought into the same 
initial position. Clearly the precise stopping-place of 
the pointer depends on the total length of its sp!n1 that 
is, the entire angle ~ ot rotation of the indicator, 
which may be counted in multiples of 2 T .• Expressed 
thusly, this variable W may have any value from 0 up to 
some maximum L (since it varies on each game). Now within 
each of the intervals of length 2 w into which the total 
variation may be divided there is a stretch favorable to 
the pointer's stopping within the given sector; for the 
pointer may stop there on the first round or on the second 
roum 1 and so on. The probability of the pointer's 
stopping within a given sector (e .g. 1 the "red11 sector 
which is one-half of geometrical area of wheel) is there-
fore equal to the sum of the probabilities for value of 
within these stretilhes. If we knew that the value of 
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was as likely to lie in any part (interval) of the vari-
ation from 0 to L as in any other part of equal size, we 
could infer immediately the required probability for we 
would not only have fulfilled the requirement forseometri-
cal synmetry (viz., that the constituting intervals of the 
roulette wheel are equal in size) but we would have 
recognized as well the values of the antecedent probabili-
ties thus enabling us to employ Bayes• rule for a valid 
inference. By such an inference we would find that the 
required probability was equal to the ratio of the sum of 
the favorable stretches to the whole variation, and so as 
to be approximately equal to the ratio of the given sector 
(e.g., 11red" sector of wheel) to the whole circle. This 
would seem plausible for although L (the maximum value of 
variable b) ) need not be an exact multiple of 2 T , we 
could presume it so large in relation to 2 T that any 
difference from an exact multiple can be neglected. But 
the fact is that we are not entitled to assume a priori 
that the value of ~ is as likely to lie in any one part 
of the variation (i.e., in a particular "red" interval) as 
in any other part of equal size (i.e., as in any other 
interval of "red" sector). This is to say that the 
probability of the po1nter 1s stopping in its seventh round 
may be greater than that it will stop in its first. It 
becomes impossible to infer probability values solely from 
the fact of geometrical symmetry between the intervals. 
Such equispecific assumptions followed naturally from our 
original so-called •assumption• that the stopping-place 
of the pointer depends on the total length of its spin 
which we called W • It has been repeatedly shownhow 
strict adherence to such geometrical assumptions as some-
what self-evident or unconditioned postulates have led 
inevitably to the positing of equal probabilities for all 
such equispecific possibilities concerned which are: _not 
applicable to Bayes• rule for determining inverse 
probabilities, for such probabilities must be asserted 
a priori and thus have no actual probability significance. 
It is at precisely this point that the a priori 
factor in Laplacean psychology becomes the remaining 
restricti~e circumstance which did not permit the explicit 
annihilation and immediate transcendence of the a priori 
two-valued interpretational framework. Such a psychologi-
cal factor has been suggested because of the blunt 
"obviousness 11 of new alternatives. such directional 
motivation necessarily evolves from the slightest analy-
sis of the implications involved in the statement 'the 
precise stopping-place of the pointer depends on the total 
length of its spin. 1 From this does it not follow "that 
the point where the needle stops will depend on the initial 
impulse given it?"l 
lHenri Poincarl, Science and Method, tr. by Frances 
Maitland (New York: Dover PUb11cat!on, Inc.), p. 76. 
Doe• it not aeem .-... ~ble, therefore, to uaume 
tbat the proballtilit,. ot tb8 pointer •a going through a 
total spin ot not more ~n tJJ "1a repreaented. by a con-
tinuous analJtical tunct1ont"1 The following cons1der-
at1cma are baaed. on the uiatenoe ot auch a function. 
164 
The 41'f18.1on ot 'Dl&ok and red aectara auppl1ea a 
div1a1on 'DJ intervale of' ... 1 w14th 6 w on the ax1a of 
tbe abaoiaaa. 'fh1a illuatN.\88 hew the probability that a 
certain value (,..) will H obained 1a cleterrained bJ' the 
continuous PI"Oba'b111ty f'unot1en t ( w ) • · 'l'h1a is the a1ngle 
hypotbea1a ot all pr0bab111tr ata teMnta, one Which waa 
derived. aolely trom. e.xperienoe. In deteraining the equ1-
. - probat.il1ty 1n roulette w ..- at111 ,et another 
aaawapt1on a posteriori. U \be a1ze ot the intervals 1a 
snell With reapeot to tb8 oeolllation ot the function 
t(w) tben 1t can be -ill' u.m (in the above cU.agram) 
that the aua ot the aba4ed. atr1pu a1111011t equals the aum 
ot the uneba4ed.. 'l'hua, &1\boualb we cannot a&J' tbat the 
ln1c1., P• 77· 
-
165 
probability for a value of ~ within any given stretch of 
the variation is equal to the probability for a value 
within any other stretch or equal size, we are justified 
in saying that the probability for the value of ~ within 
a given stretch must be approximately the same as the 
probabilities tor values or ~ within other stretches of 
the same size which together with the first •ke up a 
very small part of the total variation of W • 
It is interesting to note that both of these 
assumptions in being presupposed in any a priori determi-
nation of equiprobability were originally formulated as 
a priori principals of the calculus of probability. It is 
from Poincarl•s First Equilization Theorem that we derived 
the assumption of a continuous probability function which 
we then supplemented with an assumption based on 
Bernoulli •s Limit Theorem. Then with the addition of an 
assumption concerning strictly metrical relations (viz., 
that the intervals A w are equal in size) we have 
sufficient grounds for asserting the chances of roulette 
to be equiprobable. Hume was correct in holding all 
necessary inference to be invalid but he was merely 
deceiving himself to stop there. 
By justifying the assumption of a continuous 
probability function on a posteriori grounds we have thus 
derived the basic condition from which all probability 
statements can be derived by following the rules of 
calculus • Though our ini t1al antagonism was confined to 
the framework of an axiomatic structure (viz.~ the Hume-
Carnap two-valued construct)~ it was the reactionary 
analysis of our situation, and the increasing inability 
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to interpret a probability of induction within this frame-
work that defined (in action) the fundamental lines of a 
new ideology. One which cannot comprehend the concept of 
necessity~ whether ideal or actual. 
7. Formal Development of Axiom of Continuity 
It was only after formally developing our elementary 
axioms as implicit definitions in our theory of probability 
that we introduc~d the frequency interpretation as the 
"visual space" of the axioms. We shall now present~ as 
another possible vehicle for •explaining' the axioms~ the 
geometrical interpretation. This shall be accomplished by 
assuming the classes to be classes of geometrical points in 
a plain. The classes must then be given by geometrical 
areas. We shall discover that the definition ofothe 
geometrical point will involve the necessary endorsement of 
the geometrical theory of relative definitions. This is 
because~ for this interpretation~ we understand by the 
measure of a class B the !!!!. of the area B~ a fact which 
facilitates the introduction of the rieasure M(B). Due 
to this, and in conjunction with Reichenbach's general 
definition of a probability statement,1 the probability 
coordinated to two classes in the geometrical interpre-
tation is defined as the ratio of the measure of the 
common part of both of the classes (e.g., A•B) to the 
measure of one class (e.g., A). This can be seen from 
the following diagram: 
in which P(A ,B) = M. (A •B} 
JA.. (A) 
It will be seen advisable for for~ulas containing A as 
the first term to choose a measure such that M(A) = 1, 
so that the diagram now 'includes• another class: 
'M(A) = 1 1 is permissible since we deal only with parts 
of Band C inside A. Thus P(A,B) = M(B), P(A,C) = M(C), 
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etc. Thus, we cannot help but notice that the probability 
lviz., as a "general implication between state-
ments conoerni~ the_class membership of the particular 
given elements. Reichenbach, Theory of Probability, ep. 
C 1 t • 1 p e 46 • . 
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relation existing between the two classes B and C relative 
to a third class A are determined by the three fundamental 
probabilities [P(A,B), P(A,Q), P(A •B,C)] that were 
derived earlier tram the rule or the product in conjunction 
with the formulation ot Bayes 1 rule. or oourse it must be 
also noted in this respect that P(A,B) and P(A,C) are 
utterly useless in determining the size or their mutual 
overlapping it given alone • It is in recognition of this 
point that a "degree ot coupling" must be given, viz., 
P(A•B,C). With this isomorphism it can be shown that the 
elementary axioms I-IV are satisfied by the geometrical 
interpretation.1 . Thus, by incorporating these axioms we 
are able to arrive at precisely the same spot by employing 
the geometrical interpretation as we did with the frequency 
interpretation, viz., at the formulation or Bayes' rule. 
Although Laplace, as we have seen, is also to be credited 
with reaching this level of development, it was at exactly 
this point that we round Bayes• rule inaccessible to 
Laplace's theory or a priori equiprobability tor individual 
events • This provoked an examination ot the Bernoullian 
attempts at the reitication of a priori equiprobability 
with certain Laws or Large Numbers. All or which, in turn, 
uncovered the necessity ot distinguishing between non-normal 
l Ibid., p. 205. 
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and normal (random) sequences and thereby establishing the 
need of defining subsequences in normal sequences (random 
orders) 1 which consequently revealed various types of 
mutually independent subsequenoes requiring the establish-
ment of the axioms v or infinity which 1 although not 
deducible from the elementary axioms (I-IV), must be 
necessarily presupposed in order to be applied to external 
situations such as presented in certain games of chance 
(e.g., in the prediction of tomorrow's sun rising). 
But 1 since it is apparently impossible to find an 
equivalent to the phase symbols in the geometrical inter-
pretation it would likewise appear that the axioms (v) of 
infinity cannot be interpreted geometrically. This would 
seem "impossible" because the point-seta which comprise 
the geometrical elements are arranged in a continuous 
order, whereas the elements of probability sequences 
constitute sequences which are made up of mutually inde-
pendent (discrete) subsequences which have no aftereffect. 
It is readily seen that normal sequences, characteristic 
of probability sequences, cannot exist in the continuous 
order required by the geometrical interpretation. There-
fore, unless the definition of probability sequences can 
be extended so as to satisfy the demands of a continuous 
order, the geometrical interpretation, since it does not 
apply to the axioms (V) or infinity (which concern dis-
crete subsequences.), tares no better at this point than 
the Laplacean a priori concept or equiprobability. 
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or course • it may appear to be an easy manoeuvre 
to perfect such an extension or the definition or 
probability sequence by simply 1adding on 1 a necessary 
axiom to provide tor continuous orders. But it must be 
remembered that any such axiom (as was the case with the 
axioms or intini ty) does !!.21 follow from the elementary 
axioms or the calculus ot probability. The axioms or 
intinityw.r.e formulated inductively because it was seen 
that no empirical 1nterpretation1 could take place without 
first admitting an infinity presupposition. Consequently. 
it was stated that the Justification or such an axiom 
could take place only at a meta-level or the language. 
Likewise • the same method shall be employed 1n the 
construction of an additional axiom or continuity. This 
1s to say that we shall extend the concept or probability 
sequences to cover classes with variable contexts (i.e., 
with variable sequences) solely on the basis or the 
isomorphism existing between the geometrical and frequency 
interpretations. In short, although the elementary axioms 
lrt must also be remembered that tor our mode or 
empirical visualization we employed the frequency inter-
pretation. which was seen to apply. 
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of the normative function were deduced independently of 
any vehicle of empirical application, it was seen that 
any employment of these axioms in the analysis of physical 
events (such as in the roulette analysis) necessarily 
involved assumptions concerning infinity and continuity 
which did not follow from the elementary axioms, but were 
based instead on inductive methods. It was then seen 
that since any proposed axioms of infinity were inter-
pretable by the same frequency interpretation employed 
by the elementary axioms and since the physical visuali-
zation of the elementary axioms actually presupposed the 
inclusion of the assumptions of infinity, consequently 
the axioms V were established • • • inductively. Here 
again it is the same frequency interpretation that shall 
make possible the establishment of an axiom of continuity 
and thus extend the definition of probability sequences 
as discrete sequences to probability sequences with 
continuous attributes • It is in this way that the diffi-
culties which were met with the equiprobability interpre-
tation {based on the self-evidence principle) are 
obliterated with the frequency interpretation (based on 
the justification of induction.). 
This isomorphism shall be revealed in the analysis 
of the following empirical illustration concerning the 
prediction or the chance or hitting the bull's eye, with 
a rifle, on a certain target area. We shall call the 
precise location of a hit the attribute of event Xi 
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cilaracterized by the coordinates u, v on the target. The 
space covered by these coordinates (u, v) we shall call 
the attribute space which, 1n this example, is the entire 
target area. Thus, the attribute of .11 is the exact point 
in the attribute space which is the domain covered by the 
coordinates u, v as in the following diagram: 
A = total target area 
B • bull's eye area 
It follows, by applying the frequency method or 
interpretation, that if we know the att~ibute of each 
previously fired shot Xi we can determine the probability 
or a future but for any arbitrarily chosen area B in the 
attribute space A. This is aotomplished by determining 
the ratio or the number of hits in the common class A•B 
(i.e., in the bull's eye area) to the total number of 
hits in the attribute space A. Thus the probability of 
the next shot hitting the bull's eye B is symbolized in 
the frequency interpretation as follows: 
which is mathematically formalized as 
P(A ,B) • ~CII'J pn (A,B) 
which states that "1t for a sequence pair Xi Yi the 
relative frequency Fn{A,B) goea toward a limit p for n 
the limit p is called the probability from A to B within 
the 1r ,.1 sequence pa • In other words, the probability of 
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the next shot being a bull 1s eye (on the basis of a 
reference class of previous hits) is the limit of the 
relative frequency of bull 1a eye hits in relation to 
target hits, assuming that the number n of hits approaches 
infinity. Thus, if the looked like this at time t 1 : 
the chances or t2 being a bull 1s eye 
would be or 1/3. -
The only "catch" in this interpretation is that 
- -
when we are dealing with geometrical probabilities we 
are interpreting the axioms or probability by the ratios 
of areas: 
laeichenbach, Theory of Probability, op. cit., p. 6~ 
= 
total attribute space of A•B 
total attribute space of A 
This can be accomplished only by measuring each attribute 
of each event Xi in their individual locations in the 
attribute space (viz., A, B, A•B). Thus we must intro-
duce the measure function M(G) for areas G such that by 
providing the measures which are coordinated to the areas 
A, B, A•B (viz., the three fundamental probabilities) we 
might determine P(A,B). We must integrate the attributes 
or Xi under A •B and A • Consequently 1 
P(A B) : lim pn (A 1B) 
I '1'J~Gt;) -
• ~(A•B) 
P'\ (A) 
_ JfA•S 'fJ(U.,V)Ju.J,.,.. 
- lSA 'f (u.,,)Ju.Jv 
which is represented generallJ as 
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Here the integral is the continuous function of its 
boundaries; placed over an area in a probability state-
ment it is a geometrical probahility. But these expres-
sions are true only if a limit exists which is the 
continuous function or the point towards which every series 
of bull •s eye areas (B1 • • • Bn • • • ) tends. The limit 
of each of these "contractions toward a point" is repre-
sented as lim P(A,Bn) 1 which is our standa~ limit 
.,~~ Bn 
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expression using the notation On for the number of areas 
we happen to be integrating [i.e., M(Gn) • the probabilit1 
or a certain area]. The point is that M(Gn) cannot supply 
' 
the probabilit1 of a certain series of "boxed in 11 areas 
unless we define this "boxed in" series so as to include 
' . 
the following area Gn+l for ever1 Gn. Therefore, 11~oxed 
in'; areas, the probability of which is measured, equals 
[Gl • • • Gn • • .]. Thus the 11m1 t of P (or, the 
-
measure function) of these areas is lim M(Gn) which, 
Gn 
translated into the probability expression of an arbitraril1 
chosen area on the target, is 
11m P(A,Bn) 
?1~«' Bfl 
which is (l) the limit of the point towards which the 
"boxed in" areas [Bl • • • Bn • • • ] contract, as well as 
being (2) the continuous function of that point. It is 
important to note the rigid requirement in geometrical 
probabilities that Bn include Bn+l• This must be assumed 
for aD1 future determination of Bn (or bull 1s e1e hits). 
Since each Gn (Bn in general notation) must include 
Gn+l' therefore, the elements cannot be discrete, that 
is, they cannot be determined independent~1 
At any rate, the limit 
lim 
shall be established as the axiom of continuity, which, 
since it is not applicable to sequences with a finite 
number of attribute classes (Gl ••• Gn), is thus not 
derived from (i.e., is not deduced from) the elementary 
axioms (I-IV) of the calculus of probability. 
The M-function 'f in 1M( G) • JJ G "(u,v) dudv 1 
is the third coordinate perpindicular (in the target 
example) to the plane u, which rotates (in a curve) 
around its axis. A geometr-ical probability represented 
by an integral is the M-function ~ of the area under 
this curve. The function 'f determining the metric of 
the attribute space is the probability function. 
Von Mises refers to it as the "distribution" of the 
- ' primitive probability sequence, since it determines the 
distribution of the sequence. By "primitive" probability 
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~his is in accord with Cantor's assertion that a 
continuous series of geometrical point-sets make up a non-
denumerable infinity. Gn+l must be assumed in every analy-
sis of a continuous area. 
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sequence is meant that sequence which represents the root 
of a number of different probability sequences~ that is, 
sequences which constitute variables rather than constants. 
The sequences of a continuous attribute are more general 
than the sequences of the elementary calculus since the 
classes A~ B~ C are not given as constants (which we had 
to assume for the development of axioms I-III) of the 
sequences~ but constitute variables. It should be evident 
that these primitive sequences comprise the very foundation 
of the continuous sequence. These sequences are made up 
of elements which are individually indistinguishable and 
it is for this reason that they can be defined only after 
undergoing a process of classification whereby the state-
ment of the precise attribute point coordinated to every 
element (shot fired) Xi of the sequence is replaced by 
the weaker statements of whether the element belongs to 
A or to B respectively. This 1s to say that classifi-
cation is the process of transition from primitive 
probability sequences to classified~probability sequences 
which are determined by the statement of the areas A and B 
which are the product of some (arbitrary) division ofthe 
attribute space. Primitive probability sequences are 
directly understood only when their event-sequence to 
which they refer (viz.~ the shots fired) are 'forgotten' 
and we consider instead the sequence of attribute points 
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(viz. 1 the exact location of the shots on the target) 
given by the attribute sequence. These are called point 
sequences and have the character of probability sequences 
in which the classes A and B are made up or attribute 
points (instead of events). Thus the "points 11 or a 
primitive sequence can only b~ known as point sequences 
and the axioms are valid for every classified sequence 
that can be derived from primitive sequences. Again let 
it be stressed that the determination or a geometrical 
probability remains unintelligible until a reference class 
has been constructed by the classification or the 
primitive sequences (composed of point-sequences). Inde-
pendent events must be 'forgotten.• 
The only addition to the axiom system that is 
required for primitive probability sequences is the 
postulate or continuity 
P(A~Bn) 
Bn 
already established. We are now operating with an infin-
ite number of attribute classes established by introducing 
the measure function ~ which determines the metric of the 
attribute space 1 or (i.e. 1 ) the primitive probability 
sequence. This necessitated the assumption (employment) 
ot the theory of integration according to which the 
integral is a continuous function of its boundaries. 
In application of geometrical probabilities to 
empirical determinations, the transition from the 
observed number or hits to the limit represents an 
inductive inference without Which practical applications 
or the probability calculus could not be made. Thus, 
since the existence and value of the limit must be 
inductively ascertained, the assumption of the limit 
lim P(A,Bn) 
Bn 
1 
. is not capable of strict proof. 
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Instead it can be inferred on the basis or the observa-
tional material by means of an inductive inference (an 
extrapolation from the observed regularities) corres-
ponding to the inductive determination of the limit of the 
frequency in an infinite sequence. 
Since ~ possesses the character or probability 
I 
only when expressed with an integral over 'f , it is 
therefore called a probability density. Because of the 
theory or integration the probability goes toward zero if 
the area dudv goes toward zero. Thus the probability or 
hitting a precisely prescribed point is = 0 l This follows 
lBut this. is the very point l The requirement of 
"strict proof" is totally unfounded, unwarranted and 
mythical in probability schematic, by definition. 
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from the assertion that point-attributes in point sequences 
cannot be individually determined. Thus when 'f exists a 
density ) 0 exists. Now although the probability of 
determining the exact position of the attribute point is 
= 0 1 the probability that it 1s located somewhere within 
the attribute space is = ll This is represented by the 
integral 
~: r: ~c~,v) tkJ~ = 1 
which Reichenbach calls the condition of normal1zat1on1 of 
a probability function and which we shall refer to as the 
condition of the normative function of probability 
structure (which we spoke of earlier as non-visual) as 
opposed to 1 say, Euclidean structure. 
Thus we have 'discovered' the condition of normali-
zation of our prescribed axiomatic structure of empirical 
interpretation 1n the initial conditions of the theory or 
integration. We have likewise established the limit 
11m P(A, Bn) 
.,.,.., BD 
as (1) existing, and (2) as existing as the continuous 
function of the point towards which it contracts. Although 
this axiom of continuity is not deducible from the 
1Re1chenbach1 Theory of Probability, op. c1t. 1 p. 211. 
elementary axioms, any application of the axioms (I-IV) 
presupposes it. Also, we have learned how to incorpor-
ate primitive probability sequences into both the theory 
of order as well as the elementary axioms by the process 
of classification (for intell!Kibility), therefore per-
mitting incorporation into the frequency interpretation 
which we have adopted as the vehicle to the empirical 
visualization of the axioms. 
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8. Relative Probability Connections Between Distributions 
Physical law 'per se 1 cannot be approached as such 
except by observational means, which 1s to say that they 
cannot be known in-themselves. Since a physical law 
always presents a relation between two quantities such 
that if one quantity has a certain value, the other 
quantity assumes a certain value, we find that when such 
laws are actually tested by experiment relative probabili-
ties always occur. In other words, we find that we must 
regard the first quantity (the initial probability metric) 
as a variable and that consequently all mathematical 
functions occurring in thelaws of nature have the 
character of relative probability functions. The picture, 
strictly speaking, of a physical event, must be character-
ized by a relative probability function ~ (u;v) which 
determines for every distance a number of values v (each 
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with a certain probability) of the deviation. Thus it is 
often found that the observed deviation is greater than 
the one demanded by the theory. This can be credited to 
observational influence~ and since observational testing 
is necessary for the establishment of any physical law the 
probability character of empirical law-statements becomes 
obvious. 
In the development of a formula to deal with 
relative probability functions we shall discuss {1} the 
probability that a man of a certain height u has a certain 
weight v and~ conversely~ {2) the probability that a man of 
a certain weight v has a certain height u. It shall be 
held that the relation of these probability densities can 
be established only by the use of relative probability 
functions. Such a relation of relative densities can be 
strictly formalized only by constructing a continuous 
version of the extended rule of elimination (established 
earlier) which read 
The extension of this formula takes place upon the trans-
lation of each of the three probability statements 
P(A~Bk)~ P(A•Bk~C) and P(A~C) into their continuous form 
(following from the rules of integration discussed in the 
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preceeding section). We shall illustrate this translation 
below in three steps. 
(1) In the continuous form of P(A,Bk) the notation ~ which 
symbolizes the disjunction(B1v ••• vBr) becomes ~u,du, 
thus representing the intervals du of a continuous vari-
able u (i.e., the value of the interval from u to (u+du). 
Thus, this translation can be stated symbolically as 
(2) In theoretically the same manner the continuous form of 
P{A•Bk 1 C) becomes 
which, since it actually asserts the probability that a 
man of a certain height u has a certain weight v, must be 
put into the appropriate form for continuous relative 
probability functions, that is, a form which assumes that 
the initial probability metric {i.e., the reference class 
of the statement) is variable. Thus we shall introduce the 
notation ~1(u;v) which states the probability that v lies 
in a certain interval if u possesses a precisely given 
value. Therefore, 
------------------------------~ 
P(A•Bu,du, Cv,dv) = 
1 
.. 
1since a relative probability function (by the very 
definition of "relative") has a precise value in the first 
variable, therefore, du can be dropped. Thus, for small 
intervals du, any value u or the interval may be chosen and 
Budu can be replaced by Bu if it stands as reference class 
of expression (generally speaking). 
(3) Precisely as in the translat~on of P{A,Bk), P{A,C) 
is translated into the continuous form in the following 
way: 
Therefore, in summation, the extended rule of elimination 
is represented in continuous form as 
r•· J_. 'f(u) • 
as a relation between probability densities. Here the 
probability density X{v) is a function of the two 
probability densities Yl(u) and 1'1 {u;v). Therefore, 
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a relative probability function can be meaningfully 
integrated over the first variable only if multiplied by 
another probability function. This is to say, following 
the illustration, that a certain height does not deter-
mine a certain weight, but if a certain height is known 
{or, if a certain height interval du is known for the 
continuous variable u), there isa certain probability that 
the weight relative to the given height is equal to the 
-
1Reichenbach performs this proof on pp. 228-233. 
[Theory of Probability, op. cit.]. 
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continuous variable v within the interval dv. The main 
point is to emphasize the necessity of formally repre-
senting the connecting relations of the two distributional 
Now, as it was seen in the formulations which took 
place earlier, the extended rule of elimination must 
itself be extended so as to include all the possible 
relations between probabilities (in this case, between 
probabilities densities). Although the formula which we 
have established require~explicitly enough, the value of 
the relative probability function ~1(u,v), i.e., the 
chances of a certain weight v corresponding with a certain 
height u, it says nothing concerning the probability of 
deriving a certain height u from a given weight v. With 
~ as the height and c as the weight, the probability 
which we seek is P(A•C,Bk), and is found 1n the formulation 
of Bayes' rule for determining inverse probabilities, a 
complete statement of the possible relations of the 
fundamental probabilities: 
l 
~his is simply a restatement of Bayes 1 rule, 
developed earlier. 
which~ by letting P(A·C~~) =~2 (v;u), and in accord-
ance with the correspondences given for the translation 
of the extended rule of elimination, can be likewise 
transformed into its continuous form as 
fJ (u) ·11 (u;v) 
. r+• Y' (u) · ~ 1 (u;v)du J .• 
1 
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This is a formal statement or the continuous version of 
Bayes• rule (the virtues of which were spoken of in a pre-
ceeding section). The relative probabilities 1J' 1(u;v)dv 
and 1" 2(v;u)du can be thought or as d(q~p;u) in which 
the relative probabilities are integrated over the variable 
following the semicolon and determine the probability of 
this variable relative to values of the variables before 
the semicolon. It is with the establishment of the continu-
ous form or Bayes' rule that. these functions constitute a 
generaliza~on or the classical laws or causality into 
probability laws. Since the dependence of u on q ~ p 
[in d(q,p;u)] varies with the distributions d(p) and d(q), 
we do not have a function d(q~p·u) which is independent of 
d(p) and d(q). Therefore, a relative probability function 
cannot be interpreted as a chain structure~ in which the 
P!'Obability of a value u is determined if the values q and 
lReichenbach~ Theory of Probability~ op. cit., 
p. 234. 
p are given. For, in·vbhe relative probability function 
in Bayes' rule (continuous form), which determines 
inverse probabilities, the probability of u does not 
depend on the particular combination of p, q, nor on 
either of these two values. It depends instead directly 
on the situation s and with this on d(p) and d(q). This 
is to say that in the relative probability function 
d(p,q;u), the distribution of u must be given as relative 
to the whole situation s • Thus 
d(p,q;u) = d8 (u) 
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for, although the values of p and q determine the situ-
ations to a great extent, they do not completely determine 
s, thus implying that there are further factors determining 
s. Consequently, the "causal law" requirement that the 
"cause" determine the "effect•• univocally is not ,met in 
.. ' 
the determination of "causes" by the use of relative 
' . 
probabilities. Thus we have no chain structure in the 
sense defined (which presupposes only two-valued coordin-
ates). Finally, we cannot introduce (i.e., assume as equi-
probable) a probability such as P(A•B1 ,c) which is inde-
l pendent of the occurrences at the place B2 , because, as 
1such probabilities are those represented by the 
elementary calculus of probability (axioms I-IV). 
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we have seen, the relative probability function d(p,q;u) 
is equal to ds(u), which is to say, it alw~ys depends on 
the whole distributions of d(p) and d(q), i.e., on the 
whole situation s. This requires inductive assumptions 
and the subsequential extension of the elementary calculus. 
It should be quite obvious at this point that by 
endorsing Reichenbach's continuous version of Bayes' rule 
and its dependence (in the determination of relative 
probabilities) on the 'whole ait~ation s, 1 we are 
progressing well w1 thin the framework of an essentially 
behavioristic formalization. The contemporary mathemati-
cal extension of .this direction will be discussed in a 
later section. 
CHAPl'ER VII 
PROBABILITY LOOIC: META-REDUCTIONS REVISITED 
In constructing a logic in which the concept of 
truth-value is replaced by the concept of probability 
value we must schematically represent the substitution of 
,. 
statistical knowledge for the unavailability of specific 
knowledge, that is, for the 11lack of" individual verifi-
'• 
ability. Formally speaking, probability logic is a 
structure of linguistic elements from which two interpre-
tations have been obtained resulting from the differences 
in interpretation of ---these elements. The first arises 
from the consideration of propositions as elements of 
structure the ''weights" of which are, "truth-values," and 
is appropriately called the legic of weights. Keynes 
argues that probability statements of this kind are not 
quantifiable, that they are intended to state only a 
relation of order expressible by the terms "more probable 11 
or "less probable ."1 While granting that we often 
1J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London, 
1921), p • 34 • 
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restrict our statements to statements or order relations 
and that the verification or such statements would be 
easier than that of quantitative relations (because the 
statement or order states less than that or the statement 
or quantity)~ at the same time it would be to contradict 
the purpose of this paper to believe that the employment 
of relations or order is a proof that quantitative 
relations cannot be established. It is with such a 
reactionary movement in mind that Reichenbach proposes the 
second interpretation or the structure or linguistic 
elements by considering propositional series (as opposed 
to propositions~ 1per se 1 ) as elements of structure and 
1 
the limits of their frequencies as their "truth-values." 
We proceed in the direction or one or our initial 
purposes or maintaining the structural identity or the 
logical and mathematical concepts or probability by 
labeling first~ the logic-of-weights as the logic-or-
propositions and then~ on the other hand~ the logic or 
propositional series as formulating (as will be shown) 
the logical equivalent or the mathematical concept or 
probability~ a logieal system based on·c,bhe fr_equency inter-
pretation. In this way~ by analyzing our results~ we 
shall be able to maintain the structural identity of both~ 
~ruth-value''; referring to probability-value. 
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as well as the thesis that the concept of weight (of an 
individual proposition) has no meaning other than can be 
expressed in frequency statements, viz., as a fictitious 
property of single propositions representing an abbrevi-
ation for propositional series (or, frequency statements). 
~hus, in principle, every weight is determined by a 
frequency and, inversely, every frequency occurring in 
statistics may be thought of as a weight. Consequently, 
our action is ~ determined by a knowledge of the truth-
value (in the two-valued, adjunctive sense) of the state-
ment depicting the individual event, but is determined 
instead by a knowledge of a truth-frequence (probability 
value) 1n a sequence. This requires the substitution of 
statistical knowledge for unavailable specific knowledge. 
It is justified because it offers success in the greatest 
number of cases which is, in fact, the initial requirement 
for probability value in the first place: 
if probability has something to do with the reli-
ability of predictions, the probability statement 
must be verifiable in terms of the occurrence of 
the event predicted; otherwise the statement will 
be empty so far as predictions are concerned. 
The frequency interpretation satisfies this con-
dition inasmuch as it verifies a degree of 
probability through repeated occurrence of the 
event • If, however, the meaning of the probability 
statement refers to a single event, it is impos-
sible to verify the statement in terms of the 
occurrence of the event; and therefore the statement 
has no predictional value.l 
lReichenbach, Theory or Probability, op. cit., p. 371. 
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Although the truth-value or probability can be transformed 
to individual propositions pertaining to single events 
(descriptions), the resulting probability is only or a 
fictitious nature and the logic or probability remains a 
logic presupposing non-individual verifiability. 
The numerical value or the frequency in a sequence 
is transferred to the individual statement in the 
sense or a rating, although the individual state-
ment taken alone exhibits no features that could 
be measured by the rattng.1 
Thus we shall publically acknowledge the equivalance 
or isolated so-called self-evident single-experiences and 
the fictitious nature or so-called single "epistemological" 
propositions. At the same time we shall admit a basis 
prejudice against such intuited fiction, 'per se,• and in 
this way attach the technical construction or probability 
logic not to individual propositions, but to sequences or 
propositions instead, exactly as has been shown to be 
characteristic or the frequency interpretation or 
probability. From this shall follow the direct application 
or the logic to an appropriate mode or interpretation, one 
which need not deal with fictitious properties. 
The probability-values or a combination or a and b 
is determined only it, in addition to the probability-
values or a and b separately, the probability-value or 
l Ibid • , p. 381 • (Underline mine) • 
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another combination (i.e., Clle other than the one sought) 
must be given. This •other 1 combination is not a function 
or P(a) and P(b), but is given independently. Whereas in 
alternative logic the truth-value or the logical product 
a•b, for example, is not independently given, but is a 
function or P(a) and P(b) which are given. That the 
"other" combination becomes a necessa-ry third parameter 
can be shown by citing a statement or the generalized 
addition axiom illustrating the probability or a disjunc-
tion: 
P(a) + P(b) P(a•b) = P(avb) 
which says that if only P(a) and P(b) are given, the value 
or P(Avb), or or P(a•b), is not determined. If, however, 
the value or one or the combinations is known, those o~ 
the others may be calculated. This necessity or a third 
parameter for determinations or combination-values 
distinguishes probability logic from two-valued logic; it 
(the parameter) cannot be eliminated, but originates from a 
corresponding indeterminancy in the mathematical calculus 
(viz., in the original formalization or the addition axiom). 
If we had meant by •a 1 and 1b 1 the two sides numbered "one" 
on a certain pair or dice simultaneously thrown, we would 
have' due to the independence or the thDows and by 
employing the multiplication ~om, 
P(a•b) • l/6 • 1/6 = 1/36 
which, when inserted in the generalized addition theorem, 
yields 
1/6 + 1/6 - 1/36 • 11/36 
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or the probability of getting "one" on at least one of the 
dies (which is the probability of disjunction). 
Similar formulas can be developed for implication 
and equivalence whereas it shall be seen that only for 
negation (a) does the two-valued rule apply unaltered. 
Also, in order to prove that probability logic is a 
generalization of two-valued logic we have only to 
restrict the numerical value of P(a) and P(b) to the 
number 1 and 0 in the development of these formulas. 
(1) For disjunction and conjunction: 
P(a) + P(b) - P(a•b) • P(avb) 
(2) For implication: 
P(a)b) = 1 - P(a) + P(a•b) 
(3) For equivalence: 
P(a :b) = 1 - P(a) - P(b) + 2P(a•b) 
(4) For negation: 
P(a) = 1 - P(a) 
By giving P(a) and P(b) the values l and o, the formulas 
(which were derived from the calculus of probability) 
furnishcautomatically the well known relations of two-
1 
valued logic (as e~pressed in two-valued truth tables). 
In expressing the laws of probability logic as a 
generalization of two-valued logic for the case of a kind 
of truth possessing a continuous function we must trans-
, 
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cribe the laws of the calculus of probability into a multi-
valued logic which, in turn, shall lead us to a quanti-
tative logic bearing a continuous scale of truth-values. 
The establishment of such a multi-valued logic as an 
extension of two-valued logic resulted from our preference 
for the tautological expressal of meaning at a meta-level 
of the language employed. Remembering that a tautology is 
2 
a formula that is •true• irregardless of the truth-values 
of the elementary propositions of which it is composed and 
that, accordingly, mathematics is not concerned with the 
concept of propositional truth but only with the concept 
of tautology, it follows that the aim of mathematics (and 
consequently of our proposed calculus of probability) is 
to construct forms the truth of which is independent of 
the individual values of the components of those forms. 
It is in the same vein that the ~ythagorian Theorem is not 
1or course, the two-valued truth table must be 
added for the logical product a•b since in alternative 
logic, it is a function of P(a) and P(b~ and therefore not 
independently given. 
2 I.e., is justified. 
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asserted as either true or false, but only as following 
from the axioms assumed. Such an axiom-to-theorem impli-
cation is a tautology. Any truth involved is a property of 
sentences, not a property of physical objects. Thus 
sentences stating the truth of sentences in the object 
language actually belong in the meta-language where the 
sentence "the sentence •a 1 is true" or "v(•a 1 ) = 1" is 
found. Thus the sentence ''Bvery DUmber over 99 must be 
written with at least three digits" is true only for the 
decimal notation and it is false if asserted for all 
notations. Such an assertion "says nothing about numbers, 
but states merely a property of the notation used. 111 
Now probability logic, since it was developed 
with the qualification that the truth value into which the 
probability is transformed is of a fictitious nature 
{owing from its frequency derivation), has been established 
as a logic of non-individual verifiability. We have thus 
avoided the fictitious properties of individual proposi-
tions by attaching the technical construction of probabil-
ity logic to sequences of propositions to which the 
frequency interpretation is directly applicable. Recalling 
that our present goal'is to establish an isomorphism 
between two-valued and multi-valued frameworks we shall 
lReichenbach, Probability, op. cit., p. 394. 
perhaps first raise some doubts by symbolically expres-
sing probability as a property or propositional 
sequences while remembering that two-valued truth is a 
property of only one sentence. It shall then be shown 
that such an 'obstacle' can be eliminated only by 
employing the frequency interpretation in the representa-
tion of the propositional sequences. As has been 
established# the probability implication is symbolically 
represented in the following way: 
( i) ( y i € A 3- &i ~ B) 
p 
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from which the following definitions can be extracted when 
the frequency interpretation is employed: 
hyi : Df yi f A 
rxi = or .Jti € B 
and the ref ore # 
From this last equation it must be remembered that the 
frequency interpretation is constructed by counting the 
number of propositions 11hyi" within the subsequence 
selected by the true propositions of "!Xi". This is to 
say that "hyi 11 is a compact sequence and (due to axioms V) 
can be dropped • When this is done we are left with 
Now it was shown in the discussion on the logical struc-
ture of the frequency interpretation that 
,n(A~B) • Nn(A•B) 
Nn(A) 
now appears~ since A has now been dropped as an absolute 
probability~ as 
By assuming axioms v~ if we insert Fn(A~B) in a limit 
statement which can be valid only after the limit has 
been reached~ then consequently B must be asserted as a 
truth-value at a meta-level. This is to_say that B 
becomes (vcrxi~ = ~ ~ or "the statement 1B1 is true." 
Thus 
P(fXi) - li.,., ~(A~B) 
-
1'1~0() 
becomes. 
n 1 
P(flfi) - lim 1 N fcfx1 ~ - ~ - - -n-+ao n i=l 
1Ibid. ~ pp. 395-397. 
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which is the meta-linguistic interpretation of the same 
statement expressed in the object-language. Thus we 
have made a meta-level substitution; in the place of 
frequencies-of-objective-events. We have inaugurated 
frequencies-of-sentences-about-objective-events, viz., 
{v [f xi~= 1 • From this can be seen that the apparent 
1obstacle 1 resulting from the meaning of probability as a 
relation between two linguistic expressions is dissolved 
in the metalevel expression if the frequency method of 
interpretation is employed as 1visual aid 1 for the 
axioms I-VI which we have constructed. In sununary 1 this 
1 obstacle I was eliminated by assuming "hy 11 in i 
P(hyi,f &:i) • p to be compact, which therefore in being 
identical with the subscripts is eliminated from the 
expression, leaving P(f xi) • p. Since 11Xi" in "f xi" 
. ' 
represents a sequence of elements, the expression P(fXi) 
refers to the sequence of~propositions derived from the 
propositional function f and is called the propositional 
sequence • Thus probability appears as a property of a 
propositional sequence and is of the same logical type as 
adjunctive truth, which is a property of a proposition. 
Events are superceded by sentences about events. All 
theorems in the object language can be transferred 
immediately, isomorphically, to a meta-level interpreta-
tion. 
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Thus a probability logic can be constructed as a 
logic of propositional sequences and at the same time as 
a logic of elements which are propositional sequences as 
wholes. The idea behind such an extension of logic is 
that a logic of propositional sequences as able to show 
a wider variety of general features than a logic of the 
individual propositions which make up the elements of 
these sequences. This proposed logic of propositional 
sequences follows (i.e., acquiesces to) the axiomatic 
structure which we have established as necessarily admit-
ting the axioms of infinity and continuity. As has been 
suggested earlier, such a transition from alternative 
structures of logic to probability logic is comparable 
with the generalization of Euclidean spaces to •cover• 
non-Euclidean spaces. For although Euclidean geometry 
holds for small areas of Riemann-space, it does not 
determine the structure of larger, more complicated, 
areas. Thus two-valued lOgic becomes the "logic of 
smallest domains," while probability logic can be called 
the "logic of largest domains. "1 It is fairly well 
evident that a failure to correctly understand the 
significance of establishing the logic of largest domains 
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1rt is interesting to note (from a purely specu-
lative position) that in conjunction with these Euclidean-
two-valued and non-Euclidean-multi-valued analogies, 
Eddingtonbtheory of groups as holding for macrocosmic pro-
portions could not be deduced from a two-valued axiomatic. 
as as isomorphic extension (rather than an isolated 
reality) or the logic or smallest domains has resulted 
in the counter-establishment or two myths, both of which 
have become 'miraculous' factors in the structuring or 
our language. The first is that our environment satis-
fies the axioms or Euclid to a high degree or approxi-
mation so far as the relative positions or solid bodies 
are concerned. ThUll by letting 1h1gh degree or approxi-
mation• equal unity, we have dangerously aborted ou~ 
linguistic and logical structures and thus our ontologi-
.. 
cal and psychological coordinates. The second myth is 
causally related to the historical predominance or the 
first myth which somehow Justifies its continuance. The 
limiting significance or 'higher probabilities• has never 
been exploited. The sufficient idealization or 'Riemann! 
intentions' has been lowered into the steel trap or two-
valued truth tables. Such prostitution is to be avoided 
only by recognizing the tables of two-valued logic to be 
contained in the tables or multi-valued logic which are 
thus a generalization of the two-valued tables. This 
follows from the fact that the elementary axioms ( I-IIIl 
or probability can be derived from the frequency inter-
pretation which thus strictly permits the empirical 
visualization of finite sequences. 
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With the introduction of probability value as a 
new category of meaning, the verifiability theory of 
meaning is extended so that a sentence is regarded as 
meaningful only when it is possible to determine a weight 
for the sentence. By "possible" probability meaning we 
' ' 
refer to physical possibility which includes weight as 
that which can be physically determined but not physi-
cally verified. 'Confirmation' was alternatively intro-
duced earlier. 
On the other hand, probability meaning must be 
thought of as somewhat less inclu~ive than the logical 
concept of meaning for i~ is only logically, not 
physically,neaningful to speak about the limit of the 
frequency of an extensionally given infinite sequence; 
thus finitization of limit statements is required for all 
applications of the normative function to physical 
reality. It is in this vein that Reichenbach writes: 
Jrobability meaning constitutes-~hhe very category 
of meaning that underlies conversational and 
scientific language, for which physical truth 
meaning is too narrow and logical meaning too 
wide.l 
1 Ibid • ., p. 382. 
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CHAP!'ER VIII 
GEOMETRICAL NECESSITY OF CONTINUOUS BACKDROP 
1. Active (Continuous) and Passive (Discontinuous) 
Interpretation of the Same Geometrical Space 
We have established the necessity of employing 
relative probability functions (e.g., in the continuous 
form of Bayes• rule) if we wish to determine such 
.. causally" significant probabilities as P(A •C ,Bk), P(A ,Bk), 
P{A·Bk,c), etc. In doing this we have likewise established 
that the measure of the probability of finite domains of 
continuous attribute spaces (e.g., certain arbitrarily 
chosen sectors of the target such as the bull 1s eye) 
assume the form of an integral expression. Accordingly, 
a finite disjunction of terms in the attribute class 
('although adequate for the development of the elementary 
axioms) was replaced by an infinite disjunction in the 
attribute space (which arose from the inadequacy of the 
class assumption in geometrical interpretations). This is 
f I 
to say that interpretations asserting the sununation J: of 
finite disjunctions were generalized into a meta-interpre-
tation requiring the SummatiOn I ~rJ Of infinite J_oo -• 
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disjunctions. The possibility of this generalization was 
based on the existence of a geometrical interpretation of 
the axiom system, itself resulting from the isomorphism 
existing between the frequency interpretation of the 
elementary axioms and the geometrical relations of given 
attribute spaces. It was then seen that any capitalization 
on this 'isomorphism' would require the development of the 
additional inductive axioms of (spatial) infinity and 
continuity. With these forma;J.ly established it was then 
seen that the frequency interpretation could be applied to 
geometrical relations of the attribute space. We have been 
concerned with the transition to a continuously variable 
attribute space, the point-instants of which were found to 
be indescribable except in terms of point-set sequences. 
This resulted in the necessity of classifying pr~itive 
probability sequences in order that they be intelligibly 
formulated (by the theory of relative probabilities) into 
equations permitting the inverse determination of 
probabilities concerning the attribute space. It is only 
after such for determining relative probability densities 
(such as the continuous form of Bayes' rule) have been 
established that an additional interpretation can be intro-
duced which takes place at an even higher level. For it is 
upon careful analysis that the very structure of relative 
probabilities is seen to rest upon ·(i.e.~ is seen to pre-
~ 
suppose) the concept of probability sequences for which 
the transition to continuous variability concerns not the 
attribute space of the sequence but the very e!ements of 
the sequence itself. Obviously such a 'generalization• 
cannot pertain to attribute spaces which are indefinable 
except as point-set sequences in accordance with the 
classification of primitive sequences.1 As the only 
qualifying alternative we shall replace the continuous 
space variable xi which governs the sequence of events as 
discontinuous sequences in the attribute space~ with the 
continuous time variable Xt, which governs the same 
sequence of events as a continuous sequence of elements. 
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What we are actually doing may perhaps be better understood 
by thinking of this meta-generalization as the introduction 
of a new 'point of view•; one different from the one 
offered by the geometrical interpretation of a target area 
perforated by a discrete sequence of bullets ~wh1~h. can be 
easily illustrated by picturing the traces left on the 
target by the firing of a machine gun: 
Interpretation A 
1Following the geometrical theory of implicit (or, 
relative) definitions. 
As an example of the new (meta-) 'point of view• 
one which is not only governed by, but is also explained 
as, a continuous sequence of elements, we have only to 
visualize (for a clearer concept) the same target area, 
but marked instead by the 'firing' of a water gun: 
Interpretation B 
To partially review the levels of generalization 
to date, it should be noted that the direction of trans-
ition from one stage of interpretation to the higher 
level of its extended generalization is irreversibly 
directed toward the meta-level of the language. We have 
proceeded from the interpretation of the spatial attri-
butes as discrete members of a finite disjunction (from 
which we were able to derive the elementary axioms I-IV 
by employing the summation sign ~ ) to a generalized 
view of the same attribute space as containing an infin-
ity of members, all of which are members of a continuous 
manifold. We found this generalization to be .. ' justified 
upon the establishment of the geometrical interpretation 
of the axiom system. Thus the measure of the finite 
domains of the attribute space assumed the form of the 
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integral expression jJQ. representing the infinite sum-
mation of infinitesimal amounts. we were concerned at 
this second level of generalization with the continuous 
variability of the attribute spacec:.and found accordingly, 
that such variability could not be determined without the 
employment of relative probabilities such as the continu-
ous form of Bayes• rule. It was at this point, after 
successfully proceeding from the interpretive level ·~· 
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to the meta-level 111a 1 is true,'' that we found the latter 
level to be incomplete in itself. That is, we find that 
although the continuous variability of the attribute space 
can be expressed only by relative probabilities denoting 
the infinitesimal summation of classified primitive 
sequences, it cannot be determined, (which is to say, the 
axioms of infinity and continuity cannot be used), with-
out a prior assumption pertaining to the element of the 
probability sequence. We have found (due to the geometri-
cal theory of implicit definitions) that points in space 
need not be presupposed in order to define a certain 
attribute space; indeed, we found that geometrical 
structures broken down into constituents representing any-
thing 'less than' classified probability sequences 
disintegrate into unintelligible spaces.1 Thus, the 
lAs an illustrative 1soul-mate 1 by analogy, one is 
reminded of the unintelligibility of the single unit-
description, in-itself, and how nomo-logical classification 
was required for syntactical and semantical significance. 
This is, in fact, the mathematical formalization of the 
linguistic paraphrase. 
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spatial 'point 1 need not be defined in order to construct 
a certain space. That myth is dissolved. Nevertneless, 
are classified sequences of the spatial attribute to be 
assumed as self-evident? Are there no necessary pre-
assumptions? Is it possible to extend even further the 
meta-level "•a 1 is true 11 into its meta-level " 1a is true • 
is true"? In words, c.ancit be that the description or the 
attribute space in terms of classified sequences and 
relative probabilities can be extended and thus interpreted 
from a more general (more inclusive) 'point or view'? 
Certainly this cannot be from the perspective of the 
individual element of the attribute space, for it is 
against such uniQue verification that the bulk or our 
thesis is directed. Therefore, is it not possible to 
substitute a subscript which is a continuous time variable 
Xt in the place or the subscript xi which represented the 
direct position of each hit in the attribute space 
(target area)? Is it not necessary? 
Compare the two interpretations (A and B) which 
were illustrated by the target areas bearing the respective 
traces or machine gun and water gun firings. Following 
the diagram in interpretation A, each~i is a continuous 
attribute space variable i, so that for each space point 
1 i 1 a certain attribute domain xi corresponds • Thus the 
measure of the probability of these finite domains or the 
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target area requires the infinite summation of infinitesi-
mal amounts (and thus the integral expression). On the 
other hand, if we wish to analyze the continuous variation, 
pertaining to the same target area, of the element of the 
sequence, we are forced to change the point of view of the 
whole situation by introducing Xt as the continuous time 
variable t, so that for each time point t a certain 
element Xt corresponds. The amazing thing is that we are 
now describing the "effect" from the point of view of the 
"affect." Spatial attribute points disappear for the 
continuous variability of the sequence is governed by a 
time variable and thus cannot be required to subserve the 
geometrical requirements of implicit definitions. The 
immediate difference of course is after-effect. Earlier 
we found the axioms of infinity to be unworkable in the 
attribute space without the assumption of continuity, or 
after-effect. Yet we found that such an assumption could 
not be completely reconciled with the definition of normal 
(or random) sequences from which sprung the axioms of 
infinity. It is only by using this 1heel 1 which remained 
in the second level of generalization that we were able, 
in the third level of generalization, to more completely 
reconcile this seeming paradox of continuity by introducing 
(revealing) the temporal sequence, the continuous 
probability of which is governed by a t~e variable. 
'After-effect 1 is thus reinstate.d as the elements of the 
sequence 1 the probability or which depends on the immedi-
ate predecessor which manifests itse.lf as a "tendency to 
remain. 11 This is to say that t~e probability of the 
after-effect depends on the exact position of the attri-
bute po~nt (x 1 y) 1 the conception of which is impossible 
without the assumption or a temporal dimension. 
210 
It cannot be overemPhasized that although we are 
speaking of two interpretations they are nonetheless vary-
ing interpretations of the same attribute space. For 
greater clarity we shall refer to interpretation A as the 
passive interpretation and to interpretation B with which 
we introduced the time variable Xt 1 as the active inter-
pretation. It must be realized that in the space described 
by the active interpretation x and y are not spatial 
coordinates (in the Cartesian sense); instead they 
perform the numeration of dimensions such that a special 
value of' x {viz. 1 t or xt) determines a dimension (as does 
the subscript'~ in xi for discrete functions)~ the differ-
ence being that the value of' the coordinate in this 
dimension is the value or the time variable. We shall 
define as the value of the coordinate in a dimension (in 
either interpretation) the number of parameters needed to 
211 
determine a spatially coordinated point. Thus, in the 
active interpretation, the space described can be called 
the function space, since each or its points corresponds 
to a whole function. Contrary to the active interpre-
tation in which the axes determined by x and y are equal,1 
the passive interpretation presents us with axes deter-
mined by various values of x which may differ from the 
axes determined by the values or y. Thus, in the active 
interpretation, the number or parameters needed to define 
a point in space constitutes a continuous (unbroken) 
infinity and, by the very definition or the continuum, 
each element must have a "later than" relation, which is 
. . 
to say that each element must exhibit a "tendency to 
remain" evident in its after-effect. 
With this in mind we shall 1br1ng to roe • the 
central idea or this section, viz., the proposal that the 
same space can be built up by either a denumerable intin-
i tr. of dimensions (parameters- determining a point in the 
space) as evidenced in t~ passive interpretation which 
takes place from the •point ot- view• of the firing effects 
on the target, or by a continUous infinity of dimensions 
characteristic or the active 1nterpretation which takes 
place from the 'point of view• of the 1f1r1ng 1 event itself. 
lBy "equal .. is meant that the sequences of the 
elements xi and Yi-are identified. 
This is to say that the number or parameters determining 
a point in the attribute space. from the point or view 
.,_ 
or the time-variable, has the magnetude or a non-denumer-
able continuum •. By f'non-denumerable" is meant "uncount-
able"; a conditi'on resulting from the fact that in a 
continuum each element must be described as aftereffect 
which implies dependence or the element on its immediate 
predecessor. For 'visual' clarity let us compare these 
two interpretations by graphically representing their 
characterizations. 
u __________________________ __ 
* ~ .::t4ne. 
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In the diagram ~ and v are the spatial (Cartesian) 
coordinates and are employed as such only in the passive 
interpretation which considers the properties or a 'count-
able' (and therefore discrete) infinity or sequences. For 
such event-sequences the probability that the attribute 
point lies within the interval Q.a-llb is given simply by 
the number or hits falling into this region. In the 
diagram each hit (i.e., each time the red line permeated 
the interval Ua-Ub) is signified by a blt~Jck dot. By 
letting the interval correspond to the bull 1s eye area 
of the target, we are able to determine the probability 
of again hitting the choice area by simply counting the 
dots and employing the formula pn({•jl1 which gives us 
Fn A 
the frequency of B (hits) from A (non-hits). 
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The same diagram can be successfully used to 
illustrate the continuous probabilities determined by the 
time variable Xt, the difference being that in this 
interpretation the coordinates which are required in order 
to describe a point in space are not the same as those 
which describe the attribute space (viz., u, v). This 
follows quite naturally since each element in a temporal 
sequence cannot be at any position in space and still 
retain its temporal property. This is precisely the 
reason we have referred to the space occupied by each 
constituent point of a temporal sequence as a function-
space, for in a continuum each point corresponds to a whole 
function. Thus, referring back to the diagram, the bull's 
eye probability in a continuous event sequence is measured 
by the sum of the time intervals during which the attribute 
point was in the interval ua-ub. Contrary to the passive 
interpretation, each (temporal) distance that we add up is 
1Assuming, of course, the limit 
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not itself a discrete sequence. It is, instead, a continu-
ous event, and is determined in strict accordance with the 
definit~y requirements of a continuum. It cannot be 
defined outside of the continuum requirements. Thus the 
probability of predicting a certain aftereffect depends on 
the 'later than' relation of the immediate predecessor. 
The path of tne attribute point of a continuous probability 
sequence is represented in the diagram by a zig-zag line, 
emblematic of a one-dimensional attribute space. Only a 
single coordinate need be known to determine a certain 
'position' of a point in a temporal sequence, for since 
discrete arithmetic enumeration is ~possible, relational 
positioning of unique sequences becomes meaningless. 
Thus, the enumeration of frequencies (characteris-
tic of the passive interpretation) is replaced (in its 
generalization) by the measurement of time intervals (in 
the active interpretation) of the same space. 
It is needless to say that both interpretations 
(both passive and active) depend on the possibility of 
geometrically interpreting our axiom system. Since both 
interpretive levels are generalizations of the interpreta-
tion which renders spatial attributes as discrete class-
members of a finite disjunction, and since just such a 
lower level interpretation proved to be sufficient for the 
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construction of our elementary axioms (I-IV), therefore, 
it is irrelevant, in attempting to regulate a meta-
interpretation to the requirements of the elementary 
axioms, whether the elements discussed be constituents of 
the discrete sequences (passive interpretation) or continu-
ous sequences (active interpretation). For since by our 
definition, continuous probability sequences include the 
properties of probability sequences with a continuous 
attribute, they can thus be legitimately incorporated into 
the formal calculus of probability in exactly the same 
manner adopted for the classification of primitive 
probability sequences (in the passive interpretation). 
~herefore, the question of determining the probability 
coordinated to certain sequence is not a problem of the 
formal calculus itself, but of the interpretation used. 
2. Isomorphism of Frequency Interpretation 
with Active Interpretation 
The main thing to remember in viewing the following 
1isomorphism 1 is that in interpreting the probability for 
continuous event sequences the measurement of time inter-
vals replaces the enumeration of frequencies. 
(1) 
Frequency 
as the number of xi between 
1 and n that satisfy lti E A. 
n 
(2) Nn(A) = Dr N (Xi € A) 
i-1 
therefore, a relative fre-
quency is represented as 
FO(A B) : Nn(A•B) 
, Nn(A) 
which in P-notation is 
(3) P(A,B) : ll"' Fn(A,B) • 
11-+C» 
(1) 
Active 
r 
L (u E. B) 
t = 0 
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as the le~th of time 
t which t e point u 
remains in the region 
of B of the attribute 
space within time 
interval 0 to t • 
(2) Lr(B) = n.c. £ (u E ~ 
""'J.. t=O 
therefore, the prob-
ability for continu-
out event-sequences 
can be represented in 
P-notation as 
(3) P(A,B) = lim Lr(A•B) • 
..._... IF (A) 
3. Meta-Relation of Active and Passive Interpretations 
uHilbert space, 11 or "unitary space," the term 
' ' . denotes, for an unrestricted number of dimensions, the 
complex analogue of "Euclidean space," visually a space 1n 
. ' 
which a system of orthogonal straightline coordinates is 
possible. It is our thesis that the same space can be 
bUlt up either by (1) spatial coordinates (variables of 
discrete sequences) or by (2) a temporal coordinate (single 
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variable of a continuous sequence). Since, in the latter 
interpretation, the measurement along the t-dimension of a 
space is formed by the attribute dimensions together-with 
the t-dimension (due to the •aftereffect' requirement of 
continuous sequences), it shall be established as a more 
inclusive generalization of"the former interpretation. 
That the active interpretation is "more inclusive" than the 
passive description can be shown by comparing (quantitativeq) 
the event-sequences of each explanation as pictured in the 
diagram. Whereas, tn the passive interpretation each event-
sequence (e.g., each bull 1s eye hit) is equally denoted by 
the symbolically equivalent 1dot, 1 it is seen that the 
events recorded in the active interpretation (of the same 
spacet) are not of equal measurement. Hence they cannot 
be uniquely defined except as an aftereffect due to the 
'clinging 1 nature of its immediate predecessor in the 
guise of a "remaining tendency." 
In conjunction with our remarks made earlier per-
taining to the necessity of "meta-levels," we shall now 
attempt to justify our assertion that the active interpre-
tation is a meta-extension of the passive interpretation. 
This is to say that it asserts exactly the same thing, but 
in generalized form. But the meta-interpretation not only 
describes the same space, it also describes it more 
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naccura tely," or more in accordance with physical reality. 
In the passive interpretation, a denumerable infinity of 
frequencies of discrete sequences [which requires the 
summation of a countable infinity of parameters in order 
to determine an arbitrary point (e.g., the bull 1s eye) in 
the attribute space] is goverened by the spatial coordin-
ates u, v which can be called position-operators. Whereas, 
in the active interpretation, a continuous infinity of 
parameters governed by the single coordinate Xt (viz., the 
continuous t-variable) which can be called the momentum-
operator, sufficiently determines an arbitrary point in 
space. With these distinctions well in mind and with 
respect to the requirements of meta-translating, we shall 
explicitly state the non-commutativity of the position-
operator. and the momentum-operator. This is to say that 
the transitions from the passive-level to the active-level 
are irreversible. For example, in order to quell the 
difficulties left by Laplace~ the necessity of defining 
no~l (random) sequences arose. At the same time such a 
definition was seen to be inadequate (in the long run of 
empirical evaluations) without the subsequent acknowledge-
ment of assumptions of continuous infinity as the initial 
backdrop of such discrete sequence-orders. Nevertheless, 
it was also seen by virtue of the definition of the elements 
of normal sequences as being independent of •after-effect,' 
that normal sequences themselves did not possess the 
properties of such continuity assumptions (although they 
presupposed them). 
4. ttBrownian Motion": Empirical Prototype of 
Continuous Probability Sequences 
Deciding that it is late afternoon and that there 
is nothing in this room but a clock and a glass of 
water, we glance first at the one (5:13) and then at 
the other. Then we consider the effects of the one 
upon the other, considering, of course, that we might 
have been mistaken altogether about any conclusions 
reached concerning the one, or the other. 
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Consider a fluid mass in equilibrium, for example 
some water in a glass. All partscOf the mass appear 
completely motionless to us. Now consider the introduction 
of a spherical object of a greater density than that of the 
mass. It appears to fall exactly vertically. When it 
reaches the bottom it does not tend to rise again. 
Consider, on the other hand, the introduction from the 
bottom of the container of a spherical object containing a 
density somewhat less than that of the liquid medium. It 
appears to rise exactly vertically. When it reaches the 
surface of the mass it does not tend to fall again. 
We will consider a body whose centr~ of gravity 
can move alone a straight line (the x-axis of a co-
ordinate system). The body is surrounded by a gas 
and there is thermal and molecular equilibrium. 
According to the moleculor theory, as the result of 
the irregularity or the impacts or the molecules, 
the body will move backwards and forwards along 
the straight line in an irregular manner, so that 
in this movement preference is given to no parti-
cular point in the straight line--provided that 
no forces act on the body in the direction or the 
straight line,lother than the forces or impact or 
the molecules • 
Accordingly, instead of assuming a regular move-
ment or fall and ascent, corresponding to their density, 
our two objects (or any objects suspended in an equi-
librium solution), on the contrary, appear (under micro-
sceopic inspection) to be animated with a perfectly 
irregular movement. They go and come, stop, start again, 
mount, descend, remount again, without in the least tend-
ing toward immobility. Such movements are identical with 
2 the so-called "Brownian molecular motion." 
Next consider a graphical representation or this 
eradic tendency or the particle theoretically suspended 
in a gaseous mass in equilibrium. We find the path of' 
the attribute point to be represented f'or the 
1Albert Einstein, Theory of' Brownian Movement 
(New York: E. P. Dutton arid Company, 1926), p. 24. 
Underline mine • 
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2so named in memory of' the botanist Robert Brown, 
who described it in 1827, then proved that the movement 
was not due to living 1animalculae. 1 In investigating the 
pollen of' different plants he observed that this became 
dispersed in water in a great number of' small particles, 
which were perceived to be in uninterrupted and irregular 
"swarming" motion. Consequently he drew the conclusion 
that all matter was built up of' "primitive molecules." 
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1 
one-dimensional attribute space by a zig-zag line. It is 
not by accident that such a representation is amazingly 
similar to the graph inserted earlier for the purpose of 
diagramming the continuous sequence of traces left on 
target B by a watergun. For it is in like manner that the 
subsequent position of the particle in "Brownian motion" 
can only be predicted with some degree of probability. 
Since an observer • • • can never perceive the 
actual path traversed in an arbitrarily small time, 
a certain mean velocity will always appear to him 
as an instantaneous velocity.2 
It is thus, for all epistemological intents and purposes, 
governed by a continuous probability function. This is to 
say that any attempt to isomorphically predict the exact 
future positions of the zig-zaging particle would surely 
end in defeat. Nevertheless, it is on the basis of the 
discontinuous intervals that a continuous function must be 
assumed whereby a subsequent interval may be predicted at 
least with some degree of probability. 
We have discussed (in complete agreement with 
Einstein's results)3 the necessity of employing the time 
1see, for example, the results of experiments per-
formed by Jean Perrin. Jean Perrin, Brownian Movement and 
Molecular Reality (London: tr. by F. SOddy, 1910}. 
2Einstein, Theory of Brownian Movement, op. cit., 
p. 67. 
3 Ibid., pp. 99-101. 
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variable (xt;) in such determinations. The main point we 
wish to emphasize is the paradox involved in {1) employ-
ing the time variable and, at the same time (2) attempting 
to obtain a description which corresponds absolutely with 
the particle as it is in-itself (i.e., not-in-a-temporal-
sequence). 
available. 
f I The particle never isj only intervals are 
Perrin confirms this view with the following 
remarks concerning three drawings obtained by tracing the 
segments which join the consecutive positions of the same 
particle (in Brownian motion) at intervals or 30 seconds: 
One of these drawings shows 50 consecutive positions 
of the same granule. They only give a very feeble 
idea of the prodigiously entangled character of the 
real trajectory. If the positions were indicated 
from second to second, each of these rectilinear 
segments would be replaced by a polygonal contour of 
30 sides •••• One realizes from such examples how 
near the mathematicians are to the truth in refusing, 
by logical instinct, to admit the pretended geometri-
cal demonstrations, which are regarded as experi-
mental evidence for the existence of a tangent at 
each point of a curve.1 
What Perrin refers to as 11 logical instinct .. we 
shall refer to as the 11axioms of the calculus of probability' 
which, in permitting the interpretation of continuous 
probability sequences, thus supply an instrument enabling 
us to evaluate the continuous lines of causal connection 
as probability sequences. By •causal connection 1 do we 
mean •causal chain'? This would seem to follow if all 
1Perrin, Brownian Movement ••• , op. cit., pp. 63-&. 
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natural laws were shown to possess the form of probability 
implications; •causal chains 1 necessarily being repre-
sented by a continuous sequence in which the later elements 
could be predicted (not determined) by the preceeding ones. 
But we are not ready to generalize. Being equipped with a 
coherent axiomatic structure is not enough in a universe of 
non-verbal entities. Consequently, we shall apply the 
Rules of Chance to other empirical 'processes' and in this 
way further test its interpretative capacities. 
5. Thermodynamics: Empirical Condition of "Brownian Motion" 
In regards to the zig-zag path of the so-called 
"Brownian movements," we have suggested such "irregular" 
phenomenon as the original model after which all causal 
chains are conceived. Although such a view is not in line 
with Einstein's final (and generally deterministic) 
position,1 it is in agreement with the data presented by 
his theory of Brownian movement and the molecular-kinetic 
conception of heat. Einstein departs from the classical 
conception of thermo-molecular determination by fully 
acknowledging the irregularity of molecular movements and 
thus employing probabilty disjunctions (instead of fixed 
values) as denoting particular moleculor states at 
particular time intervals: 
lMacrocosmically speaking. 
Suppose a physical system placed in an environment 
of absolute temperature T , which system has 
thermal interchange with the environment and is in 
a state of thermal equilibrium. This system {. • • ) 
is fully defined in the terms of the molecular 
the~ry of heat by the variables of condition p1 • • • 
Pn• 
This is to say, of course, that the "spherical 
object" which was suspended in the fluid mass in equi-
librium did not itself possess the innate characteristic 
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of irregular motion. c > Indeed, it was quite dead. Neverthe-
less, it did succeed in 1interrupting 1 a closed system in 
thermal equilibrium, resulting in the irregularity of 
impacts of the gas molecules {formally in equilibrium). 
An immediate conclusion would be that there are, in fact, 
no closed thermodynamical processes. Granting that the 
path of the bombarded particle can be traced only by 
probability statements, what can be said concerning the 
future distributions of the bombarding molecules? 
6. Entropy as Ground of Information Theory 
A standard application of the axiomatic method 1n 
physics is the science of thermodynamics, large parts of 
which are derivable from the first and second laws, that 
is from the axioms that energy and entropy are •state 
variables' and are functions of other state variables such 
1Einstein, Theory of Brownian Movement, op. cit., 
p. 21. 
as pressure, volume, etc., whereby energy is constant and 
entropy is increasing in closed systems. 
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Using the results of the kinetic theory of gases, 
according to which the heat content of a gas consists in 
the irregular mechanical motion of its molecules, 
Boltzman1 showed that the collisions of molecules are 
governed by statistical laws which lead to an average 
equalization of differences in speed. In an overwhelming 
number of collisions, the faster molecules will lose speed 
and the slower ones will gain it. The passage of heat 
from higher to lower temperature is thus to be understood 
as a statistical equalization of differences in molecular 
speed. By generally understanding "entropy" to signify 
2 ' 
the "lack of molecular activity," Boltzma.n found that the 
principle of the increase in entropy (such as governs the 
burning of a match) must be regarded not as a strict, but 
as a statistical, law. This is to say; "It is highly 
probable that in the burning of a match the entropy of 
total system involved will become larger as the match 
burns." Notice that this la~ is derived solely from a 
lvienness physicist, 1872. 
2Entropy will later be explained as the measure of 
the extension of a class of possible arrangements, the 
inverse of intensional information. 
32nd Law of Thermodynamics. 
probability interpretation of a frequency distribution. 
In other words# there is no strict denial of the physi-
cal possibility of the initial and terminal states of a 
thermodynamical process being equal; it is merely held 
to be "highly probable" that entropy will increase. In 
this sense the necessity asserted in "entropy must become 
larger" is not equivalent to that asserted in "energy 
must remain constant." Although the law of the increase 
of entropy is guaranteed by the law of large numbers, it 
is a 1guanantee 1 based solely upon observed frequencies; 
not of the type backdropping the strict laws of physics, 
such as the laws of classical mechanics, which are 
regarded as exempt from possible exceptions. 
Boltzman achieved this almost sacreligious reduc-
tion of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics by 
observationally recognizing the statistical relation 
. between the probability of a state and its entropy. He 
explained the temporal direction of a burning match as a 
statistical trend by recognizing ordered molecular states 
as being the exception in a world of chance. This is to 
say, it is highly improbable (on the basis of empirical 
observations) that an ordered state, one containing a 
small amount of activity and consequently a high amount 
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of entropy# be found to exist independent of an antecedent 
state of higher activity and lower entropy. In order to 
better illustrate the derivation of information in a 
thermodynamical process let us employ the following 
diagram: 
disordered state 
high activity 
high entropy 
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By applying Boltzmann's ideas to the problem of 
the distribution of gas molecules in a container and 
supposing the gas to be in a state of partial order 
(i.e.,not in thermal equilibrium) the conception of infor-
mation as negative entropy (and, vise versa, entropy as 
negative information) can be derived from the above 
diagram. For example, the molecules may be regarded as 
being numbered individually,1 although the order of these 
numbers at t 1 is in no relation to the existing arrange-
ment at t 2 • Assume the distribution of molecules in cells 
to be known at t 1 • Without looking in the container, in 
which cell is the molecule "one"'at present (i.e., at t 2 )? 
1As the proper names of these molecules. 
Does our information consist of anything more than the 
knowledge portrayed by.;tAe probability disjunction 
Pl ••• Pn? The exact distribution can be asserted only 
when we know for every cell how many molecules are 
contained in it. 
Order being the exception, it should be easily 
seen that the probability of the latter state far exceeds 
that of the former. This is to say that B, upon being 
recognized as being derivative from something other than 
a chance distribution, must, by the very nature of 
"recognition," have been derived from a frequency distri-
. ' 
bution. Which is to say, in turn, that any information 
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concerning the entropy-state of B can be established only 
as the meaning of A • This will become clearer if we think 
of A as the active molecular state and B aa the final 
state in which the molecules have become inactive. Thus 
we can think of B as the resulting "marks" of the marking 
. . 
activity A. B, which exists at t 2 , becomes the record of 
A, which existed at t 1 and information concerning B has a 
statistical dependence on A. Accordingly, by considering 
it as given that the entropy-state of A is lower than the 
entropy-state of B, as it turns out we have more infor-
mation concerning lower entropy-states than concerning 
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higher entropy-states. Thus, the entropy information at B 
(viz., the "markings 11 of A) portrays a negative amount of 
' ' 
entropy as compared with the higher state of inactivity 
(higher entropy) of B. B does not portray the entropy-
state of B-at-t2, but instead the entropy-state of A at t 2 • 
With this it can be asserted that entropy-information con-
cerning the actual entropy-state of A-at-t1 can be 
supplied only "by way of" a post-interaction state B-at-t2 • 
Entropy increases with ignorance about the event 
predicted and is in inverse ratio to intensional 
information. However, if we are ignorant about the 
event, we shall learn much from.the event; entropy 
therefore measures informatron-from the event, or 
extensional information.l 
Thus low entropy states (in thermodynamical processes) 
require post-interaction states of a higher entropy for 
their explanation. In search of a post-interactionary 
state (to •explain' A), we are able to derive such a state 
only by recognizing the statistical predominance of 
frequency distributions (over chance distributions) of B 
as the state occurring at t 2 and as existing as a record 
and therefore only surviving evidence of the molecular 
activity of A at t 1 • It must be seen that the chronologi-
cal order in wtleh A and B occur were •arrived at• inversely. 
Although a low entropy-state {A) requires a post-inter-
action state (B) of higher entropy for its explanation, 
lReichenbach, Direction of Time, ed. by Miria 
Reichenbach (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1956), p. 174. 
it is only from the point or view or the higher entropy-
state that A could be inversely inferred in the first 
place. 
In summation, in thermodynamical theory, if we 
find an amount or information greater than zero existing 
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at a certain time tn, it must be interpreted as an 
existing record of a past event occurring at tn~l· such 
information records, and therefore is the meaning or that 
past event and it is statistically dependent on the actions 
of that past event for any significance it might have as 
recorder-of-those-past-actions. Thus, information 
appearing at a certain time concerns the past. Or, in 
thermodynamical terms, information about a certain state 
(A) must be obtained after that state (at B) and there-
fore must itself portray a lower (negative) amount of 
entropy than the state at which the information occurs 
(viz., at B). Thus any fo~mal representation of the 
information occurring at any time must appear in the form 
of negative entropy, for it has been deemed (through 
empirical observation) more probable that all thermodynami-
cal processes go in the irreversible direction of higher 
entropy; information being suppliable only by post-
interactionary and consequently higher entropy states. 
The ground for this thermo-representation of law in 
probability terms is the empirical recognition of the 
statistical dominance favoring the successive appearances 
of the frequencies A followed by B; as opposed to the 
mere chance distribution of low and high entropy-states. 
This is to say 6 P(A•B) > P(A) • P(B). 
It is also interesting to note, concerning the 
•connection' of entropy with information theory, that 
1 Shannon and Weaver, in mathematically representing their 
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definition of the measure of intensional information, are 
acutely aware of the negativity (in terms of external 
correspondence) of present representations. Consequently 
they present the information formula in its negative form: 
n 2 
H : - K A1_ Pi log Pi 
The positive expression of the same formula (while no 
less •negative' in essence) is given by ReiChenbach as 
m 3 
H(p) = ~ pi log Pi + logm 
i=l 
1c. Shannon and w. weaver, The Mi.thematical Theory 
of Communication (Urbana: University or Illlriols Press, 
1949), 
2Ibid., p • 19. 
3Reichertbach, Direction of Time, op. cit., p. 170. 
This is to point out that Sharmon and Weaver choose to 
formally define intensional information (i.e., concerning 
the present at tn) only in extensional terms {i.e., only 
in terms of the past occurring at tn_1 ). 
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CHAPI'ER IX 
NECESSITY OF TEMPORAL DIRECTION 
IN PROBABILITY FRA.MEWCRK 
Alas, the kaleidoscopic eyes starting orf into 
the distance and shadowed with melancholy might 
enable us perhaps to measure distance, but do not 
indicate direction. The boundless field of possi-
bilities extends before us 1 and if by any chance 
the reality presented itself tocour gaze, it would 
be so far beyond the bounds of possibility that, 
dashing suddenly against the boundary wall, we 
should fall over backwards.1 
1. Axiomatic Formalization or Temporal Direction 
By~ecognizing' the statistical predominance of a 
frequency distribution in the race of universe of chance 
occurrances, the results or thermo-molecular investi-
gations have not only supplied us with ordered sequences 
of physical events, but with an irreversible temporal 
direction as well. But as tempting as it may seem, it 
must be rememberee that such made-to-order conclusions 
were not mathematically formalized, that is, they were not 
deduced from the tautological axioms which structure our 
normative function but were derived, instead, from the 
1Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, op. cit., 
p. 442. 
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empirical recordings or one particular branch of science, 
viz., thermodynamics. Or, to put it another way, the 
'findings' concerning the causal connections of thermo-
. ' 
dynamical processes can be classified (in-themselves.) 
simply as empirical visualizations, or, interpretations, 
perhaps one of many. Indeed, the use of statistical 
considerations in thermodynamics appeared to be merely an 
expedient, forced upon us by the limitations of man 1s 
abilities; it was assumed that if we could only observe 
every molecule in its path, we would be able, like 
Laplace's superman, to predict strictly the future develop-
ment of the gas, and we would not have to resort to 
statistical considerations. Statistical laws thus appeared 
to be laws "faute de mieux"-formulations (empirical 
. . 
interpretations) tentatively adopted for want of something 
better. According to such a view, statistical laws are 
ultimately reducible to causal laws. But, as we have seen, 
such a reduction is tenable only by presupposing, as 
irreducible, the two-valued normative function (i.e., a 
strict axiomatic calculus) which we have formally 
extended into a logic of probability. Thus, to reverse 
things a bit, a complete exploitation of such an "extension" 
would result in the ultimate reducibility of all causal 
laws to statistical laws. To adequately complete the 
project we cannot rely solely upon the empirical 
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interpretations of thermpdynamieal processes or games of 
chance# both of which were seen to employ the frequency 
interpretation. We must establish an isomorphism between 
the particular mode of visualization and the normative 
structure of our language. Thus# although on the evidence 
so far presented we can establish the formal ('legal') 
correspondence between certain empirically derived fre-
quency distributions (i.e., between certain physical 
orders of events) and the tautological axioms of the 
calculus ofJprobability, we have not, as of yet, mathe-
matically correlated the empirical assertion (in thermo-
dynamics) of unique temporal directionality using 
probabilities alone. Accordingly the question arises, 
:roan the assumption of asynunetrical direction be derived 
from the formally presented axioms of probability?., Or 
again, 10o the axioms stated thus far (which are capable 
of describing continuous sequences) actually presuppose 
the existence of physical processes which are irreversible?' 
First we shall accept the considerations of thermodynamics 
which, holding that the description of a particular gas 
state occurring at a certain time is statistically 
dependent on the existence of an additional gas state of 
lower entropy occurring at an earlier time, conclude that 
such processes go only in the direction of higher entropy 
al¥i81:'e therefore irreversible. We shall now seek to 
derive precisely the same results (v1z. 1 the assertion 
of the irre~ersibility of time order) solely from the 
normative axioms of probability formulated above. 
First 1 in order to better clarify the idea of ir-
reversibility associated with probability1 consider the 
following extraction from the games of chance. We are 
given two similar containers A and B; A containing two 
white balls as opposed to one black1 while B contains two 
black balls and one white. · 
A B 
Stated Information: a white ball is drawn 
Deduction: 
~· - l ..... 
the c.bances are 2 to 1 tba t it was drawn from 
container A. (Silllilarly the odds would favor 
container B if a red ball was drawn). 
If probability implications were symmetrical the 
above conditional could be stated 1n reverse 
order: 
Stated Information: the chances are 2 to 1 that a container 
is container A. 
Deduction: a white ball will definitely be drawn! 
This is obviously a faulty deduction for the correct 
answer, given the odds of 2 to 1 favoring the A con-
tainer, would be that the chances are now 5 to 4 that a 
white ball will be drawn. Such probability statements 
are irreversible. The problem row is to determine 
whether or not the axioms of irreversibility can be 
successfully employed as a vehicle useful in the formali-
zation of empirical irreversibility. 
2. Time Order (Causally-Between Relation) 
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In the face of two-valued inadequacy the elementary 
axioms we developed by assuming (in the form of the rule of 
existence) the existence of classes of frequency distribu-
tions such as A, B, and c. This is to say, we assumed the 
statistical probability method from the very outset of the 
axiomatic development of a calculus of probability. 
Entirely through this method we can establish the events 
A, B, c1 as existing in a certain order by defining B as 
2 
being "causally-between" A and C if the following condi-
tions are met: 
(l) l > P(B,C) > P(A,C) > P(C) ':7 0 
(2) l > P(B,A) ~ P(C,A) ~ P(A) > 0 
(3) P {A•B,C) = P(B,C) 
lAlthough the proper notation would be x € A, 
y € B, z e c, these have been reduced to A, B, C for 
simplicity of explanation. 
2ae1chenbach, Direction of Time, op. cit., cr. pp. 
190-197· 
With these conditions accounted for B can be asserted to 
be "causally between" A and C. By examining equation (3) 
we note tha. t B "screens off" A from C •1 Likewise B can 
be shown to screen off C from A by reversing the values 
of equation (3): 
P(C·B~A) = P(B~A) 
Thus~ following equation (3)~ if the mark of A is evident 
inc~ for example~ if the condition of a sunny day A is 
evident in the subsequent change-in-the-weather C (by its 
contrasting absence)~ and B screens off A~ as a sudden 
thunderstorm B obliterates a sunny day A~ therefore~ the 
mark of A must also be evident in B. This is the exact 
reason A is dropped in equation (3) and continuity of the 
mark must be assumed. As was mentioned, this same 
example holds regardless of whether A or C is screened 
off by B. The 1catch, 1 ultimately responsible for the 
establishment of order in the series, is that B~ itself, 
cannot be screened off by either A or C. This can be 
derived from the following inequality: 
2 
P(C•A,B) > P(A,B) 
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If these conditions are satisfied by three events A, B, C, 
we can conclude that B is causally between A and c. 
1we have established this in axioms since A-series 
is compact. 
2P(C•A,B) = P(A•C,B) 
The reason this relation holds regardless of whether the 
order is A, B, C or C, B, A is that, given the (statisti-
cal) assumption in the form of equation (3) 
P(A•B,C) • P{B,C) 1 
it can be shown that since 
therefore, 
P(B•A,C) : 
P{B•C,A) 
P(B1C) [A is "screened orr"] 
P(B,A) [C is "screened offu] J 
P(C•B,A) : P(B,A) 
can be successfully deduced from equation (~) and the 
symmetrical order of the events is established. 
Equations (1) and (2) are mathematical formalizations 
establishing the superiority of closely 1spaced 1 prob-
ability distributions over chance distributions in all 
information ~ o.1 The combined use of relation (1)-(3) 
can thus be shown to lead to order requirements holding 
for the construction of a causal net. Direction .. is 
reversible, however; A, B, C = c, B, A. 
~hus strict determinism of effect C by cause 
A or B, as formulated in mechanical equations to 
define the between-relation, is replaced by statisti-
cal determinism which becomes weaker with growing 
causal distance. 
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3. Local Comparability of Time Order 
It shall now be shown that while the specific-
ations of the causally-between (and thus order) relations 
may well be met, a definite direction cannot be assigned 
to a series A, B, C based on this criterion alone, and 
for this reason the concept (comprising this criterion) 
shall be extended to include the ordinal relations of 
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more than three events, all of which satisfy the previ-
ously stated requirements (1)-(3). So far the::between-
relation has been shown to merely order the three events, 
that is, it merely pieces events together in a net, 
indifferent to serial order (order in one series). Conse-
quently, relying solely on the between-relation (1)-(3) we 
cannot distinguish, upon adding other events, between eq~ 
directed causal lines 
A 
and counter-directed causal lines 
c 
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Both satisfy the causally-between requirements. Neverthe-
less, distinction can be made by introducing the principle 
of' the local comparability of' time order which is based on 
the specific observations of' coincidences and approximate 
coincidences existing between events which constitute a 
causal net constructed in accordance with the between-
requirements (l)-(3). In words, a causal net based on 
statistical rather than strict causal laws, one ordered as 
a whole and above all, one acquiring the same properties 
as a causal net of' classical mechanics exhibiting lineal 
order (at this point) rather than serial order. 
Now, given five events, (l), (2), (3), (4), (5), 
if' one of' the events (e.g., (2)) satisfies the causally-
between requirements in relation to two other events 
(e.g., (3) and (5)), a neighborhood relation is established 
with nothing assertable about direction. But, in addition 
to this causal 1inclusion 1 of' (2), if' (3) and (5) are also 
l 
"coincidences, 11 then the causal lines in this neighborhood 
must be counter-directed as is seen in this illustration: 
1For example, heat and flame are statistical 
coincidences of' the striking of' a match. 
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Now 1 if we find that {2) also satisfies the causall~ 
between relation for [(1) and (3)] and [(4) and (5)] as it 
. . 
did for [{3) and (5)] and [(1) and (4)] 1 but that (1) and 
,. . (3) are not coincidences as were (3) and (5) 1 then (1)-(2) 
must go 1n the same direction as (2)-(3) and likewise~ 
(4)-(2) must go in the direction of {2)-(5). We have thus 
established lineal order for the neighborhood relation by 
assuming, first, the observation of discrete elements in a 
sequence and 1 secondly, that the between-relation is unique 
for three events, i.e., that among three events only one 
event can exist between any two other events. The problem 
was to distinguish between the equi-direction and counter-
direction of orders satisfying the causally-between 
relation. In order to establish both processes (1)-(2)-(3) 
and (4)-(2)-{5) as sharing the same direction it is 
necessary to compare the time order of local events which 
is possible only empirically by observational verification. 
This leads to the continuity assumption which states that 
approximate coincidences are defined observationally. In 
other words, in the diagram 
approximate 
coincidences 
The order of (1)-(2}-(3) equals the order of (4)-(5)-(6) 
due to the observed coincidences of (1) and (4), (2} aOd 
1 . (5), and (3) and (6). Although (1)-{2)-{3) and (4)-{5)-
{6) could be going in op~osite directions and the same 
diagram would result, nevertheless, this would conflict 
with the observational data of the coincidences (1)-(4), 
(2)-{5), and (3)-(6). Without the continuity assumption 
(viz., that "in a given description, both processes have 
2 the same time direction" ••• which is observationally 
verifiable!) the concept of coincidence could not be 
defined. This is to say that we must think in discrete 
terms on the object level but in continuous terms in the 
meta-level of the language employed. Thus, on the object 
level of descriptions a direction of time cannot be 
defined except by a priori reference to some irreversible 
process {as evidenced in the substituting of "-t" for "t" 
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in an equation in classical mechanics). But by constructing 
a causal net based on statistical {rather than strict) 
causal laws, not only must the causally-between assumptions 
(1)-(3) be satisfied, but also, by defining observable 
1rt should be noted that we are using "verification" 
in this discussion in the broadest (macrocosmic) sense. 
2Reichenbach, Direction of Time, op. cit., p. 35. 
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coincidences 1 counter-directional processes are distinguished 
from equi-directional ones. This resulted since 1 from the 
diagram 
[{l) and (3)] and [(5) and (4)] are not coincidences because 
' -
they cannot be separated from (2). Thus local comparability 
establishes the causal lines of (1)-(2)-(3), or (3)-(2)-(l) 
as equi-directed (but not serially-directed) 
0/l 
While, at the same time 1 lines (3)-(2)-(4) 1 on the evidence 
given, could be diagrammed as counter-directed (small : 
~ow•) _because, although (1)-(2)-(3) must be uni-directed 
and likewise (4)-(2)-(5) 1 it has not been established that 
both directions must be the same, except on observational 
grounds. 
Thus we have the wnole -process going in the same 
direction by constructing a sta51$tical causal net using 
probabilities only 1 founded on the assumptions of the 
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local comparability of time order~and the causally-between 
relation. Since we now have lineal order, all that remains 
to be done is to assign a time-direction to one causal line 
and a temporal direction will result for the whole net. To 
accomplish this we shall need to enlist the aid of the 
principle or common cause. 
4. Principle of Common cause 
If an improbable coincidence has occurred, viz., if 
P(A•B) >P(A) • P(B), there must exist a conunon cause. 
This is the gist of the principle. Directionality is born 
upon applying it to the neighborhood relation developed 
earlier: 
(1) If (3) and (5) are improbable coincidences, and (2) 
can be established as causally-between (3) and (5), 
thus (2) is their common cause. 
(2) Although (2) can be established as causally-between 
(1) and (3), nevertheless, (1) and (3), not being 
improbable coincidences, have no common cause. 
(3) In answer to the question '~hy cannot (2) be the 
conunon cause of (1) and (4)"? let it be remembered 
I 
that we have alrea~y established (by the local compar-
ability of time order) that the direction of (1)-(2) 
is the same as that of {2)-(3), and that consequently 
(2) succeeds rather than preceeds, the coincidental 
occurrance of (1) and {4). 
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By saying that the common cause of (3) and {5) 
(viz., (2)) explains the frequent coincident of (3) and 
(5), we refer not only to the derivability of the relation 
P[{3)•{5)] > P[(3)] • P[(5)], 
but also to the fact that, relative to the common cause (2), 
the events (3) and (5) are mutually independent : a 
statistical dependence is here derived from a mutual inde-
pendence. Thus (2) is the common cause which functions as 
the connecting link by transforming an independence into a 
dependence. This merely repeats what has been previously 
stated concerning thermodynamical processes, viz., that if 
two events (3) and (5) occur as coincidences more fre-
quently than would correspond to their independent (chance) 
occurrence, then they are statistically dependent on a 
common cause (2) for their explanation. The definition of 
temporal direction supplied by the principle of common 
cause is thus identified with the rule that the observation 
of an ordered state (in an isolated gas system) is the 
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observation of a post-interaction state. The simultaneous 
occurrence of (3) and (5) is thus regarded as indicating 
order because statistically it requires a common cause 
(rather than a mere chance distribution) for its explan-
ation. 
Due to the statistical isotropy of the universe 
(viewed in the form of a lattice-invarient, as in the 
example of the "soap bubble 11 used in the discussion of 
Bernoulli above), the states of order (1) and (4) are not 
directly approachable as pre-interaction states. "Pre-
interaction" is an unintelligible word, except from the 
point of view (via an inverse inference) of a post-inter-
action state. Thus, if we were to attempt to correlate 
the results of thermodynamics with the Bernoullean conclu-
sions reached concerning limits in the games of chance in 
the form of a "cosmological., pictorialization, the 
' ' 
resulting parallelism between entropy increase and 
lim P(A,Bn) 
11~ca~~--
Bn 
could be legitimately conceived in the form of a universe 
the constituent processes of which are proceeding in the 
direction of higher entropy; the assumption of statistical 
isostropy presupposing the assumption of infinity. The 
statistical relations in the resulting universal lattice 
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(mixture) are visible only through the internal dependence 
of after-effect. The "present lattice 1 " as our present 
information 1 cannot itself be explained (i.e. 1 is not 
visible) except as internally dependent (as an after-
effect) on statistical relations of the whole lattice-
invariant. 
CHAPI'ER X 
OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF OBJECTIVE PROBABILITY: 
STOCHASTIC BEHAVIORISM 
We shall generally assume the fundamental interest 
of physics to be the study of objectivity 1per se.• 
Consequently, if we consider all epistemological effects 
to be made up of discontinuous probability sequences, in 
words, to be ~henomena, 1 and as causes of these effects we 
establish continuous probability sequences, therefore, in 
this schema, if objectivity 1per se_, 1 is to bear any 
significance at all it must correspond to the definitions 
holding for continuous probability sequences. As we have 
developed and tested axioms of probability in accordance 
with empirical interpretations, the concept of a symmetri-
cal universe towards which man imperfectly gropes, using 
as the rigid reminder of his inadequacy the Laplacean tool 
of probability ••• such a concept, proposing a subjective 
probability in the race of a symmetrical determinism, has 
been replaced by the concept of objective probability 
linkings in space. Likewise, the concept of probability 
as the eternal symbol of existemological "imperfection" 
loses all significance in a universe which has no 
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"perfection"-coordinate. It is with this point in mind 
that this thesis has been presented as a remarkably un-
timely (considering the contemporary political scene) 
reminder that the "material" things of everyday life 
(which are so often interpreted through a Euclidean haze) 
are not the pristine stuff of reality. The primitive real 
entities are other things altogether, whereas "cars," 
"baseballs," and "Diety" are classified sequences, that 
is, they are systems which are structured complexes of 
these primitive "entities." Although the primitive 
entities are themselves ''only" indeterminate linkings in 
space, we have shown, nevertheless, that such indetermin-
ancy ~ be mathematically interpreted as continuous 
probability sequences. It follows that mathematical 
descriptions do not entail a strict deterministic rigidity 
which predominated classical mechanics. 
l. Freedom !mplica~ion 
In denying ontological determinism "freedom" 
(self-determinism) becomes a matter of predictive capacity. 
The theory suggested here has grown out of an effort (in 
the contemporary Behavioristic school) to truly represent 
that human freedom of choice in a mathematical precisement 
of the notion of "utility." We shall find that an analy-
sis of freedom entails the understanding that choice (by 
implying alternatives) implies belief. The question 
naturally arises 11Where do so-called intuited personal 
beliefs fit into the inorganic tautological set-up 
which has so successfully churned out so legitimate a 
criterion of predictiorl? 
2. Belief Implication 
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The justification of a belief is not required for 
the justification of an action, although rational action 
(the act of inductively inferring) shall be seen to 
include the action of believing. We have injected the 
frequency interpretation of probability into the self-
evident framework of analytic tautologies and thereupon 
received the justification of action. Beliefs 1 on the 
other hand 1 are not so rationally conditioned and are 
often found gloating in the spectrum of empirical 
inunediacy. But they are not an admissible source of know-
ledge1 for there is no such thing as synthetic self-
evidence. Neither can they (beliefs implying non-beliefs, 
both of which imply something-less-than-tautological-
certitude) be axiomized. Accordingly1 beliefs cannot act 
as the logical justification of that which ~ be 
logically justified, viz., theoretical inductive action. 
In fact, we shall confine the legitimacy of beliefs to 
the lower empirical levelsj "legitimacy" not implying 
tautological "necessity •11 
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Hume, in attributing induction to the conventional 
belief-in-induction, thereby, in abandoning said belief 
succeeded in disqualifying induction in favoroof skepti-
cism. But induction, implying the rational quest for 
success in the act of prediction, wa~ logically derived 
from a meta-tautological framework and thus was not to be 
undermined by the mere withdrawal of empirical beliefs. 
Although Hume was correct in pointing out the lack of 
necessary justification for inductive procedures, he was 
mistaken in assuming the only alternative means of 
acquittal to be the facade of personal belief which was 
indeed merely a facade and thus quickly disposable. We 
have attempted to persuade the reader of another possible 
means of vindicating induction by establishing a calculus 
of probability which in itself provides sufficient justi-
fication for all inductive action. we agree with Hume 
that it is not within the jurisdiction of "belief" to 
justify the formal statements of self-evident analytical 
processes. Where we disagree is with his (1) assumption 
that tautological frameworks, in being necessary {in being 
analytical), thus require the corresponding necessity of 
isomorphic external symmetry for this justification, and 
with his {2) conclusion that consequently the inadequacy of 
the latter involves the denial of the former. On the 
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contrary we shall hold that the fact of physical indetermi-
nancy itself is the verifying empirical visualization of 
the tautologically derived normative function of Indeter-
minancy. Thus the laws of probability as means of calcu-
lating1 not future events but the probabilities of future 
events 1 are completely deterministic. This is not a two-
valued necessity but a multi-valued sufficiency1 for as a 
means of calculating future observational knowledge (single 
events) the system of law is indeterminate. Therein lies 
the fundamental equating of "most probable'' with "most 
possible"; possibility implying indeterminancy, it is the 
rules of indeterminancy which are unimpeachable. 
Granting that the axioms of probability provide 
sufficient justification for the inductive positing of the 
element of the "highest weight" selected from a similarity 
' ' disjunction (reference class) consisting of elements of 
1 
various weights1the question of personal choice comes into 
play1 especially in view of our initially stated tendency 
toward Behaviorism. Since the possibility of choice 
would include the possibility of alternatives, the question 
boils down to whether a man1 fully aware of the most 
probable chance of success 1 can consciously choose from 
among the other elements in his reference class. Of 
course this would involve the possibility of choosing the 
lThis agrees with the essential tenants of Reichenbach's 
famous • justification or induction• (cf. Reichenbach1 Theory of Probability~ op. cit.~ § 91). 
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least probable event and predicting its future occurrence. 
By denying self-evident assurance to the empirical levels 
of synthetic belief-statements 1 beliefs must thus either 
be included in the tautological rules of probability or 
else discarded as mean1ngless 1 i.e. 1 as logically unintelli-
gible and unnecessary. This is to say that for a man to 
consciously choose from the possibilities presented is to 
consciously diminish his absolute respect for success which 1 
in being mechanically presented by the axioms of probabil-
ity 1 involves no choice whatsoever. Therefore it might 
appear at first glance that choice excludes axiomatic 
ju~tification. In other words 1 to admit bias towards an 
improbable occurrence when confronted with the solution-
most-logically-possible is to define belief with the 
admission of discrimination. The question: Can the 
psychological fact of intactuation be logically justified 
by the axioms of probability? 
3. Axiomatic Justification of Passion 
"The determination of the weight of a proposition 
l differs greatly from that of truth. 11 Consequently the 
possibility of improbable occurrences are implicitly 
embedded within the actual formulation of the reference 
class of possible occurrences. For although certain of the 
p. 33. 
1Reichenbach1 Experience and Prediction1 op. cit. 1 
possible alternatives are more probable (have a higher 
weight), "we see that the weight becomes superfluous if a 
- l 
verification is attained • 11 In this sense, even the most 
intoXicated probability must have open-ended respect for 
the sober alliance of d~nutive chance. 
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1Action 1 would appear to be dichotomized in mean-
ing; dividing into (l) strictly •computer' acts (i.e., the 
mechanical, or reactionary positing of the highest weight 
in the reference class -which is, in view of the past fre-
quencies observed, the •most one can do 1 logically), and 
(2) the awareness of the multivarious possibilities: the 
sudden affrontal of dilemmat (the "embarras de choix" -
the sensation that the •most one can do 1 is not enough to 
guarantee success). Clearly enough, •action' demands a 
decision about unknown events, tully knowing that the 
security of the highest weight becomes an etherial reflec-
tion upon the next turn of the wheel. For what precisely 
is the future but the negation of the present similarity 
disjunction with the confirmation of one or its eiements? 
Thus the explanation of •action• recapitulates 
the •motive-for-action 1 which demands for its comprehen-
sion the existence of the non-existent or, in Sartre's 
1Ibid. 
-
l 
words, the "nE!gatitE!." ("The mind is the negative" 
Hegel. "ormlis determinato,est negatio" - Spinoza). 
It is the problem of sanely interpreting the 
dominating personality of the least significant possibil-
ity that is nerve provoking by its very presence. 
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Consider the emotion of "tear" which Reichenbach defines 
as 11an exaggerated feelins of expectation concerning the 
probability of an undesirable event."2 Is the degree of 
probability concerning an 'undesirable event• inversely 
relational to our •reeling of expectation• preceeding its 
occurrance? Of course not. The fact of a low probability 
has been known to increase the degree of expectancy.3 
Nevertheless, it was the fluctuations of the probability 
scale which served as (indeterminate) causal factor. 
That the emotional interpretation among individuals 
may vary (although the similarity disjunction and its 
accompanying degrees of probability remains the same) can 
be justified by the rules of probability upon examining 
the assumption of its denial, viz., the •computer•--
individual. Aware only of the first· meaning of •action, 1 
lJean-Paul sartre, Bei~ and Noth~ness, tr. by 
Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Ph osophical brary, 1956), 
p. 437. . 
2Reichenbach, Theory of Probability, op. cit., 
p. 368. 
3Excellent examples ot such a tendency can be found 
in the case studies reviewed in Existence, ed. by May, 
Angel and Ellenberger (New York: Basic Book, Inc., 1958). 
he becomes a determinist through his unawareness of the 
second. It is the Rational Man, acting solely on the 
evidence scientifically recorded by his acute observation 
of frequencies of past events, who carefully surveys the 
byways (and under and around and behind the byways) , 
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hangs his calculator around his neck and,taking a deep 
breath with a confident air, steps out into the byway, 
only to be hit by a falling star. Prostrated by the 
improbable, the renegade occurrence, it is useless to 
counter 'If enough had been known •• • ,• for then the 
1renegade 1 event itself would have become probable and the 
improbable might still have occurred (in this case saving 
the man 1s life). Of ~ourse, this only makes way for the 
inevitable recoil, 'Still, if enough had been known •• ~; 
"enough" here implying Everything, which in turn supposes 
Laplace's assumption of external symmetry (viz., the 
possibility of knowing everything). 
Because the statement 'The future is indeterminate' 
has been logically axiomized, inductive inferences based on 
the frequency interpretation of probability infrequently 
turn out to be incorrect. "Motives have meaning only 
inside a projected ensemble which is precisely an ensemble 
of non-existents,~1 the non-existents referring in this 
1sartre, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 437. 
case to the elements of a diBjunctive reference class. 
That the individual event es<~apes the realm of tauto-
logical determinism has been tautologically determined. 
Consequently, the computer-irdividual, by punctually 
acknowledging the most probable subsequent occurrence 
with quietistic approval was clearly in a state of 
muddled deception if he imagined the legal capacity of 
the probability framework within which he functionally 
predicted to extrapolate with the maximum degree of 
exactitude. For in playing his tautology to the hilt 
{or convincing himself that he had done so) he not only 
became a psychological curio but a walking paradigm of 
intellectual perversion as well. 
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Ass~;the rules of probability we have no 
choice but to inductively infer the element of the highest 
weight if the floor plan of future single events could be 
necessarily assumed as tautological repetitions of the 
past. The •catch 1 here being that probability rules, in 
applying only to an infinite number of occurrences define 
all single events as fictitious. In this sense it would 
appear that to assume the r~le of Rationality would be to 
work only with infinite sequences. The fact, that this 
is contradicted by the finite disjunction derived 
observationally by ennumeration for our reference class 
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reveals the physical fact and the accompanying disillu-
sionments or a one-by-one empiricism. The •rational man,• 
in trundling from event to event, must not only remember 
each event in the order in which it occurred but must at 
the same time assume meta-axioms of infinity (entailing 
axioms of continuity) in defending this frail collection 
against the incredibly immense and magnitudinous, 
prodigiously gigantic and colossally Atlantean, Herculean, 
and Cyclopean, inexpressibly exorbitant, unutterably 
monstrous and ineffably unconscionable Futtire, necessarily 
reduced in his case (with some embarrassment) to the next 
single event. Knowledge becomes a 'concatenation or 
inductions• made one by one from one fictitious outgrowth 
to another. Because we are compelled to a realm or 
perceptual ennumeration or single pictorializations does 
not imply in the least the unique intelligibility or any 
one or the pictorializations, in itself. We have seen 
how the interpretation or the single discontinuous event 
presupposes the assumptions of a continuous probability 
sequence. We have seen that only from a finite reference 
class can such a presupposition be uncovered and thus 
axiomized. 
Consequently we shall endorse computer-actionJ 
which,in reacting toward the higher probability of success, 
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excludes choice, only to co-endorse the legal permission 
of respecting the alternative possibilities of failure. 
The main reason for this cosignature evolves from their 
mutual reliance on fictive events. Thus in holding that 
all actions are on principle intentional, we must also 
admit all intentional posits (inductive inferences) to be 
fictitious fixations. We must thus agree that although 
strictly rational action is possible, it cannot be 
accomplished within the probability framework without the 
concomitant awareness of possible failure in the succeed-
ing event. For such a single case has no influence ·on the 
infinite number of cases-necessarily assumed for the only 
logically possible interpretation of the single ease. In 
this sense 'beliefs' are rationally feasible conditions 
of action, but only upon the condition that they remain 
confined to "observational" concretizations of fictitious 
single-events. Thus a person may choose not to travel by 
air on a particular·date despite the odds heavily favoring 
his safe passage, relying instead on his belief 1n 
disaster·to prompt his decision; 1belief 1 in this case 
referring to the rational awareness of possible disaster. 
·Belief is a result of the empirical evaluation of 
the laws of probability. It is not a condition of those 
laws. Thus although logical actions must take beliefs 
into consideration, they are not justified by them. 
4. Freedom 1per se • 
We shall omit any extensive discussion on the 
initiation of new (personal} projects implied by freedom 
as •self-determination' except to point out that s~ch 
self propagating actions are justified by the inclusion 
ot improbable actions in the laws of probability. For an 
individual to fully exploit his freedom he must choose to 
deviate from the absolute guarantee of uncertainty 
provided by the axioms • There are two logical dirac tions 
of deviation: (1} towards a completely chaotic state in 
which no ordered sequences, whatsoever,are to be found, 
or (2} towards a completely deterministic state. The 
first alternative is discarded as contradictory by the 
very tact that any definition or chaos presupposes the 
definition of order (including probable order) which in 
turn demands the function of 11recognition"; both or which 
cannot exist in a state which is licentious 'a priori. 
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On the other hand, the acceptance of the second alternative 
would seem to nullify all the arguments suggested thus far 
against a strict determinism. But it must be remembered 
that the strict determinism previously discussed had 
ontological (meta-level} presuppositions of symmetry 
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resulting in a one-by-one metaphysics, whereas by applying 
a deterministic mode of action (viz., an intentional mode) 
s~lely to the level of single events within the framework 
of probability the maximum result is a one-by-one empiri-
cism. The difference thus between actions-of-freedom and 
rational-actions-of-belief evolves as·~,bhe difference 
between necessity and probability; "necessity" being con-
fined to the needs of the personality, "probability" to 
that which he can 'depend on• as his external circumstance. 
The intensity of freedom thus is proportionally related to 
the necessity of single-event predictions and thus cannot 
be fully defined ~or the particular individual) until the 
possible element (regardless of its degree of probability} 
has transcended itself as a mere projection into the 
future~ by the fact of its actuality. Freedom is the 
desire-for-and-successful-attainment-of-a previously 
chosen 'objective• in the face of a universe which requires 
nothing and guarantees nothing except the~utter futility 
1 
of ontological freedom (determinism). Yet, freedom on 
the empirical level of single events is axiomatically 
acceptable, although not rationally admirable. One only 
exhibits his own inner needs in the admiration of the 
projected needs (in the act of self-determination) of 
another. 
lThe continuum is not 1free. 1 
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5. Mathematical Implication 
The revolutionary mathematical idea is that this 
can be done with a set-function, in contrast to the point-
function used in previous attempts at two-valued interpre-
1 tations. By defining "utility" as an interested valu-
. . 
ation by the individual of his potential acts, and by 
considering all acts to have utility, every selection 
space (e.g., of the probability densities A, B 1 C, used in 
the construction of Bayes• rule) is composed of points 
which must now be considered as a subset having a utility 
associated with it. Thus "utility" is now to be considered 
' . 
as a set-function. Consider the following diagram: 
Selection each of these 
. spaces subsets is 
equipped with 
individual 
utilities 
None of the three selection spaces can be thought of as 
rigid entities, in-themselves. Therefore 1 the utility of, 
for example, selecting "C" (i.e., the prompting motivation 
1consequently 1 we adopted the theory of implicit (relative) definitions. 
behind such a choice) 1 is defined only by an analysis of 
its subsets. This corresponds to the necessary role of 
subsequences in the axiomatic development. Thus 1 if 
"utility" is to be considered of an intelligible nature 
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it must assume the identity of a set-function. It is our 
contention that the notions of utility and probability 
combine to give us the single key to the full resolution 
of the entire substance of reality 1 viz. 1 as consisting of 
three modes: 
(l) Past acts which have already been participated 
in; 
(2) Possible future eventualities in which one figures; 
(3) Present probabilities of these (future) eventuali-
ties, based on past acts.1 
These three modes have been seen to require the 
dual efforts of both the individual and his environment_ 
both of which can be considered as two complex marginal 
processes (distributions). When one's thinking 1demands 1 
such a unifying concept, the 1binding together' of these 
two marginal probability distributions (of continuous and 
discontinuous probability sequences) can be thought of as 
'forming' a parent process representing the whole complex.2 
lit is important to note that the ~resent mode 
consists of a fictive endurance (in-itself). 
2consequently there appears to be no necessary 
1demand 1 for a Bradlean Absolute. 
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It is most "convenient" that many contemporary 
theories in the Behaviorist school follow the patterns 
set down by Reichenbach's axioms of probability. It 
would appear that a general •working hypothesis' would 
equate the concept of objective probability with a 
behavioristic (stochastic) schema. Accordingly, Professor 
1 Barankin (University of California) has developed a 
mathematical law of behavior, using set-functions, which 
formally states the law of evolution of a personality 
strain in much the same way we defined 'after-effect' in 
the post-interaction state by the •.tendency (of the pre-
ceeding states) to remain.• 
1E. W. Barankin, Quantitative Theory of Human 
Behavior, I: The Si;le Individual (Rarid Corporation 
Research Memorandum -900 (1952)). 
CHAPl'ER XI 
IMPLICATION OF NBo-DUALISM 
1. Geometrical Necessity of Spatial "Betweenness" 
in Topological Evaluations 
The essential ideas of this action evolve from the 
assertion that the holistic properties of a topological 
structure (viz.~ the topological character of the universe) 
cannot be determined if the description is restricted to 
infinitesimal regions. The conception of spatial "between-
ness" (in the interpretation of a space as being built up 
of discontinuous probability sequences) revealed the basic 
meaning of the topology of space. It contains the answer 
to the question 1 1Wbat is actually meant by the order of 
spatially adjacent regions? 1 The concept of spatial metric 
was thus supplied by the empirical •concern• centering 
around causal propagation. We have shown how II in infor-
mation theory the concept "earlier 1 " "later 1 11 and 
' . 
simultaneous" revealed themselves as ordering concepts by 
means of which we were able to characterize the most 
general properties of causal structure. The· fact is that 
from the recognition of spatial order (or discrete 
sequences) a causal chain was inferred • The point we wish 
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to stress here is that the rules formulated in the topolo-
gical coordinative definitions which governed the construc-
tion of the space of discontinuous probability sequences 
characteristic of interpretation A in an earlier section 
(which was illustrated by a machine-gunned target area), 
are in essence rules which serve only as the basis of ac·-
complicated procedure by which the construction {interpre-
tation B) of a space governed by a continuous time function 
and thus composed of continuous probability sequences is 
inferred. In other words, the interpretation of a space 
as composed of a continuous non-denumerable infinity of 
elements (viz., interpretation B of a ,;target sprayed by a 
watergun) was possible only on the basis of the antecedent 
existence (logically; not chronologically) of interpretation 
A composed of a discontinuous infinity of elements. This 
is to say that the definite character of the fundamental 
metrical form e~presses the discontinuous nature of space 
while it is the indefinite character of the same 
fundamental metrical form which forces us to infer the 
singular nature of time. Only from 11betweermess •• can 
continuity be conceived; such an inference taking place on 
a meta-level. 
But, as we have suggested in our discussion of 
information theory, the meta-inference of continuous time 
from the ordered sequence of discontinuous topological 
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relations does not give us an exhaustive description or 
the nature or temporal continuity. Although a distinction 
between space and time is definitely expressed in the 
comparison or interpretations A and B, nevertheless, it 
does not give us a complete comprehension or the peculiar 
characteristic or time which makes any strict delineation 
ot the present virtually impossible. At the present the 
present eludes us • • • until a later date • • • until a 
time in ;the future when an information formula will 
express a negative amount or entropy corresponding to a 
high degree or information about some particular ~­
interaction state, a state we shall then take to be our 
present present. 
From this consideration or the "incompleteness" or 
temporal continuity evolves another essential property or 
time, viz., its directionalitf• This becomes apparent 
when we recall that it was upon the assumption or temporal 
continuity {alone) as the dimension or the causal chains 
that the 'workability' or the relative probabilities in 
determining antecedent <811118 c£ discrete events was groumed. 
Whereas space reflects only the neighborhoodielations 
between co-existing causal chains, time is the direction 
ot the grain (tendency~ or 'strain) or the manifold along 
whioh the causal chains extend. Thus, it the description 
is restricted to infinitesimal regions such as defining 
areas built up of continuous probability sequences as in 
interpretation B of the watergun target, the topological 
character governed by spatial cowdina tes remains an open 
question. The holistic properties are not determined. 
In particular the possibility remains that for the 
universe-as-a-whole the axiom of the nonexistence of 
1 
closed causal chains may fail. But this need not bother 
us, for since '~e can employ the concepts of space and 
time only so long as there are phenomena that realize 
them,2" it follows that any conception of the universe-
as-a-whole would be unintelligible. For "incompletion" 
' 
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bas been established as an essential characteristic or the 
assumption of temporal continuity necessary tor the 
determination or relative probabilities. An infinity of 
meta-levels must be assumed. 
A computation of probabilities of the higher 
level is possible only when limits of the higher 
level are known. Whereas statements about limits 
of the first level are thus given a probability 
meaning, those concerning limits of the second 
lTo imagine such a universe would be to visualize 
a two-dimensional world, without singularities, contain-
ing closed time lines. Mathematically speaking, such a 
conception appears to be possible; one in the special 
theory of relativity applies in infinitesimal domains 
without exception. 
2Reichenbach, The Fhilosop~ of StRce and Time, 
tr. by Maria Reichenbach and Jobil eUrid. ew York: 
Dover Publ. Inc., 1958), P• 288. 
level do not have this sort of' meaning. True, a 
probability meaning for statements of the second 
level can be constructed by computing probabili-
ties ot the third level~ but then new statements 
are introduced that do not have a probability 
meaning. In other words, a probability meaning 
can be constructed for every limit statement, 
but not tor !!!•l 
Our axioms 1rely 1 on such an ontological Incom-
pleteness in accordance with our conception of' meaning. 
This is to say that the virility of' these axioms relies 
on the inductive inference of' continuity rather than the 
deductive assertions of' dis-continuous verifiability. 
This leaves the future open, considered as Future, 
1per se. 1 
2 • From Discrete to Continuous Probability 
Sequences: a Neo-Duality 
Paralleling our earlier construction of' two 
possible interpretations of the same space, each of' which 
can be derived from the axioms of' probability~ quantum, 
phenomena, with its dualistic appearances of' particle 
and wave~ has led to the following (apparent) dilemma: 
considering matter to be composed of' discontinuous 
particles~ how do we explain their occasional wave-like 
behavior? On, on the other hand, supposing matter to be 
composed of' a continuous substratum which supports waves, 
1aeichenbach, Theory or Probability, op. cit., 
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how do we explain corpuscular phenomena? Of course, such 
a dilemma evolves only from the presupposition of a two-
valued epistemology (or, "epistemological physics") which, 
1n assuming matter to have either the one or the other 
ureal" constitution, would be directly opposed to any 
doctrine denying absolute physical reality. Thus any 
neutrality toward the wave-particle paradox1 would be 
2 diametrically opposed to any "realistic" claim asserting 
the concepts of physics to isomorphically correspond to 
an external reality of independently existing things. 
For those who recognize the particle-wave distinc-
,tion as a dilemma badly in need of rectification (by way 
of unification), fascinating solutions have been proposed. 
Schr6dinger suggested that particles are actually only 
illusions; what "appears" as a particle is "in reality" 
; ' 
only the crest of a wave group-. When it was seen that 
such wave crests rapidly leveled off and thus lost their 
corpuscular appearance, the~.:: wave-interpretation (seeking 
to unify the particle-wave duality by explaining particles 
through waves) was quickly replaced (in strict reactionary 
manner) by the counter proposal of Max Born,3 namely that 
lElevated by Niels Bohr and Heisenberg to a 'funda-
mental principle' of duality inherent in all matter. 
2In the Einsteinean sense that there can be either 
discrete particles ~ continuous waves in matter, not both. 
3M. Born, Philosophical Quarterly, 3 (1953), p. 139. 
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what "appears" as a wave intensity is "in reality" a .prob-
ability density of particles as the real constituents of 
matter. Although Born's unitary particle-interpretation is 
widely accepted in physics today, there is apparently no 
need for giving an explanation as to why particles ought to 
obey wave-like laws in their statistical behavior. After 
all, it was just such an inquisitive nature, prompting an 
investigation of the wave crests themselves, which eventu-
ally broke down Schr6dinger 1s wave-interpretation of 
particle appearances. Instead a quiet neutrality has 
suddenly appeared, awkwardly suspended above the initial 
reactionary proposal of Born. This tendency seems to be in 
accord with the beliefs of Niels Bohr1 that wave appearances 
of particles are manifestations of a fundamental irreducible 
trait of nature displaying particle as well as wave features 
in complimentary fashion, without permitting a decision in 
favor of one or the other "pictorialization." 
such neutrality does. not follow.from Born's counter-
theory. The legitimacy of subjugating the statistical 
behavior of particles to wave-like laws muat be explicitly 
established, thoroughly exploited. In the fog of neutrality 
only the statement of the principle of indeterminancy is 
clearly visible. It li-terally glissons with the epistemo-
1.~1~a l -premise , "Nothing ·can be determined and this is the 
lN. Bohr f Atom :Physics and Human Knowledge (New York: 
John Wiley, 1958J. 
truth." Then it leaves us thinking, ·iwhich is It, the 
particle or the wave~'~? .. While refraining from a denial 
of the necessity of a "lack of" as the inherent impetus 
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ot one's psychology, we wish merely to raise the question 
concerning the legality of absolute coordinates ( •Either 
x or y') as determining factors, first in one's linguistic 
framework and then,(in chronological order),his ontologi-
cal structure. Accordingly, we do not wish to propose 
that the principle of indeterminancy itself is unreliable, 
but only that the grounds upon which it is based (viz., 
the grounds asserting the duality of particle and wave 
as irreducible co-existing realities) are questionable. 
Roughly resembling the conditions Which prompted 
the Laplacean revolution, this temporary impasse between 
two theories concerning the real constitution of matter 
can be transcended by redefining the concept of duality. 
We have done this in the case of the two geometric inter-
pretations of the same space by revealing the space built 
up by spatial coOrdinates to be irreversibly extended 
into the more inclusive interpretation or a space built 
up by temporal coordinates. Continuous probabil!ty 
sequences were seen to be the generalization of discontinu-
ous probability sequences, but it was insisted that the 
former could be conceived only by way of the latter 
(viz., by employing relative probabilities as in the 
continuous form of Bayes 1 rule). With this in mind it 
shall now be held that although the interpretations ot 
•continuity' and 'discontinuity• are indeed dual reali-
ties'· they are not to be thought ot as epistemologically 
co-existing realities. Continuity shall be presented as 
the fundamental backdrop ot all discontinuous interpre-
tations, a 'sinister' backdrop, tor it can be reached 
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only by way of an inductive inference made tram a statisti-
cal grouping ot discontinuous moments, and by the time 
such an inference is made, the continuous space which it 
interprets is a legitimate memory. 
At first sight it may appear paradoxical that the 
postulate ot continuity should be at the root ot a 
branch ot physics (viz., Quantum Mechanics) notorious tor 
its discontinuous events. But the apparent paradox dis-
solves upon the realization that the occurrence ot dis-
continuous transitions tram state to state are acausal 
events controlled not by a strict causality but by 
statistical law which is itself foreshadowed by the 
postulate ot continuity. This is to say that_ the very 
concept ot a continuity postulate requires discontinuous 
Jum\lS rrom state to state, tor it is only atter the 
statistical behavior ot such discontinuous chance-sequences 
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has been collected that an inference can (and, indeed, 
~) be made toward the concept of cause-effect continuity. 
It is only after several spatially related positions of an 
object in an attribute space occurring at certain regularly 
spaced1 time intervals have been 11cellected" that an 
' ' inference can be made, solely from the reference class of 
these discontinuous points-in-space, to the concept of 
continuous notion, i.e., to the assertion "the object ~ 
moving." Thus, en the basis of a statistically derived 
order of discontinuous spatial points (sequences of events), 
that is, by using the principle of common cause which 
stresses the existence of an antecedent cause common to twe 
contemporary events A am B, if P(A•B)>P(A)•P(B), we find 
that to causally relate discontinuous events (~o give an 
order to them inductively) baa actually required the 
assumption or continuous cause-effect relations. The point 
1s that we can only proceed from a statistical collection 
of static states to the inverse inference of a common 
cause. But such an inference itself presupposed the 
aaaumpt1on or a continuous relatioaship between the two 
t1M-div14ed spatial points (sequences or events). 
consequently, 1nverses1nterence are seen to presuppose 
inductive 1nf'erences. Thus although the "starting point" 
l.rh1a "regularity" is statistically confirmed. 
appears to be from a static position, any explanation 
concerning the significance of this position requires 
the reduction ot this static order (e.g., two simul-
taneous occurrences) to a past interaction which in turn 
explains their improbable coincidences (order being the. 
exception in a world of chance) by their purpose rather 
than by their cause. The explanation of the discontinuous 
coincident events, in leading to finality rather than to 
causality, thus exposes the inductive concern for 
continuity, the assumption ot whicb then explains rather 
than is-explained-by, the idea ot a common cause as a 
"deus ex ma.china •11 For statistically ruled events, in 
ordinary games of chance as well as in quantum tests, 
1 
violate the law or sufficient causation. Statistically 
ruled events cannot be explained except as post-inter-
action states. In this sense there is sufficient reason 
for insufficient causation. There are elementary reasons 
tor the lack of sufficient causation tor the statistical 
character or •atomic 1 events. These reasons come under 
the inductive assumption of cause-effect continuity. 
It has long been known that the law of unitary 
(continuous) transformation is at the root of •wave inter-
ference.• But the general implication for natural 
lNot to be contused with the law of sufficient 
reason. 
philosophy is entirely missed it one clings to a funda-
mental particle-wave duality as a principle in its own 
right. •wave interference• can be explained on the basis 
or simple non-quantal postulates of continuity. As an 
example, this is the same as saying "pain" can be 
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explained only on the basis of a statistical collection of 
discontinuous event-memories, viz., the memory of a state 
where the pain was missing and the memory ot a state in 
which the memory-of-the-state-where-the-pain-was-missing 
was interrupted by the pain itself. These two discontinu-
ous states can be compared with the states 1A = a sunny 
day 1 and 1C =a subsequent change in the weather, used as 
.. 
illustrations in previous sections. Although neither can 
exhaustively be called the cause of the other, C is 
labeled as an effect of an occurrance intervening between 
A and C which can be called •a sudden thunderstorm• B or, 
in the case of the pain-example, the pricking of a finger 
by a pin. In either case, it (the pin) as cause, is not 
remembered; only that state whieh it interr~pted, (A), and 
that state which it interrupted with, (C~ is experienced. 
The point is that B-as-cause must be inferred from A •C-as-
effects which were actual experiences.1 It is at this 
1Refer to the axiomatic derivation of the quantity 
P(A•C,Bk) in Bayes• rule. 
point that B shall be established as an eternal influence 
inversely interred from remembered (statistically 
collected) effects. All soli~istic tendencies must dis-
appear with the very awareness of c, the explanation of 
which requires the necessary inference from observable 
events A •C ("phenomena") to the unobservable agent B 
( "interphenomena") which is itself res pons ib le for the 
distinction between A and C in the first place. 
Thus it has been our purpose, by employing as 
illustrative examples both those crude in generality (as 
thunderstorms and pin-pricking) and those not-so-crude 
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and more technically to the point (as geometrical probabili-
ties and thermodynamics) to suggest, in general, the 
necessity of meta-interpretations (meta-extensions) for 
the explanation of all events which must appear in static, 
discontinuous orders. In particular we have tried to show 
that a classical approach relying on a two-valued construct 
cannot do without the concept ot probability. The Justi-
fication for this position evolved from the discovery that 
the events in a so-called deterministic empiricism could 
be described only as discontinuous (quantum) 'Jumps• from 
' 
state to state; 1 jumps 1 not obeying deterministic cause-
effect relations. Instead these :jumps· (individual events) 
could be explained only by ascribing to statistical law. 
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The need consequently arose of replacing the •old' cal-
culus of two-valued logic, applicable only to one-by-one 
(deterministic) conclusions., with a more general, more 
inclusive calculus, one capable of coping with statisti-
cal distributions. The essentially two-valued normative 
function must be replaced by an axiomatic structure 
capable of more extensive empirical (eg., geometrical) 
visualizations. Accordingly, axioms were developed as the 
basis of a calculus of probability and it was seen that, 
within such a framework, statistical collections of 
discrete events could not be explained without the induc-
tive assumption of axioms of infinity and continuity. 
The concept of 1duality' arose when it was seen that 
although it was necessary to presuppose continuous 
probability sequences in the evaluation of discontinuous 
probability sequences it was nevertheless impossible to 
directly approach a continuous sequence except through the 
guise or discrete (or, relative) probabilities, as in the 
continuous form of Bayes 1 rule. Thus the necessity of 
probability controlled discontinuous quantum jumps follows 
from the principle of thermodynamical continuity. Due to 
the statistical collecting necessary in the evaluation of 
information concerning a particular state the time element 
was introduced. 1 Information 1 could explain a certain 
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state only as a post interaction state. Though time 
itself is continuous, its continuity can only be inferred 
from a statistical grouping or discontinuous moments as 
having already occurred. The continuity, the motion in 
our information formulas is always or a negative degree. 
We are told only that motion has occurred, not that it is 
- -
occurring.1 or course, without discontinuous moments or 
recognized coincidences the idea or continuous time would 
be unapproachable (remembering the holistic properties or 
a topological structure remain undeterminable if restricted 
to :Jntini tes imal regions) • It is in this sense that both 
continuous time and the discontinuous moments or temporal-
ity must both be said to be realities, but not equally 
co-existing realities. They •exist' at different levels. 
They constitute a neo-duality. 
On the surface of a general re-evaluation or the 
notion or duality the following definitions begin to 
appear: 
[a) "real" shall refer both to the discrete stepping 
" ' 
stones or all cognitive processes (viz., single 
fictitious events), as well as to the continuous 
backdrop which must be assumed in order to 
evaluate the simple event; 
lAs a somewhat •weak' analogy consider the infor-
mation wbioh tells us the brightness or the sun at a par-
ticular time~ which actually tells us 'only' the condition 
of the sun 1~ minutes ago; as to its present intensity, we 
.. t wait 18 minutes • 
{b] "actual" shall refer to what is epistemically 
' . 
real and thus to the ensemble of' non-existents 
found in the inclusive similarity disjunct~on 
[(a V b) ·i"=b] necessarily utilized as reference 
class in any rational appraisal of' a single 
fictitious event, viz., those events which flank 
our existence; 
[c ] "Absolute Perfection" is meaningless; 
[d] ''Absolute Certainty" ·is meaningless; 
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(Neither [c] or [d) can possibly be inferred merely on 
the basis of' a similarity disjunction of' chance distri-
butions, each of' which is a discontinuous, incomplete 
trace, tet such disjunctions are literally •all we have•). 
[e] "continuous Limit" is cognitively significant, 
. . 
for although it cannot be deduced from the 
similarity disjunction it must be assumed 
inductively antecedent to an evaluation of' inf'or-
mation. 
CHAPrER XII 
FINAL NC7J.'ES CONCERNING THE ONTOLOO ICAL 
RAMIFICATIONS OF A NEO~UALITY 
By permitting us to interpret continuous probabil~ 
ity sequences our normative function supplies us with an 
instrument capable of constructing the continuous lines of 
two-valued causal connection as probability sequences. 
Consequently 1 the 'intentional meaning 1 or causal continuity 
becomes non-verbal in the sense tbat it must be interred as 
existing 1nterphenomenally behind each recorded series or 
trace-phenomena; the intentional awareness of a particle 
in continuous motion becoming significant only through the 
collective appreciation or so many discontinuously 
scattered-markings. Continuity only through the effect-or-
continuity. The 'disappointment 1 lies somewhere within 
our definition or "actual." 
. ' 
The perceiver and the thing-perceived: the cogni-
tive acceptance of the former cannot be reconciled with an 
intelligible comprehension ot the latter. Isomorphic 
correspoDdence and its two-valued normative function must 
be quietly dropped ott into the night 1 and within that 
small interval separating the dawn the scaffold must be 
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quickly reconstructed. There is no intermediate realm 
between the thing-perceived and the (fictitious) idea-
of-the-thing-perceived. All beliefs no matter how 
reverously contrived and ecclesiastically orientated must 
be pauperized, 1n the final analysis, to the status or a 
"thing," a trace, a fictitious fixation. So far there 
have been no dreams that have taken wing. Not one man 
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has been born light enough, i!_l· enough, to leave the eartht 
Yet, while we are denied the more pompous forms of 
Idealism we are simultaneously restricted to an epistemology 
of Chimerical actualities. Indeed, the universe has dwindled. 
But even this •ract 1 is insignificant: how can the death 
or Determinism be heralded as a major event of the day, 
when in fact it never existed? Nevertheless, something is 
happening. Although we are left to work with only caprici-
ous probability controlled quantum jumps we are destined to 
discover lying somewhere behind such apparently desultory 
chance distributions, the non-capricious, non-desultory 
Continuum. JILny shall be disappointed, for the Continuum 
in being logically derived, cannot be an object-of-Belief. 
Belief is empirically rational. only. Any order which we 
may impose upon a certain series or discrete traces 
deobstructs the recognition of a particular frequency or 
appearances. {We find that we cannot sit back and take 
note of a surface being shredded by the spray of machine 
bullets without exposing the tact of 'recognition.• The 
order, somehow embedded within the evenly distributed 
rows of punctured holes • • • how did it get there? 
Effects, each and every one of them, plainly delineated 
effects. Effects? "No, unique events, 11 says the mother 
ot a child struck in the skull by one of them. No, ••• 
effects • Blame the Continuum!) 
[f] "horror": a syntactically adequate synonym 
denoting the awareness of future uncertainty; 
(g] "Purpose": restricted to epistemological pro-
jects, not transferable to the Continuum, 'per 
se'; 
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The two-valued world is falling to pieces and man 
does well to concentrate all of his attention upon the 
remaining fragments of actuality, the fragments that have 
been there since the beginning. Truth-falsity, action-
Qounteraction, impulse-recoil; each at its diametrically 
opposedt:position of a wheel in motion. A wheel drunk with 
tbe monotony of .,unvarying repetition. A symmetry sick 
with the oil of perfection. Nevertheless., we see that 
behind the nobility of all its gestures of incontestable 
absolutism there lurks the spectre of the ridiculousness 
of it all--that the presupposition of an underlying rhythm 
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of perfection is not only sublime, but absurd. And because 
we see this in time we .have seen fit to preserve the love 
ot Euclid in our subastral house of passion already gaudy 
with mixed imagery. We have succeeded by simply extending 
the limitations ot our linguistic scaffolding (and conse-
quently reducing the periphery of our emotions). 
On its wobbly axle the wheel rolls steadily downhill; 
there are no brakes, no ball bearings, no balloon 
tires. The wheel is falling apart, but the revolu-
tion is intact ••• •1 
Concluding Note 
The squeeze ot contingency required is critical, is 
cruel. It is the reluctant elucidation of the mysterious 
thrill of invisibility coupled with the occult thrill of 
reluctancy. It is the predicament of explaining a tour-
dimensic>nal universe in three dimensional terms, the pre-
dicament often making requisite the remarkable tendency to 
become what is called "mad": to all at once become 
"illogica~" when compromise becomes impossible 1 when 
tendency-itself becomes stagnate and stagnancy-itself 
becomes· irredeemable. It is to dissolve dichotomy with 
analogy to principles of non-division arid to integrate 
results (each elemental phasm with phantasm, each refrac-
tional distortion with its succeeding hallucinatory 
lHenry Miller 1 Tropic of Cancer (New York: Grove 
Press Inc. 1 1961), P• 166. 
distortion) only to regard such juggernaut methodology 
as non-decapitory and repeat illusion towards conclusion 
(towards truth? "towards Truth irxleed, towards unity 
and zero) towards the cruel Essentiality of Continuous 
Becoming which, in being unapproachable in itself yet 
necessarily so, has become the essence of frustration, 
azxl the epitomy of delight. 
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